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Disclaimer 
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Glossary of abbreviations 
 
AS   
 
Accommodation Supplement, housing costs assistance available to 
homeowners, boarders and renters not in Housing New Zealand 
Corporation houses 
 
CCS  Childcare Subsidy 
 
CTC  Child Tax Credit, a per-child payment to families that existed prior to 
in-work payment; an additional payment to low- to middle-income 
families not receiving other assistance; to be replaced by in-work 
payment in 2006 
 
EMTR  Effective marginal tax rate 
 
FAM  Family support, financial assistance paid by MSD and IRD to 
qualifying families with dependent children; currently consists of FS, 
CTC, FTC, and PTC 
 
FACS  Families and Children Surveys, United Kingdom 
 
FIA    Family Income Assistance 
 
FS    Family Support, a per-child payment available to families whether in 
or out of work, to help with the costs of dependent children 
 
FTC    Family Tax Credit, a payment per annum to families not in receipt of 
benefits to guarantee a minimum in-work income 
 
HNZC    Housing New Zealand Corporation 
 
IRD    Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand 
 
IWP    In-Work Payment, a per-family payment made to the principal carer 
to help parents move into and stay in paid work 
 
MSD    Ministry of Social Development, New Zealand 
 
OSCAR
   
Out-of-School Care and Recreation subsidy, a childcare subsidy with 
payments to providers for school-age children up to 13-years-old 
 
PTC    Parental Tax Credit, financial assistance for the first 56 days after a 
child is born where paid parental leave is not taken 
 
PRILIF   Programme of Research Into Low-income Families, United Kingdom 
series of surveys that preceded FACS 
 
UB   
 
Unemployment Benefit: a benefit paid to adults who are able to work 
but unable to find employment 
 
WFF    Working for Families, programme of changes to accommodation, out-
of-work and in-work assistance introduced over the period 2004–
2008, announced in Budget 27 May 2004 
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1 Introduction to the purpose of this study 
 
Last year the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) commissioned research to 
review international evaluation methodology and literature to help in the preparation 
of evaluation of the Working for Families (WFF) policy, introduced in 2004 to assist 
working low- and middle-income families in New Zealand. The results of the study 
are in two parts: Working for Families: Methodological considerations in evaluating 
the programme and Working for Families: Literature review of evaluation evidence.  
 
This first part, the literature review, reviews international literature, comparing the 
economic impact of WFF with those of welfare reforms elsewhere. It introduces the 
central issues within the New Zealand and WFF context using a combination of 
cross-national comparisons and an intensive country or programme literature review. 
This provides a good balance between depth and coverage and enables a consistent 
method of review. 
 
Research findings are aimed at government social researchers and will enable 
evaluation to be carried out on WFF based on a sound understanding of current 
international evidence and benchmarking.  
 
For more detailed information on the WFF programme and the rationale behind these 
studies, refer to Working for Families: Methodological considerations in evaluating 
the programme. 
 
1.1 Overview of the literature review  
 
The review addresses evaluation evidence in each of the five key areas: take-up of 
assistance; making work pay; poverty, social assistance and standards of living; 
childcare subsidies; and child outcomes.  
 
Selection criteria and issues of interest were agreed with MSD and relate to the 
evaluation issues for WFF. The key issue is how evaluations are selected. Some 
countries were excluded because analogous programmes did not exist or relevant 
evaluations not carried out, or because evaluations were not sufficiently formalised or 
documented. Similar considerations reduced the number of documents available for 
review in some other countries. Because of this, the method of selection for literature 
is outlined separately for each topic. 
 
1.1.1 Take-up of assistance 
 
Take-up of assistance is an issue where there is a desire to ensure that people take 
advantage of the assistance available to them from the WFF package. The main 
theoretical explanations of take-up and their relationship to institutional approaches 
to income transfers are outlined. The research first draws, in part, from recent 
comparative overviews of take-up of transfers, which provide a clear basis to select 
literature across countries.  
 
An intensive literature review covers the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
of America (USA), focusing on programmes for working age people. These countries 
are the only countries with a large national literature on take-up of assistance.  
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1.1.2  Employment and making work pay 
 
Two kinds of literature are examined here: a review of the theoretical literature, 
mostly labour economics, and a review across countries of how far the evidence fits 
with such theoretical predictions. Evidence was sought mostly from the large body of 
US literature; UK literature that has followed and interacted with the US literature; 
and the smaller group of cross-national papers from the OECD and from studies of 
European programmes by the European Commission.  
 
The USA, UK and Canada provide most of the review evidence for employment 
effects for families with children. The policies implemented in these countries have 
rarely been “pure” in-work supplementation but have been accompanied by active 
labour market programmes of varying types and contemporary changes to eligibility 
for out-of-work benefits for the same general target group (families with children). 
Where possible, the focus is split between sole parents and couple parents.  
 
1.1.3  Poverty 
 
The approach here is to assess how far poverty and living standards have changed 
in other countries as a result of changes in social assistance, in-work benefits and 
housing allowances. However, the cumulative effects of the WFF package are not 
matched by recent policy changes elsewhere and elements of the WFF package will 
therefore be taken separately. 
 
The intensive review of literature on poverty and living standard outcomes uses the 
same set of programmes in the USA, UK and Canada as is used in the previous 
section on employment and making work pay. This allows a more consistent 
discussion of the link between outcomes for employment and incomes, and hence a 
more consistent analysis of the evidence on poverty and hardship. 
 
1.1.4  Childcare and child outcomes 
 
The review of childcare and child outcomes is much broader and covers a wider 
range of issues than the reviews on take-up, making work pay and poverty. Here the 
review was guided largely by the need for breadth rather than depth of coverage, to 
meet the request for information on a wide range of issues that might be of relevance 
to the evaluation of WFF.  
 
Two contrasting groups of countries were chosen for the reviews of childcare and 
child outcomes: three English-speaking countries (in addition to New Zealand) and 
four Nordic countries. Australia, the UK and the US were chosen because they share 
many characteristics of the New Zealand childcare market and have recently placed 
increasing emphasis on monitoring key child outcomes. While these countries are 
different from New Zealand in some respects, similarities in the development of 
childcare services and policies to improve child outcomes mean they have had to 
confront some similar challenges – trying to increase both childcare use and parental 
employment, and in improving some key child outcomes. Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden were included because childcare services there have developed very 
differently, with what are considered to be better outcomes for children. 
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Some potential problems of terminology and language regarding participation and 
take-up became apparent in this review. We clarify these below for subsequent 
discussion of take-up of income maintenance programmes. 
 
This term “take-up” itself is used in three ways in the literature. At its simplest, “take-
up” refers to a gross measure of any participation in a programme. This can include 
claims made or approaches to the programme without evidence of entitlement or 
enrolment. In a more applied sense, “take-up” refers to effective enrolment; that is, 
those who claim and receive the programme This may be called effective 
participation, and it is very common to see reports of the number and composition of 
programme recipients reported in administrative data on such programmes. These 
two meanings describe participation primarily, and are used across a wider range of 
programmes; for instance, take-up of primary health care services, use of leisure and 
sports facilities and participation in voluntary programmes of a variety of sorts. “Take-
up” may also be expressed as a rate of participation, where numbers receiving the 
programme are expressed as a percentage of an underlying population with a set of 
general characteristics as appropriate. Such figures can show the coverage of 
transfers on poor or working poor populations, for instance. 
 
The third use of the term is a measurement of how many entitled people claim and 
receive the programme, and can be thought of as a measure of evaluative 
participation. Measuring rates of take-up can assess how well the programme is 
reaching the intended target group and thus can identify those who do not participate 
but are entitled to do so as well as those who claim and receive. It is important to 
emphasise the term “entitlement” at this point. Measures of programme take-up 
explicitly attempt to measure how far the “entitled” population is covered by the 
transfer in question. This means that the rules of entitlement have to be sufficiently 
certain to be captured through data on individuals. For example, if programme x is 
available only to those individuals with income below level y then take-up is the rate 
at which x covers all of population with incomes less than y and not just those who 
have claimed and receive x. If we compare this to a more discretionary scheme, 
where programme z covers the needs of only those with incomes below y who 
additionally fit some discretionary principle that cannot be identified consistently in 
the wider population because it relies on administrative discretion that can award 
transfers or not to people with the same circumstances, then there is no certainty 
about calculating the size of the target population because of the discretionary rule. 
This means it is possible to calculate coverage but not to assess how far entitlement 
is taken up. 
 
The evaluative notion of “take-up” is the main focus of a large body of literature on 
the performance of income maintenance programmes and is the primary concern of 
this review. This meaning of take-up is very commonly expressed as a rate – the 
number receiving the programme divided by the number entitled to do so (see 
Bryson et al.2006). 
 
Problems of terminology remain within this third meaning, because the terms “take-
up” and “non-take-up” are used but are mirror images of the same aggregate pattern 
of behaviour. “Non-take-up” concentrates on individuals who are entitled to but do not 
receive the programme, whereas “take-up” describes the overall problem. The 6 
literature generally prefers the term “take-up”, and this term will be used here to show 
the extent to which the programme reaches its target group. This means that “non-
take-up” is directly inferred as the corollary.  
 
Why is take-up important? Currie clarifies two of the main issues facing policy makers,  
… targeting will always be imperfect. Some of those who take up benefits will not 
‘deserve’ them, and some of those who are eligible for benefits will not take them 
up. If take up by eligible individuals is low, the programme may fail to reach its 
main goal …. If take up by ineligibles is too high, then government revenues will 
be diverted from other productive uses. (2004:4)  
 
Atkinson differentiates between concerns about “effectiveness” of transfer 
programmes and concerns about the outcomes of non-take-up “as a cause of low 
incomes” (Atkinson 1989:191). Both concerns about effectiveness and income 
outcomes are relevant to MSD, evaluators and to policy makers in New Zealand, as 
the WFF package is designed to:  
·  ensure people who work are better off as a result of their effort 
·  ensure families have incomes sufficient to provide their children with a 
decent standard of living  
·  ensure people receive their full entitlements  
·  simplify the benefit and tax based family income assistance structure.
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Making sure that take-up is optimised can be a key part of ensuring incomes are 
sufficient and work is rewarded. 
 
2.1.1 WFF and take-up terminology  
 
How do these and other terminology problems impact on the WFF package of 
income transfers in New Zealand? WFF is put forward as an “integrated package” of 
reform across the following programmes: 
·  means-tested housing allowances (Accommodation Supplement) 
·  means-tested support for families with children – both those in work and out of 
work (Family Support, In-Work Payment and Child Tax Credit and Parental Tax 
Credit) 
·  means-tested childcare subsidy (improvements to Childcare Subsidy and Out-of-
School Care and Recreation subsidy) 
·  categorical means-tested Invalid’s Benefit – where changes to work rules will 
encourage employment. 
 
The non-trivial problem in describing the literature alongside these programmes 
stems from the names given to the programmes. All literature from the UK (the 
largest individual source country and the most readily comparable to WFF 
interventions) and most from the USA use the term “benefits” to describe the range of 
income maintenance programmes available – housing allowances, social assistance, 
and in-work tax credits for instance.
2 However, the New Zealand Government largely 
avoids “benefit” language and has a range of differently named programmes across 
both MSD and Inland Revenue Department (IRD) that encompass cash programmes 
of very different kinds as well as tax credits.  
                                                  
1 Social Development and Employment Minister Steve Maharey in A new approach to social assistance 
– media release. http://www.msd.govt.nz/media-information/press-releases/2004/pr-2004-05-27-3.html 
2 It may be of interest that the distinction in terminology within Britain between contributory “benefits” and 
means-tested and other forms of social assistance, was addressed in the 1960s as part of a wider 
concern to de-stigmatise social assistance – in particular for pensioners. If removal of stigma and an 
improved equity in perception of entitlement across transfers is an aim then differences in terminology 
and treatment could be one area for further consideration. 7 
 
MSD administers: 
·  benefits – the term “benefit” is used solely for MSD-generated core benefits such 
as the Unemployment Benefit, Domestic Purposes Benefit, Sickness Benefit, 
Emergency Benefit, Widow’s Benefit, and Invalids’ Benefit. 
·  supplements – these include Accommodation Supplement, Special Benefit 
·  subsidy – this includes the Childcare Subsidy. 
 
IRD administers: 
·  tax credits – such as Parental Tax Credit, Family Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, In-
Work Payment.  
 
The term “benefits” can thus confuse a New Zealand reader if used across the entire 
WFF package as it might be in the British sense, but a generic term is needed 
nevertheless. We employ the term “transfers”; however, in quotations from the 
literature the term “benefits” will appear regularly and should not be interpreted 
narrowly.  
 
Different forms of income maintenance have different rules and different cultures of 
administration and clientele. These give rise to differing words for elements of 
participation and take-up. As the imaginary example discussed in section 2.1 
explains, “entitlement” is a key concept. The term “eligibility” is more ambiguous as 
eligible people may claim and be considered but not determined as entitled for 
reasons that are not to do with their circumstances alone. Budget constraints may 
mean that eligible people are not entitled, for instance. In the USA many eligible 
people are turned away from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
social assistance programme because there is no underlying legal entitlement to 
programmes even if they are eligible to apply. Measuring take-up for such 
programmes can look at participation – who comes forward and who receives the 
programme – and can describe this in terms of coverage of an inexactly drawn target 
population. But because there are no consistently applied rules it is not usually 
possible to accurately estimate a wider population of potentially entitled people and 
this means a take-up rate cannot be precisely measured.  
 
WFF mostly comprises of a set of regular transfer programmes in which a person can 
participate and obtain additional income if their circumstances fit those described in 
regulations and their income falls within the statutory parameters. We use the term 
“entitlement” rather than eligibility across all of these WFF transfers.  
 
The entitlement approach is crucial to take-up estimation and underpins the 
methodologies for establishing take-up rates as described in the accompanying 
methodology paper (Bryson et al. 2006). The basis of the measurement of take-up is 
that entitlement can be identified, usually through secondary analysis of household 
survey data that can capture the circumstances of the family (whether they have 
children and work sufficient hours, for instance) and the recipient population, 
expressed as a percentage of the entitled population. 
 
Another term with problematic associations is “claimant”, which in New Zealand is 
deemed to refer only to clients of the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC). The 
terms “applicant” or “client” are preferred in New Zealand, depending upon the 
context. In this instance, the widespread British use of the term “claimant” is inexact 
and can be misleading as it can refer to both those making a claim and to those who 
receive transfers. We use the term “recipient” to describe those who receive 
transfers. However, the process of claiming a benefit is not just one of applying, and 8 
thus the term “applicant” (the term used most often in New Zealand) is not always 
sufficient to capture the whole process. Many applicants may ask for forms but do not 
fill them in, for instance. This distinction is crucial because the literature on take-up 
that most directly addresses concerns about access to WFF has moved to look at 
take-up as the outcome of a mediated claim process. This includes the decision to 
apply and to submit an application together with subsequent actions of determination 
that together add up to “making a claim”. For this reason we use the term “claim” to 
refer to an application for a transfer that is both submitted and considered. 
 
2.1.2 Take-up of the WFF transfer package 
 
The issue of take-up for the WFF reform is focused primarily on the issue of claiming 
entitlement to means-tested income transfer programmes of different kinds – both 
individually and as a package of entitlements for those who are entitled to more than 
one element.  
 
There are several conceptual difficulties in establishing how take-up and non-take-up 
can be established and measured.  
 
First, there is the ability for someone to take up one or more parts of the WFF means-
tested transfer package, without necessarily claiming their full entitlement across the 
package. For example, this may be true of Childcare Subsidy, independent of 
underlying entitlement to Family Support (FS) and In-Work Payment (IWP).  
 
Second, the payment of some elements of WFF through the tax system with year-
end reconciliation means that entitlement at any point in time is more difficult to 
establish as changes in circumstances and reconciliation are not contemporaneous. 
The experience of Australia and the UK in this respect suggests that public support is 
reduced for programmes that endemically overpay and produce perceived 
indebtedness (Whiteford et al. 2003, Howard 2004, and Griggs et al. 2005). Such 
public perception can thus affect take-up in ways that are discussed further below, as 
fear of debt from overpayment is consistently found to be associated with non-take-
up (NAO 2002:55).  
 
Third, there are a variety of perceptions of take-up that can be followed and related 
directly to its measurement, and which come from the institutional implementation of 
the programme(s). These are covered below.  
 
The main methodological questions surrounding the data needs and identification and 
measurement of take-up, are covered in the methodological report (Bryson et al. 2006).  
 
2.1.2.1 Structure of the take-up review 
 
MSD has two primary concerns with regard to WFF: awareness of assistance and 
ease of access. Both these concerns are well founded and well covered in the 
literature. But while awareness of transfer programmes is a factor in applying for 
transfers, it is often not sufficient to either apply for a transfer or to subsequently 
ensure that any application becomes a claim for that transfer. Indeed, findings in the 
early 1970s in the UK that some people did not make a claim, even after they had 
been identified as entitled and given information, led to a more robust and 
comprehensive analysis of take-up. The problem of informed non-take-up means that 
the issue of awareness has to be taken into account in defining and exploring the 
non-take-up of transfer programmes. It also means that improving knowledge and 
awareness of programmes can potentially improve take-up.  
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Ease of access is also important for several reasons. First, it affects claim behaviour. 
Most approaches to studying take-up associate the process of making a claim with 
costs and trade-offs at the individual level; others cite institutional factors as 
important. Problems of access can be both individual and institutional. But 
institutional ease of access is not a commonly agreed aim of policy. Indeed, some 
argue that social assistance and other poverty-related transfers should not be easy to 
access, in order to improve targeting, so that making a claim “arises from a self-
selection process in which only the most deserving people are thought to apply, and 
there is no incentive for the non-poor to pretend to be poor...” (Creedy 2002:151). 
Easing institutional ease of access also points to a variety of initiatives, approaches 
and programmes that can assist claims to be made – through outreach, telephone 
call centre and web-based service provision, for instance.  
 
This part of the review puts the issues of awareness and ease of access into the 
wider theoretical and empirical approaches to take-up. Three main sections each 
address a central question: 
1.  How is take-up conceptualised? 
2.  Who fails to take up and why? 
3.  How can take-up be maximised? 
 
Splitting the discussion in this way produces “overlaps” but also builds as we 
proceed, so lessons from the theoretical conceptualisation and empirical 
measurement of take-up can be brought together in a concluding overview that 
refocuses on core WFF concerns.  
 
We will not cover issues that relate to underlying problems of measurement of take-
up here. The accurate identification of entitlement in survey and administrative data 
and the ability to estimate take-up rates accurately in the face of measurement error 
is a key methodological concern and covered in the methodology paper (Bryson et al. 
2006). However, we sometimes have to mention measurement error in order to 
contextualise findings on the explanations of take-up and the characteristics of those 
who do not.  
 
2.2 Conceptualisation of take-up 
 
The history of studies of take-up of means-tested transfers has grown largely from 
early studies in the UK and the USA that applied to out-of-work social assistance in 
the 1960s and expanded to in-work transfers and housing allowances in the 1970s 
and subsequently. Before the 1960s, the assumption that a national system of 
means-tested social assistance provided an effective minimum income guarantee 
held sway. Early studies of take-up emphasised this was not the case, particularly for 
pensioners in the UK, and that poverty was still prevalent despite the welfare state. 
Various studies throughout the 1970s used a range of approaches linked to 
improving uptake: “A general view emerged that non-take-up could be attributed to 
three main factors: ignorance, stigma and administrative complexity..., and that these 
three main factors interacted” (Corden 1999:142). 
 
Local studies in the 1970s in the UK also focused on a more active research remit, 
where surveys and campaigns, often associated with the burgeoning “welfare rights” 
movement, would provide information and advocacy in order to improve take-up. 
However, these studies increasingly found that information and awareness often did 
not lead to a claim. Problems in take-up could be tempered but not solved purely by 
providing information, advice and advocacy. The approach of these many local and 
other empirical studies was to measure take-up rather than try to explain it. This led 10 
to a position in British literature in the late 1970s where there was no clear 
explanatory framework for take-up. Retrospectively this period has been termed a 
“conceptual clutter” (Craig 1991). Clearer explanatory research evidence on take-up 
began to appear when theoretical models were put forward by psychologists and 
economists in the early 1980s. However, this theoretical modelling placed the main 
emphasis on the individual making (or not making) the claim for transfers. 
 
2.2.1 Psychological models 
Figure 2.1  Kerr psychological model 
 
Source: Kerr 1982, 1983 
 
Kerr produced a model for understanding take-up of transfers (British social 
assistance for the elderly) based on a sequential decision-making process in six 
stages (1982, 1983). Each stage was a necessary pre-condition to the next, which 
cumulatively built to the point where an application for social assistance was made 
(the Kerr model did not distinguish between claim and application). This model, 
based on “thresholds”, summarised in figure 2.1, gave rise to a long list of UK 
research that explored avenues opened up by the Kerr approach. Kerr’s main 
influence was a body of research that clarified decision making and its effects, but the 
Kerr idea of strict sequential thresholds has never held up in reality. Many of the 
supposed thresholds are actually aspects in the decision to claim that are held 
contemporaneously, and some beliefs and attitudes can counterbalance others. Also, 
the model was found to be too individual and ignored the important effect of peers 
(family and household members in the main) and the administrative process.  
 
Ritchie and Mathews (1982) put forward an alternative model that looked at up-take 
of housing allowances. They used a series of trade-offs between internal and 
external influences, such as the influence of peers, interventions to encourage claims 
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trade-offs. However, they found that, in addition to the trade-offs, an individual’s 
underlying perception of need and of their eligibility were crucial to making a claim. 
 
The literature that followed focused on the process of making a claim. This was an 
individual process of decision making mainly, but it can be mediated by peers and 
members of the household and by institutional factors. In the end, the theoretical 
models themselves have contributed mainly to questionnaire design for qualitative 
studies that have attempted to follow and explain the process of making or not 
making a claim for an income transfer. Most of this literature focused on elderly 
claimants of social assistance, although in the early 1980s a number of studies 
looked at claims for in-work transfers for families with children (called Family Income 
Supplement in the UK at the time) and later at the combination of work incentives 
and claiming in-work transfers. These studies appear most relevant to concerns for 
take-up of WFF and, in particular, In-Work Payment. 
 
In the US there has also been a limited use of small-scale qualitative work to explore 
claiming behaviour, but most work has focused on the food stamp programme 
(Bartlett et al. 1992 and McConnell and Ponza 1999). McConnell and Ponza, looked 
across elderly and working-poor populations and found factors relevant to the failure 
to take-up included information, perceived lack of need (particularly for the elderly), 
low levels of transfers, programme administration and hassle, and “stigma or other 
psychological reasons” (1999:x). This list, from their overview of US literature and 
experience, maps very well to the British research findings and adds extra weight to 
the generalisation of the following explanatory factors that flow from the British 
research literature. 
 
2.2.2 Explanatory factors for take-up: the claiming process 
 
What are the main explanatory factors identified in the literature that focus on the 
claim process for transfers for people of working age?  
 
Ignorance and awareness: It is worth first restating that knowledge or awareness of a 
programme is a necessary but not sufficient factor for taking the programme up. 
Much early research in the UK (summarised in Corden 1983 and Craig 1991) looked 
at advocacy and information supply and found that “providing advice and information 
often still did not trigger applications from people who said that the main reason for 
not claiming had been lack of knowledge” (Corden 1999:142).  
 
Perceptions of eligibility often proved to be the most prevalent barrier to making a 
claim. Such perceptions are partly based in information. The Corden study (1983) 
showed that newspaper and television advertising sometimes aroused awareness of 
the programme but information given was not often sufficient to form a perception of 
eligibility. Information from formal sources, state and voluntary sector organisations, 
solicitors and advice centres had a more direct influence on making a claim, but the 
most important source of information was often informal, through friends, family or 
work colleagues. Publicity on its own was found to often result in false perceptions of 
potential entitlement to the programme, as publicity often used a “model family” with 
stereotypically simple needs and income profiles. These had a tendency to be 
generalised into rules (Craig 1991). 
 
Individuals who perceived themselves as being in need were also more likely to 
claim, and these feelings of need were often a trade-off between information about 
eligibility and entitlement. A strong conviction about potential entitlement often 
overcame weak perceptions of being in need (ibid).  
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Understanding/complexity: Rules of entitlement are often complicated and can be 
difficult to understand. Early research tended to over-emphasise how complexity 
remained an issue even when knowledge of the programme existed (for instance, 
Taylor-Gooby 1976, Deacon and Bradshaw 1983). More recent UK studies confirmed 
that the more complicated the programme (or set of programmes) the more difficult 
the process of obtaining a basic knowledge and understanding of potential 
entitlement (Costigan et al. 1999). 
 
In addition there is the complexity associated with multiple entitlements and 
agencies. A consistent finding across the past 20 years is that UK applicants rarely 
understand that one piece of the “system” (ie the combination of local and central 
state bureaucracies and their agencies) is not in contact with others, and thus a claim 
or information given to one is not shared by all (most recently found in the review by 
the National Audit Office 2002). 
 
Combining take-up with entering work: There is the additional difficulty of 
understanding the potential “outcomes” from in-work transfers associated with a 
move into employment. Policy is designed to overcome economists’ concerns for 
work incentives, reducing replacement rates and making work pay. However, 
qualitative research into combined work entry and take-up show that perceptions of 
reservation wages
3 are linked more to household needs than labour market rewards. 
To be clearly understood, the net impact of potential transfers on family income and 
therefore on the actual and perceived risk of moving into work and changing income 
sources is crucial (McLaughlin et al. 1989, Ford et al. 1995). However, perceived 
hassle with changing entitlement and the disruption to family budgets caused by 
delays in in-work programme payment and the inherent delays in wage payment are 
often also crucial to whether take-up of in-work benefits is part of a larger decision to 
return to work (Ford et al. 1995). 
 
Stigma: The issue of stigma as a reason for non-take-up arises throughout a wide 
cross-section of the literature. There is a wide range of underlying theoretical 
positions regarding stigma. One is that receiving help from the state is contrary to 
being seen as independent and autonomous in a market driven society (Deacon and 
Bradshaw 1983). There is also the cultural legacy of earlier programmes; for 
instance, the Poor Law on the elderly population who remember its operation in pre-
1940s Britain. However, there is no clear cohort effect in British patterns of take-up 
that would support such a specific programme effect (Dornan 2003).
4 There is 
evidence from the USA that more recent changes to administrative practices to make 
public assistance more stigmatising help to deter claims (Evans 2001 and see also 
discussion below). US sociologists have stressed the “shame, embarrassment and 
social disapproval afflicting a claimant whose participation in a welfare program is 
observed by others or becomes known to others (ie family, friends, neighbours, 
employers, etc)” (Yaniv 1997:438). A German study of social assistance also linked 
questions about social attitudes and social participation to take-up and found that 
those who were not part of a social group, and thus open to social stigma, were more 
likely to take up assistance (Kayser and Frick 2000). Publicly identifiable actions 
associated with claiming food stamps in the USA have been criticised for being 
blatantly stigmatising as the special vouchers must be used in a public place to buy 
goods. “Some markets make the program even more salient by having specially 
marked check-out lines for those with food stamps” (Pettigrew 1980:222). Similar 
                                                  
3 The reservation wage is the income a person will have in their mind when seeking work. It is the figure 
that is needed to ensure their family is provided for, and the job-seeker will look for a wage that matches 
these expectations. 
4 This finding may be overtaken by more recent emerging evidence following large scale interventions to 
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criticisms of visible stigma have been made for children receiving free school meals 
in the UK (Storey and Chamberlain 2001).  
 
The Corden study of in-work programme found that attitudes towards the potentially 
stigmatising receipt of state help were largely overcome when it was linked to 
earnings and being in work – recipients tended to see themselves as belonging to the 
“respectable poor” (Corden 1983). However, this positive aspect of in-work benefits is 
a double-edged sword, for two reasons. First, Craig points out that being in work 
appears to act as a barrier to grasping eligibility (1991:549). Second, the lack of 
stigma for in-work transfers may be relative to the high stigma of receiving out-of-
work support previously. This other main source of stigma is the actual or perceived 
treatment of applicants and recipients by programme administrators. A perception of 
widespread fraud by staff can impact on applications for benefit, especially where the 
outcome is uncertain (Howe 1985). Many local studies that also suggest this finding 
are reviewed by Dornan (2003). Recipients are less likely to report stigma than non-
recipients, and the perceived stigma of claiming is reported as worse than any 
actually associated with making the claim (Dornan 2003).  
 
Another type of stigma comes from just having to relate to bureaucracy – whether 
deliberately stigmatizing or not. Administration that requires personal and financial 
details can be intrusive and, added to delays in delivery, can alter the balance of the 
perceived costs of making a claim. Valid rejections of a claim can be humiliating 
(Craig 1991). Perceptions of current entitlement are often linked to previous 
experience of a claim. If a previous claim has been refused there is an apparent 
reduced likelihood to claim on the basis that it has been tried before and failed (Noble 
et al.1992), irrespective of how well or badly the system treated the recipient. 
 
Trigger events: There is a common finding across the literature that life events can 
trigger claims (even where potential entitlement preceded the event itself). Many of 
these events are risk events, usually associated with a claim for an income transfer, 
such as unemployment, sickness, retirement and survivorship. However, there are 
other events such as personal crisis or periods of financial stress that can precipitate 
the claim process (see Dornan 2003 for an overview). The actions of others can also 
trigger entitlement, such as peers receiving assistance or contact with an adviser or 
advocate who can assist with making a claim. Such trigger events can overcome many 
of the normal problems of perception, stigma and ignorance that prevent take-up.  
 
2.2.3 Economic approaches 
 
The issue of non-take-up of an entitlement is a fundamental challenge to the 
economic orthodoxy that individuals optimise their resources. Economists have 
clarified analysis of take-up using secondary analysis of survey and administrative 
data and econometric techniques that can identify multivariate associations. 
However, most of the economic literature does not address irrationality in take-up 
behaviour; instead it treats non-take-up as a rational behaviour based on a cost-
benefit trade-off. This means that some of the terms used by non-economists, such 
as stigma, are interpreted differently in this form of analysis from a sociological or 
psychological perspective and represented as “costs”. Economists have also looked 
at take-up in a wider selection of programmes – social insurance transfers, other non 
means-tested transfers (see Currie 2004 for an overview) and of non-transfer 
programmes such as employment programmes (see, for instance Heckman and 
Smith 2004). We limit discussion in this section to means-tested programmes unless 
evidence on other programmes suggests it is also applicable.  
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The economic approaches are probably most useful when the statistical findings 
are considered alongside results from more direct behavioural or attitudinal 
investigation, pointing to issues and areas where specially designed surveys or 
small-scale investigations might be most fruitful. (1999:145) 
In this section we use the headlines from the main economic approaches to, and 
explanations of, take-up. This allows us to put greater weight on the empirical 
evidence gained from multivariate econometric analysis in the discussion of 
characteristics and explanations. 
 
In the earliest studies of take-up, based on experimental negative income tax 
programme data from Seattle and Denver, Ashenfelter (1983) summarised such 
costs as follows: “… the incidence of information, reporting or other unobserved non-
pecuniary costs are a significant deterrent to actual programme participation” (p517). 
The standard way to estimate non-pecuniary costs was to assign a hypothetical value 
to them because they are almost always unobserved directly. (This is one of the main 
differences between econometric theoretical discussions of take-up and the specific 
studies of take-up that use a psychological decision-making approach as discussed 
above). This means Ashenfelter was able to estimate a family’s “distaste” for 
programme participation alongside their incentives, to alter labour market behaviour 
to qualify for the programme in a discrete choice model. He found no significant role 
for “welfare stigma or other non-pecuniary program participation costs” (Ashenfelter 
1983:524). 
 
Moffitt conflated the potentially numerous reasons for “disutility arising from program 
participation” into a measurable value that he called “stigma”, to use when such 
disutility prevented participation (1983:1023). He admits that ignorance or application 
and compliance costs may additionally explain non-participation but argues that 
these are “almost impossible to distinguish from stigma” (Moffitt 1983). Moffitt’s 
approach to combine these types of cost into a single measure of stigma makes 
intuitive sense in applied terms. For example, a long and complex application form 
for a transfer may carry large transaction costs and be stigmatising to complete. His 
approach contrasts starkly to that of the psychologists who try to construct decision-
making measures that are theoretically distinct and that interact. In reality, the 
differences spring largely from data used for analysis. Economists have traditionally 
used large survey data sets not specifically designed to capture data on attitudes and 
the claim process, whereas much of the previous literature in section 2.2.2 was 
based on small-scale qualitative studies of take-up itself. The combination of 
secondary analysis of survey data and good specification of econometric models 
gives rise to the economic literature’s key strengths. 
 
Moffitt’s key insights were that stigma arose from the act of receiving welfare and did 
not vary with the amount of welfare received, and that the probability of take-up 
varied with the size of potential entitlement. This distinction, between a flat cost 
arising from the participation and a variable cost from the size of the entitlement 
when deciding to participate, has since been consistently and empirically validated 
across programmes and countries. For our purposes, the key finding is that take-up 
is lower where potential entitlement is lower (for instance, with higher earners whose 
entitlement to in-work tax credits is low) because potential entitlement is such a 
powerful predictor of take-up. Why? It is partly because households tend to seek out 
assistance at a point where their income is particularly low – as found by Ashenfelter 
(1983). However it also reflects the balance between the costs and benefits of 
participation. Higher income groups with smaller potential entitlements are less likely 
to take up assistance because they do not consider it worth it.  
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Moffitt’s other lasting legacy is the underlying tripartite distinction he brought together 
in his single concept of “stigma”: information costs – the availability of information 
and how difficult and prevalent this is; participation costs – the time and effort 
required to fill in forms, seek out supporting evidence and deal with bureaucracy; and 
stigma – the socio-psychological costs to reputation and self-worth from being seen 
to receive the transfer. It is interesting to note that these fit quite nicely alongside the 
main headings of the body of research discussed above. Despite a huge gulf in 
approach and methodology there is a far narrower gap between the economists and 
the social psychologists and social policy analysts discussed previously. 
 
Currie (2004) identifies two other emerging theoretical trends in economic 
approaches to take-up. First, the issue of social networks, which was assumed to 
explain greater take-up for those who live in areas with higher numbers of those with 
identical ethnicity (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000) or immigration cohort 
(Borjas and Hilton 1996). But the underlying validity of the interpretation that it is 
social networks per se that underlie such differences is not generally accepted. 
Recent analysis of potential information sharing across such networks found no such 
finding (Aizer and Currie 2004) and experimental evidence found only small but 
significant effects for information sharing
5 (Duflo and Saez 2002). 
 
Currie’s second alternative theoretical approach comes from behavioural economics. 
This approach suggests that standard assumptions about costs do not take into 
account the way that people’s understanding and appreciation of such costs vary 
over time. This means that the costs of enrolment in a programme precede the 
benefits and that these immediate or current costs are perceived as a higher relative 
cost to the subsequent and latter provision of benefits. Such an approach has been 
examined by comparing automatic with elective participation in employer 
superannuation schemes. Findings showed that participation improved in automatic 
schemes but that behaviour was indeed very “sticky”, ie it was slow to adjust away 
from the former behaviour. As Currie points out, the importance of such findings is not 
that they support the general findings from a more traditional view of costs and 
discounting, and that the policy implications, “both suggest that reducing the 
immediate costs associated with enrolment, or adopting default enrolment, would 
increase participation” (Currie 2004:9). The idea that take-up is a dynamic and time-
related behaviour has also been examined by Carr et al. (1984), who show from 
longitudinal data that turnover and income changes are higher in the eligible 
population than among recipients. This means that cross-sectional eligibility may 
under- or over-represent longer-term eligibility and the measurement of take-up may 
miss some of those entitled for shorter periods.
6 
 
2.2.3.1 What factors have economists found to explain non-take-up? 
 
Economic analysis tends to focus on the three main areas identified by Moffitt (1983): 
information costs, transaction costs and stigma. The other main area of research has 
been on measurement error and the data quality required for establishing robust 
take-up estimation. The issue of data quality and measurement error is covered in 
the accompanying methodology paper (Bryson et al. 2006). 
 
                                                  
5 within a network in a employer superannuation scheme. 
6 This also means that income sources for problematic cases such as low-paid self-employed people 
may create significant problems for both administration and measurement of take-up of means-tested 
transfers. The self-employed have been historically omitted from United Kingdom official measures of 
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Empirical econometric estimation of the effect of information costs requires data on 
respondents that captures awareness of the programme and, ideally, some measures 
of different information patterns. It is very rare to find studies of this kind because 
data of such type is rare. Currie (2003) cites US Department of Agriculture
7 findings 
that very high proportions of eligible non-recipients, around 75%, were unaware of 
their entitlement. Evidence from the review of falls in take-up of food stamps that 
accompanied US welfare reform in the mid to late 1990s showed that changes to 
availability of information on food stamps to the AFDC
8 and TANF populations had 
significant impact on lowering take-up (US Department of Agriculture 2001). Yelowitz 
(2000) found that information sharing across a group of associated programmes for 
which there is multiple entitlement also improved take-up. The most direct evidence 
comes from experimental research where information given to the treatment group 
significantly increased take-up compared to the control group (Daponte et al. 1999). 
 
The evidence for the effect of transaction costs on take-up is both clear and plentiful. 
Daponte et al. (1999) also found that even when information on eligibility was given 
equally across the eligible group there were still differences in take-up associated 
with the size of award. Currie and Grogger (2002) found that increased transaction 
costs (increasing re-certification intervals) had a direct negative effect on take-up; this 
confirmed findings by Blank and Ruggles (1996).  
 
Welfare reform in the USA has sought to deliberately increase transaction costs by 
increasing the number and severity of administrative hurdles in claiming social 
assistance. There is clear evidence that such intentional administrative changes in 
“welfare reform”
9 had an impact on reducing take-up. Practices such as diversion (the 
practice of persuading or preventing claims by meeting an immediate need to refer to 
other sources of help), increasing work requirements, “hiding“ claim forms or delaying 
their availability for 28 days and of more punitive sanction regimes (see Evans 2001 
for discussion) all led to reduced take-up (Moffitt 2003). Currie (2004) points out the 
important policy question that accompany decisions to increase transaction costs: 
“Are the non-financial barriers screening out the ‘right’ people? That is, are the 
various administrative requirements attached to these transfer programmes targeting 
benefits to the neediest eligibles?” (p15). We discuss associated issues concerning 
such barriers and the characteristics of those who do not take-up below. 
 
Stigma is more difficult to establish as a reason for non-take-up. Yaniv (1997) 
provides the most thoughtful examination of stigma from the standpoint of economic 
psychology. He also integrates more sociological discussion of stigma into his 
understanding. Instead of seeing stigma as a fixed cost, as most economist analysis 
does, Yaniv points out that stigma is inevitably linked to other people’s (or those of 
society as a whole) perceptions of your actions (claiming a benefit) even if this action 
is not public knowledge. Thus, public or media disapproval or resentment of transfer 
programmes financed by taxation is not enough in itself to produce stigma unless an 
individual’s receipt is published. Indeed, the individual claimant/recipient’s perception, 
or as Cowell puts it “his perception of other people’s perception of his own actions” 
(cited in Yaniv 1997:437) can matter most. Yaniv shows that fraud and stigma are 
conceptually identical when modelling take-up. This leads to a finding that changes to 
work requirements are more likely than changes of the rates of entitlement to change 
stigma and take-up. Such a wide conceptualisation of stigma has been difficult to test 
empirically, although there is other indicative evidence. The introduction of electronic 
                                                  
7 The main administering department for the food stamp programme. 
8 AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children) was the main social assistance programme in the 
US from the 1930s through to 1996. 
9 It is important to note that the term “welfare reform” in the USA usually relates to changes to out-of-
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payment cards to replace food-stamp vouchers had no identifiable impact on take-up 
in the USA (Currie 2004). Likewise the replacement of “benefit payment books” with 
wage-based payments of family working credit in the UK (a change, in part, 
introduced to reduce stigma) had no discernable effect on take-up rates. An associated 
UK finding is that requirements for disclosure of income information were found to 
reduce participation rates for workmen’s industrial compensation (Bitler et al. 2003). 
 
2.2.4 Institutional and sociological models of take-up 
 
Research during the 1990s (mostly in the UK and Europe) wanted to move the focus 
away from the individual and more to the social context of the claiming process and, 
specifically, to include the role of administrative institutions in non-take-up. Buckland 
and Dawson (1989) put forward a process that moved from the individual 
conceptualising a claim (perhaps influenced by peers or members of their 
household), to preparing the claim and its subsequent assessment by the 
administration. After assessment comes consideration by the individual, which may 
lead to review or appeal if information is seen to be incorrect. Once the claim is 
established comes routine claiming and the different factors that influence take-up 
that this entails (for instance, matching entitlement to changes in circumstance, and 
avoiding gaps and overlapping periods of entitlement). While Buckland and Dawson 
were the first to explicitly include factors from the administration of transfers in a take-
up model, their approach was soon overtaken by a clearer multi-level, multi-agency 
approach put forward by van Oorschot (1991, 1995, 1996 and 1998). It is important 
to stress that this approach came from a detailed international overview of non-take-
up which: 
suggested that benefits which showed high levels of non-take-up tended to share 
some characteristics. There were structural features of benefit design or 
administration ... which led to greater possibilities of take-up. (Corden 1999:147)  
 
Figure 2.2  van Oorschot multi-level model of take-up 
 
Source: van Oorschot 1995:37 
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Figure 2.2, van Oorschot’s diagrammatic overview of this approach, shows how non-
take-up occurs from three interacting levels, each with their own actors: the scheme 
level, determined by policy makers; the administrative level, where actions by 
administrators are most important; and the client level, where the actions of claimants 
and recipients are most important. Policy makers may thus choose schemes that 
have characteristics associated with take-up problems – complexity, means testing, 
non-transparent interactions with other transfers and the tax system, for instance. van 
Oorschot (1991) found non-take-up is higher in schemes that have the following 
characteristics: 
·  a high density of rules and guidelines 
·  complex rules 
·  vague criteria of entitlement 
·  a means-test 
·  aimed at groups in society who are the subject of negative valuation (associated 
with negative prejudices) 
·  supplement other sources of income 
·  that leave the initiative to start the claiming process fully to the applicant. 
 
Corden (1995), reviewing such characteristics for take-up in the UK, added the 
following: 
·  a test of disability 
·  overlap or interaction with other benefits 
·  challenge to cultural norms or characteristics. 
 
Administration of transfers may embody practices and/or organisational cultures that 
militate against good take-up. This second level, as originally described by van 
Oorschot (1991) and reviewed by Corden (1995), can be summarised as having the 
following characteristics that determine levels of take-up: 
·  information supply  
·  service provision 
·  application forms 
·  subsequent negotiations 
·  administrative links between benefits (transfers) 
·  accuracy in decision making 
·  policing the system. 
 
Organisational culture is therefore as important as organisational practices, with 
potential take-up problems where higher priority is given to probity and fraud issues 
or domination by revenue collection aims, than to entitlement and payment. (There 
has been much discussion of this in the UK both in the role of local government 
revenue collection agencies in the delivery of housing benefits and in the recent 
expansion of Inland Revenue’s role in delivering child and in-work tax credits.) 
Additionally, the administrative practices that frustrate high rates of take-up are 
potentially broad (see discussion of non-monetary transaction costs above, for 
instance) such as delays, poor frontline communication with claimants and recipients, 
or poor referral and delegation of complex and more simple adjudication.
10 
 
                                                  
10 Another extreme example the author was told of is a practice in one city in the USA where periodically 
large portions of all payments would be ceased on the grounds that the administration were certain of 
some level of inaccuracy and fraud and would cease payments and await recipients to respond before 
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Such an interactive multi-level and multi-agency model is difficult to test empirically. 
The main research that does test empirically is the van Oorschot study of households 
in the Netherlands. Summarising this research:  
He argued that once the basic knowledge and perceived eligibility thresholds had 
been achieved, the most important part of the process, then the rest of the process 
represented an overall trade-off between factors that promoted and deterred 
claiming. ‘Triggers’, especially in the form of information or a newly perceived 
need, could be important catalysts to action, either prompting claims or altering the 
balance in the trade-off. There is an overall emphasis on understanding take-up as 
a dynamic process, with movement at all three levels of the model, and reactions 
and interaction of the different actors. (Corden 1999:149) 
 
The client level captures the discussion outlined in the psychological and economic 
approaches above (see figure 2.2). However, this approach by van Oorschot (1995) 
led to him dividing non-take-up into three sets of categories: 
 
Primary or secondary non-take-up. Primary non-take-up refers to individuals who do 
not claim. Secondary non-take-up refers to claims made that are rejected – through 
misapplication, failure to use discretion or other reasons. 
 
Full versus partial non-take-up. This distinguishes the situation where no transfer is 
claimed at all, from the situation where a transfer is claimed but full entitlement is not 
awarded 
 
Permanent versus delayed non-take-up. This distinguishes between cases where 
time is the main factor determining the act of making a claim – waiting for a job 
application to come through, for instance – and where non-claiming is not time 
related but due to other factors. 
 
2.2.5 Overview of conceptual approaches 
 
How do these approaches link back to WFF evaluation information needs, with 
regard to awareness of and access to transfers, which underlie concerns about take-
up?  
 
Each of these alternative approaches has real merits. The first two are more 
empirically testable, but the third raises crucial questions about the potential 
influence of the structural design of WFF, its implementation, cross-agency 
collaboration, and other aspects of its implementation and administration. These 
influence the way in which applicants, recipients and others view and interact with the 
programme. Indeed, all three approaches see “awareness of” and “access to” income 
transfers as an issue not purely posited on the characteristics of applicants, potential 
applicants, and recipients. This means that the scheme(s) and MSD and IRD 
operations are “important factors that determine take-up across different groups of 
people”. This also suggests the answer to another WFF evaluation question: “Do 
people’s views of delivery agencies influence their decision to access assistance?”  
 
One important lesson from the theoretical literature is that there is apparent 
agreement that take-up is the result of individual, social and institutional factors. It is 
therefore worth repeating the point made in the accompanying methodology review, 
that any proposed research on take-up is best served by not fully committing to a 
particular disciplinary viewpoint but by conducting research on factors that are known 
to affect take-up at each of these levels. A wise policy maker would take the 
psychologists’ appreciation of the decision-making process, the economists’ view of 20 
the three types of costs and the institutional view that administration and scheme 
design contribute to take-up.  
 
Of course, convincing administrators that systems and procedures that are efficient 
and effective for assessment and payment may have take-up considerations is 
difficult. But one obvious applied finding from the literature is that internal 
administrative “costs” can be exported to the individuals who approach the system – 
transactions costs and information costs especially. Promoting awareness is, of 
course, hugely important and is a common reason for low take-up, but providing 
individuals with information is not enough to ensure uptake of assistance. Wrong 
information or wrong beliefs are a problem for take-up and misinformation is a 
problem on both sides – with the need for clarity in adjudication and administration as 
well as correct information from claimants. 
 
The issue of stigma is important and is mentioned in all three approaches but is 
difficult to measure and capture accurately.  
 
2.3 Take-up rates, characteristics and explanations 
 
In this section we address several empirical questions about who does and does not 
take up the types of transfers envisaged in WFF. We focus the discussion first on 
individual and other across-the-board characteristics and then look at each type of 
transfer separately and link characteristics to measured take-up levels. 
 
2.3.1 What are the characteristics associated with non-take-up? 
 
A large body of evidence relates to take-up for the elderly (particularly in the UK). 
Such evidence is put to one side – apart from factors that may directly relate to 
working age people and children. The evidence cited comes from a selection of the 
take-up literature that fulfilled two criteria:  
a) it was multivariate analysis so that the interrelationship of factors could be most 
clearly assessed 
b) it appeared it could be generalised to the needs of WFF. 
 
2.3.1.1 Income level and poverty 
 
In order to understand the question “who does not take up”, it is crucial to align 
demographic and other non-income characteristics with the near-universal finding 
across all “take-up” studies that smaller awards are not taken up. In means-tested 
transfers this necessarily implies that the poorest (that is, those who qualify for the 
highest amount of payment), have higher propensities to claim. Thus, those who are 
most at risk of chronic poverty, for instance non-working sole parents and people with 
disabilities, are often found to have higher take-up rates when compared to those 
who may have risk of short-term income loss or who have incomes at the margins of 
poverty/income thresholds for entitlement (frictional
11 short-term unemployed and 
two-earner low-income couples, for instance). Take-up is also likely to be lower with 
characteristics that are associated with earning capacity, such as educational and 
skill level. 
 
The best quality empirical evidence is thus found in analyses that separate the 
independent effects of income and personal and other characteristics in multivariate 
                                                  
11 Frictional unemployment involves people being temporarily between jobs, searching for new ones. 21 
estimation.
12 Dornan (2003), looking across the evidence from UK studies, confirms 
that “One of the most important aspects illuminated by multiple regression analysis is 
that those with low eligibility are less likely to take up their entitlement” and cites the 
studies of Blundell et al. (1988) and Fry and Stark (1987, 1991). To amplify this 
generalised finding we concentrate on transfers in the UK and USA that look most 
like WFF-type programmes. 
 
For in-work benefits in the UK over the past 33 years, it has been found that take-
home pay is negatively associated with take-up of in-work family support transfers. 
The evidence is consistent for the earliest version of these transfers, Family Income 
Supplement (1972–1988) analysed by Dorset and Heady (1991) for the expanded 
and more generous Family Credit (1988–1997) analysed by Brewer, Suárez and 
Walker (2003); and most recently for Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC, 1997–
2004) (Brewer, Suárez and Walker 2003). Similarly, take-up of housing allowances in 
the UK for low-earning families with children was found to be negatively associated 
with take-home pay (Dorset and Heady 1991).  
 
The study of take-up for housing allowances for low-income working families is 
hindered by the absence of such transfers in the USA for comparison and by the fact 
that British studies currently do not distinguish between those entitled to housing 
allowances by virtue of entitlement to underlying social assistance and other entitled 
low-income populations. 
 
When we turn our attention to social assistance for non-employed working-age 
populations we have greater difficulty in interpreting findings consistently across 
schemes. This is due to very considerable contextual differences in rules and target 
populations. It is also not always possible to identify families with children as specific 
groups of the social assistance population with specifically estimated take-up profiles. 
US schemes are less problematic because federal social assistance has only been 
available for families with children. Evidence is consistent from Ashenfelter (1983) in 
an early study of take-up through to the most recent appraisal of AFDC by Blank 
(2002), where take-up is linked to size of eligibility. Riphahn (2001) finds clear 
associations between the size of poverty gaps and take-up of German social 
assistance and thus confirms that those with higher incomes and smaller poverty 
gaps are less likely to take up assistance.  
 
Even though the evidence appears clear cut, some care must be taken in 
extrapolating this point. First, Duclos (1995) has shown that part of the effect may not 
be just that potential claimants see less utility in claiming small amounts but also that 
administrative error is more likely to decline for those with smaller entitlements. 
Second, income does not explain everything. Even where it would appear that 
characteristics strongly associated with income have no other independent 
association with take-up, this is not the case. Blundell et al. (1988) find higher 
education levels are associated with non-take-up of social assistance, as do Brewer, 
Suárez and Walker (2003) for Family Credit and WFTC. Social renters have been 
found to take up social assistance more than owner-occupiers (Fry and Stark 1987), 
while Duclos (1995) and Brewer, Suárez and Walker (2003) also find this for in-work 
benefits. There has been some discussion of how far peer effects or other social 
networks may explain these results but no definitive conclusions. 
 
Household/family composition is a factor that also appears to influence take-up 
independent of income, with single-adult households more likely to take up 
                                                  
12 The recent OECD overview has an excellent summary of the methods of econometric studies of take-
up that will not be repeated here – see text box 1, p23 in Hernanz et al. 2004. 22 
assistance (Fry and Stark 1987; Duclos 1995; Brewer, Suárez and Walker 2003; and 
Scholz 1994). This may reflect longer-term income deprivation risks in single-adult 




There is considerable evidence of ethnic differences, irrespective of income or 
poverty, affecting take-up (in the USA such differences are more often spoken of as 
racial). However, it is often difficult to establish what the underlying drivers of poor 
take-up are for ethnic minorities, and it is crucial for interpretation that ethnicity is not 
a proxy for other linked characteristics such as education level, earnings/income level 
or length of residence. Aggregate coverage rates show higher levels of receipt of 
working-age means-tested transfers in minority ethnic populations in both the UK and 
USA. However, these headline figures are mostly the result of demographic and 
economic characteristics (higher numbers of families with children, a higher 
proportion of larger families and households, and lower income) rather than 
indications of different propensity to take-up. 
 
Another weakness in the literature is in the area of take-up of transfers by indigenous 
groups. US social assistance programmes for American Indian populations tend to be 
specific programmes with limited comparability. There are no obvious studies of 
evaluative take-up by indigenous people in Canada and Australia. There is thus little 
evidence of direct relevance to concerns about take-up for Māori and Pacific Island 
communities in New Zealand, beyond what the literature shows can be expected 
given demographic and income characteristics, and relationships with the 
government agencies involved. 
 
UK evidence is patchy. Howard et al. (2001) cite take-up problems based on 
language barriers, especially for those of non-English speaking background, both in 
terms of understanding and awareness, and on institutional administration. Survey 
data usually contains too few participants of any particular ethnic group to make take-
up probabilities significant, and joining all ethnic populations into a single non-white 
group averages out a great deal of underlying unobserved differences in language, 
length of residence, and culture. Overall, evidence from the UK on differences due to 
ethnicity suggests this is an under-researched area, and the few studies that exist 
(mainly on pensioners) suggest that differences between ethnic groups are great 
(Craig et al. 2002). 
 
US evidence is clearer on racial categorisation. Duggan found that, conditional on 
being poor, Hispanic children are less likely to receive SSI
13 (Currie 2004:16). 
However, most findings of higher participation rates by black and Hispanic families 
are based on coverage of the populations; they are not multivariate and thus usually 
do not take income and other factors into account. The Moffitt analysis of changes in 
entry and exit patterns for the post-welfare reform US TANF programme finds a 
negative association with being black and entering the post-1996 system (2003). 
Blank and Ruggles (1996) found higher take-up of AFDC and food stamps among 
eligible women correlated with being black, taking various other individual factors into 
account. However, interpretation of US findings on black and Hispanic probabilities of 
take-up have to be considered in the light of high levels of residential segregation 
(often partially racially based) that mean that the findings on race may in part be 
based on community, network or other unobserved factors, together with the greater 
likelihood of persistent periods of poverty for these groups. 
 
                                                  
13 US Federal Supplemental Security Income. 23 
Minority ethnicity can reflect more recent immigration, and Currie summarises the 
literature on US welfare (AFDC and TANF programmes) as “while immigrants are 
more likely to be eligible for welfare, they are less likely to take it up, other things 
being equal” (Currie 2004:16). The likelihood of take-up is then found to rise with 
“assimilation”




Differences in policy regime at the state level (and below, at the county level in many 
states) in the USA make interpretation of area-based differences in take-up difficult for 
that country. It is much easier to put forward the UK evidence on this point, where there 
is a uniform comprehensive set of national schemes more akin to New Zealand. Noble 
et al. (1992) find differences between the cities of Oldham (higher take-up) and Oxford 
in Family Credit take-up. Brewer, Suárez and Walker (2004) find differences in regions 
of England over the period of 1994 to 2000. Take-up is much lower in London, for 
instance, and in other regions where economic growth has been fastest. Rural location 
seems to negatively affect take-up in Scotland (Bramley et al. 2000). 
 
2.3.2 How does take-up vary by programme type? 
 
2.3.2.1 Social assistance for non-working families with children 
 
Table 2.1 shows the trend in take-up rates for social assistance for non-working 
families with children from 1990 to 2002 in the UK (the only country to have an official 
time series of take-up statistics). However, there are several discontinuities that 
underlie such a time series: a change in underlying survey data employed to 
calculate rates from 1993/1994 onwards, and a policy change from 1998 means that 
unemployed families on social assistance are no longer counted. Even so, table 2.1 
shows medium- to long-term trends in take-up and exemplifies some of the findings 
from previous discussion about who fails to take up assistance and why. Take-up 
rates for couples with children have been between 80% and 95% for 13 years using 
a caseload measure (the headcount of those claiming out of the total number eligible 
to claim), whereas lone parents have take-up rates of 95% and over. Expenditure 
take-up rates (a percentage of eligible budget claimed) are higher because lower 
amounts are unclaimed, with rates consistently between 85% to 95% for couples with 
children and over 95% for lone parents. 
Table 2.1 Take-up of income support by families with children in Britain 






















Couples   80–






100  95–100  95–97  95–98  96–
100  96–99  96–





























Source: DWP 2004 and previous versions 
 
Studies of take-up of income support (and of supplementary benefits, its pre-1988 
equivalent), consistently show that families with children have higher take-up rates 
                                                  
14 This is the term used by Currie, and refers to length of time of residence primarily. It does not mean 
“cultural assimilation”. 24 
than families without (ignoring those of pension age who are less likely to claim for 
other reasons) (Fry and Stark 1993). Multivariate probit estimation of take-up of these 
social assistance benefits confirm the general findings outlined in the previous 
section: take-up increases with underlying entitlement and falls with levels and 
sources of income, and is higher for sole parents (but lower for single people without 
children). Additional findings of interest and relevance are that take-up is found to be 
independently higher with the presence of younger children (aged 0–5 years) 
compared to older children, is higher for those defined as “sick” but lower for those 
unemployed, but increases with duration of unemployment. Take-up is also lower for 
both private tenants and owner-occupiers compared to social renters
15 (Fry and Steel 
1993, table 7.1). 
 
The USA has a very different experience – its federal social assistance programmes 
since the 1960s have been claimed primarily by sole parents.
16 There are no “official” 
estimates of take-up and no comparable time series to match the British profiles. 
Take-up rates for US social assistance programmes (only available in many states for 
families with children) increased among the eligible following the launch of President 
Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty” (Moffitt 1992). Blank (1997) also shows that 
take-up further increased in the 1980s and 1990s and added to overall caseloads. 
Take-up of AFDC (up to 1996) was estimated to be between 80% and 90% when 
using administrative data, and at a more comparable (to the UK) figure of between 
60% and 70% using survey data. Take-up of the post-1996 system (TANF) is lower – 
both in caseload size and in the propensity of eligible families with children (mostly 
sole parents). Moffitt (2003) suggests that take-up has fallen to around 40% for sole 
parents and between 50% and 55% for poorer sole parents. 
 
The American federal programme of food stamps has been in place since 1975 and 
is available to all types of families with incomes less than a monthly income limit and 
assets below $2000 (Currie 2003) of the US poverty line.
17 Thus, food stamps are 
provided to social assistance claimants (AFDC and TANF) as well as people on low 
incomes, pensioners and disabled people. There have been a number of studies of 
take-up for food stamps. Early studies concentrated on information problems, and 
Coe (1983) found that the 54% of eligible people who did not take up assistance 
reported ignorance of or confusion about their entitlement. This finding was confirmed 
by Blaylock and Smallwood in 1984. Similarly the GAO study in conducted in 1988 
(GAO 2002) found that the 51% who did not take up assistance believed they were 
ineligible. Blank and Ruggles (1996) found take-up among eligible women correlated 
with being black, young, never married, disabled, not working and having a large 
family. These were factors that were also associated with persistent poverty. Daponte 
et al. (1999) using an experimental methodology confirmed that food stamps were 
least likely to be taken up by those with small entitlements but that information 
problems were also present. They found an overall caseload take-up rate of 75% and 
an expenditure take-up rate of 87%.  
 
Recent studies of the fall in the take-up of food stamps are an important source of 
literature; for survey and methodological approaches and for evidence of what 
underlies the rising rate of failure to take-up. Bartlett and Burstein (2004) surveyed 
eligible non-participants and found little support for non-awareness as 96% had a 
                                                  
15 Social renters rent a property from the government, local council, etc, and are receive a housing 
benefit or subsidy. Private tenants rent from private property owners, and are part of the standard rental 
market.  
16 The US tends to define sole parents as “single mothers” on a criterion of marriage rather than living 
and household arrangements. This makes comparison with other countries that use only demographic 
composition to define lone parenthood difficult. 
17 See discussion of the US poverty line and its basis in Currie 2003, chapter 4. 25 
basic awareness of the programme. Awareness was highest for working-age people 
with children. The more important reason for non-take-up was awareness of 
eligibility, with only 43% aware. Overall attitudes explained non-take-up, with 91% 
restrained by feeling they “can get by without” or “do not like to rely on government 
assistance”. Bartlett and Burstein define stigma separately, although attitudes to 
independence are obviously partly from stigma and this only explained a smaller 
additional reluctance to apply. This stigma was based on previous experience of the 
programme, such as being treated differently when using food stamps in shops. A 
smaller number of eligible non-participants had approached the welfare office and 
had not obtained information or application forms. 
 
Bartlett and Burnstein (2004) sum up the evidence well by saying they found fairly 
consistent evidence on who did not take up, but less clarity on how this linked to 
underlying sets of characteristics.  
Households with historically lower than average participation rates include those 
with elderly members, with a white or Hispanic household head, and households 
with earnings. Households with higher incomes, assets, and headed by 
individuals with relatively more education also have lower participation rates. In 
contrast, participation is highest among households with children, large 
households, those receiving public assistance, and those receiving higher than 
average FSP [Food Stamp Programme] benefits. Multivariate analyses of the 
relationship between participation rate and household characteristics show 
similar findings, though race, the presence of children, and FSP benefit levels 
have significant effects in some, though not all studies. This suggests that the 
variation in participation rate and household characteristics among these sub-
groups may stem from correlation between these characteristics and other 
characteristics that significantly affect participation rates. (p4)  
 
Gross estimates of take-up include many who are not families with children, and are 
in the region of 69%, with a rise in take-up over the period of 1988 to 1994 (Currie 
2003) but a subsequent decline. As expected, families with children are more likely to 
take up assistance than elderly claimants; in 1994 it was estimated that 86% of 
eligible children received food stamps. The US Congress Committee on Ways and 
Means reported that take-up was higher for lone parents – near 100% – compared to 
other households with children at 78% (1998). However, this finding is not wholly 
supported by evidence from longitudinal data that found many sole-parent families 
leaving TANF for work had failed to take-up entitlement (Zedlewski and Brauner 1999). 
 
2.3.2.2 In-work transfers to families with children 
 
Britain again leads the field with an historical time series of official take-up rates
18 of 
in-work transfers payable to low-income families with children. 
                                                  
18 This is confirmed by the OECD study, Hernanz et al. 2004. 26 
 
Table 2.2 Take-up of in-work transfers by families with children in Britain 
  1990/1991  1991/1992  1993/1994  1994/1995  1995/1996  1996/1997  1997/1998  1998/1999  2000/2001  2001/2002  2002/2003 
  Family Credit  Working Families’ Tax Credit 
Caseload   
All  62  66  71  69  70  71–75  67–70  66–70  62–65  71–74  72–76 
Lone parents    77  80  80  77–84  74–80  78–84  77–83  82–88  84–90 
Couples      66  61  62  65–70  59–64  55–60  49–53  59–64  59–65 
Expenditure 
All  68  73  81  82  83  82–88  75–81  75–81  80–85  82–88   
Lone parents    86  90  91  84–92  80–88  84–91  85–95  89–95   
Couples      76  75  76  77–86  69–78  61–70  71–78  71–80   
Source: Inland Revenue 2004 and DSS 1999 (and previous versions) 27 
 
Table 2.2 shows take-up rates for Family Credit (introduced in 1988 to replace the 
previous, less generous Family Income Supplement (FIS)) and WFTC (introduced in 
1999 and also a more generous system than its predecessor). Another policy change 
in 1992 reduced the weekly hours of work required to qualify for Family Credit to from 
24 to 16. Alongside these policy changes have been changes in the underlying 
survey data and methodology used, which meant improved measures were available 
from 1993 and estimates moved from point to range estimates in 1996/1997. These 
figures show that lone parents consistently have higher take-up than couples, and 
that expenditure take-up rates are higher than underlying caseload rates. Both of 
these findings reflect the core research finding that take-up declines with smaller 
entitlements/higher original incomes.  
 
A number of studies have measured take-up of British in-work transfers. We 
concentrate on those across periods of policy change to maximise the ability to 
generalise on underlying characteristics that may also apply to New Zealand. The 
Dorset and Heady (1991) study of FIS between 1984 and 1987
19 included 
multivariate probit estimation that showed take-up negatively associated with take-
home income with age of the head of household and education level, and with private 
renting and owner-occupation. No difference was found for ages of children.
20 More 
recent work looking at both Family Credit and WFTC (Brewer, Suárez and Walker 
2003) confirms that lone parents are more likely to take up assistance and that take-
up declines with increases in income, from both earned and other sources. They also 
found that take-up declines with more education, with the presence of disabled 
adults, with the presence of young children aged less than five years (for lone 
parents only) and with private renting and owner-occupation.
21 
 
The change from Family Credit to WFTC in 1999 has also been analysed through 
more descriptive studies. The Family and Children Study, a longitudinal panel of low-
income families with children, set up in 1999, looked at the impact of changed policy 
on incomes. One aspect of this has been to measure awareness and take-up. McKay 
(2001:42) reports that awareness among non-claimants – those who could correctly 
name the scheme providing in-work payments to parents in work – was around 50%. 
He found that about one-third could name it exactly and the remainder identified the 
old programme (Family Credit). When asked about the income limits for eligibility, 
only one-third could put forward a guess and most of these understated the income 
limits. These figures replicated similar findings on Family Credit from the 1999 survey 
(McKay 2001). Two years later, the overall awareness level was the same, 50%, but 
a higher proportion could correctly name the programme as WFTC (Barnes et al. 
2004:190). 
 
US evidence is concentrated on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programme. 
While this refundable tax credit can be paid regularly alongside earnings it is claimed 
at the end of the year. Tax-filing is completed in 99% of cases. Because participation 
is linked to tax-filing there are compliance issues associated with claiming EITC. For 
instance, taxpayers with previous year(s) of non-filing are more unwilling to file and 
claim EITC (Scholz 1994). There are no official times series of take-up estimates. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates take-up in 2002 to be between 82% 
and 87% overall (Currie 2004). Scholz (1994) found similar overall rates, between 
80% and 86%, in 1990.  
                                                  
19 FIS was introduced in 1972 and was replaced by Family Credit in 1988. 
20 Some care must be taken in comparing these results with results for subsequent schemes as eligible 
weekly hours of work were different under FIS than subsequent schemes. 
21 This contradicts the findings by Fry and Stark (1993) in section 2.3.2.1, and likely reflects differing 
times, methods, underlying systems, and populations under study. 28 
The US General Accounting Office (GAO) has also produced estimates of EITC take-
up for 1999 that give a breakdown by families with and without children (table 2.3). 
Households with children have higher take-up rates than households without 
children, and take-up falls as the number of children rises (GAO 2002). 
 
Table 2.3 GAO estimates of EITC take-up in 1999 
All  75.0% (± 2.7) 
No children  44.7% (± 3.9) 
1 child  96.0% (±7.7) 
2 children  93.0% (±8.3) 
3 and more children  62.5% (±8.3) 
   
Note: Actual participation rates at the upper bounds of range cannot be more than 100%. 
Source: GAO 2002, table 1 
 
Scholz (1994) also uses multivariate probit estimation to examine the characteristics 
of (all) non-take-up (but measured as filing a tax return and receiving EITC). He finds 
non-take-up associated with self-employment and with occupational categories 
associated with household work (eg cooks, housekeepers and childcare workers), 
which may point to employer compliance issues. Overall, and because of the 
compliance issue, take-up was higher according to income and lower for those 
receiving other state transfers, larger families, those non-married, males and those of 
Spanish origin (Scholz 1994). It is difficult to know how to interpret these results as 
relevant to similar in-work transfers that are not tied to the end of year filing of income 
tax, as there is considerable overlap between non-reporting and non-filing of taxes 
that would in other systems be taken as non-take-up if considered on income 
eligibility grounds alone. 
 
2.3.3 Housing allowances 
 
There is very wide variation in housing allowance programmes across countries, tied 
on the one hand to particular forms of housing finance, social housing provision and 
private rent control, and particular methods of providing social security and social 
assistance on the other. First, housing finance systems may provide subsidies that 
reduce rents below market level or rely solely on transfers to make rent affordable. Or 
these systems may combine both approaches. Many social assistance schemes pay 
all or an element of housing costs as a part of the underlying scheme. Others pay 
housing allowances only to those who do not claim social assistance, and yet others, 
such as the British scheme, have a two-tier system that pays most to those on social 
assistance and then introduces income tapers that reduce entitlement as incomes 
rise above social assistance levels. The design of other transfers may also include 
assumptions about rent coverage, with or without a separate housing allowance. For 
instance, recent reforms of in-work transfers in the UK have sought to raise income 
from in-work tax-credits to lift eligible people out of entitlement to housing allowances 
and thus reduce overlapping entitlements to means-tested transfers and their 
potential to interact to cause high effective marginal tax rates. 
 
With these large differences in mind we attempt to focus on take-up for those who 
have incomes above social assistance levels. Published British data on take-up of 
“housing benefits” (HB) for rent are based on inclusion of both those who claim 
underlying social assistance and those who have incomes above it and are thus not 
immediately relevant for our discussion that seeks to distinguish underlying social 
assistance and in-work populations. 29 
The Fry and Stark (1993) analysis of HB for non-pensioner working-age adults (those 
not claiming underlying social assistance) between 1984 and 1987 shows caseload 
take-up rates of between 48% and 54% and expenditure take-up rates of between 
64% and 72%.
22 They show that take-up rates are highest for sole parents (69%) and 
those single and childless (57%) and lower for couples with children (50%) and 
childless couples (46%). In their multivariate probit analyses, they find non-take-up 
associated with private renting, age (for men only) and unemployment (men only) as 
well as the usual findings about falling with income and rising with entitlement, as 
previously outlined above. These results predate changes in housing finance that 
raised rents in both private and public sectors. However, Bingley and Walker confirm 
the tenure, education and income/entitlement findings in a later study in the 1990s 
(2001). 
 
Studies of housing allowances in the Netherlands also found large levels of under-
claiming – Koning and Ridder (1997) estimate take-up rates of around 64% and 
Rouwendal (2002) between 45% and 63%. 
   
2.3.4 Overview of take-up measurement and analysis  
 
This section has approached three main questions on take-up:  
1.  Who is more or less likely to access assistance? 
2.  What is known about factors that underlie variance in take-up rates?  
3.  What are the important factors that determine take-up for different groups of 
people? 
 
The evidence is clear that means-tested transfers are consistently under-claimed by 
those who have smaller entitlements and higher incomes. However, policy makers 
need to know how this primary non-take-up factor links with other characteristics and 
how it combines with structural issues of design and implementation of the schemes. 
Families with children are more likely to take up assistance, lone parents especially, 
and these findings are commonly found even when income and entitlement levels are 
taken into account. Other findings, such as that private renters and higher education 
levels are associated with non-take-up, are probably transferable to New Zealand. 
 
2.3.4.1 Is there evidence of under-utilisation by high-need groups?  
 
There is some evidence of under claiming by ethnic minorities and immigrants. 
Otherwise the main findings suggest that high-need groups, those with the greatest 
to gain, claim most. However, the strongest evidence for any effect of under-
utilisation by high-need groups comes from the USA and is linked to the system 
design and implementation for out-of-work social assistance.
23 A system that makes 
claiming difficult and deters entitlement will have low take-up rates, and putting 
lifetime limits on claims will alter the way families with younger children (who are 
probably at highest risk) will put off claiming more than those with older children who 
are faced with a “use it or lose it” situation (Grogger 2002, Grogger and 
Michaelopoulos 2003). This brings us back to systemic and design issues and their 
effect on take-up, and how take-up can be maximised. 
 
There is one further question to consider at this point.  
                                                  
22 These figures include the ineligible recipients identified in the underlying survey data. If these are 
removed take-up increases to between 57% and 62% caseload and to between 68% and 74% for 
expenditure. 
23 There is some evidence of interest in New Zealand of US style reforms. New Zealand Business 
Round Table Policy Backgrounder No 4 – October 2004 for example 
http://www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/policy/policy-2004/PB_No4.pdf 30 
 
2.3.4.2 What is the evidence on sustained take-up?  
 
We understand this concern to be about continued take-up across time for those who 
continue to be entitled but have to renew their claims periodically. Put simply, do 
those receiving benefits continue to claim their entitlement when they periodically 
have to re-qualify? The short answer is there is no direct evidence linking entitlement 
and claiming. However, there is evidence that over a sustained period, low-income 
families who depend on in-work transfers build a strong and continuing relationship to 
them (Marsh and McKay 1993, Finlayson et al. 2000). This loyalty matches the Moffitt 
hypothesis of a fixed stigmatic cost linked to receiving benefits. However, it is also 
clear from Currie and Grogger (2002) that increasing the requirement to re-verify 
entitlement increases transaction costs and therefore reduces take-up. There is also 
likely to be a high level of measurement error in cross-sectional estimations of such 
take-up; short periods of non-receipt within a sustained period of entitlement may 
reflect delays by either claimant or administering institution, which may later result in 
a backdated award for this period. Additionally, the issue of annual review and claw 
back of overpayment in tax-credits may have particular effects on increasing the 
marginal transaction and benefit costs at the point of reclaim by potentially linking a 
renewed claim to an existing overpayment and debt. This is, as yet, not clear from 
the UK case despite continued high profile problems of overpayment and recovery 
that have emerged recently (Lane and Wheatley 2005, Parliamentary Ombudsman 
2005). 
 
2.4 Maximising take-up 
 
The potential to improve take-up is great, but evidence of what works is minimal. This 
area is poorly covered in academic literature. It is known that administrative practices 
are crucial to take-up, “rather minor interventions aimed at simplifying the application 
process, improving the efficiency of the bureaucracy and/or reducing the perception 
of stigmatisation, are likely to have tangible effects on participation” (Hernanz et al. 
2004:22). Most of the evidence presented here is descriptive. It shows how policies 
and programmes to improve take-up have been approached but provides little 
evaluation of such programmes. 
 
Recent evidence on take-up by pensioners in Britain
24 by the National Audit Office 
(NAO) – the official auditing organisation for government – shows that the van 
Oorschot view of take-up as a systemic problem is now entering administrative 
orthodoxy. The NAO sees the barriers to take-up operating at three levels. 
 
1) System 
·  complexity of the overall system – including rules which vary between benefits 
and frequently change, and complex linkages between benefits 
·  intrusive means testing – requirement to provide sensitive information about 
income and capital. 
 
2) Administration 
·  leaving the initiative to the claimant to start the claim process – many assume 
they will be informed of entitlement 
                                                  
24 Northern Ireland has its own separate government administration of out-of-work transfers from the 
rest of the United Kingdom. The Department for Work and Pensions operates across the remaining 
countries, Wales, England and Scotland, which together form Britain. In Northern Ireland, there is also 
an officially adopted “take-up strategy”. 31 
·  poor or inaccessible channels of communication – the means of 
communication to obtain information or make a claim may not be appropriate for 
the client group 
·  access to information and advice – many perceive information as difficult to 
obtain. 
 
3) Customer level 
·  ignorance of and misconceptions about benefits available – many have little 
or no knowledge of benefits available, especially if they have had little contact 
with advice agencies 
·  difficulty in completing forms – some forms are time-consuming and difficult to 
complete, and many assume the whole process will be difficult 
·  fear of stigma and humiliation – associated with the belief that benefits are 
“handouts” 
·  fear of losing independence – claiming benefits or transfer is seen by some as 
being dependent on the state 
·  perception that making a claim is not worth the effort – some make a 
judgement as to whether the anticipated gains are worth claiming for, given the 
assumptions about the arduous process. 
Source: NAO 2002:4 
 
While the NAO study was of pensioner transfers, especially social assistance, most 
of this approach is potentially transferable to working-age families with children. 
Indeed, the NAO report has been used by many local government organisations to 
review initiatives for take-up in their areas.  
 
Currie puts the problem succinctly by pointing out the way take-up will increase:  
a) more people want the service;  
b) the fewer the barriers that are placed in their way; and  
c) where institutions (including private ones) have incentives to assist individuals 
in taking up their benefits. (Currie 2004:23). 
We use Currie’s threefold distinction for the remainder of this section.  
 
2.4.1 Raising awareness and reducing information costs 
 
In their review of marketing and awareness campaigns, the Social Security Agency 
for Northern Ireland (SSANI) reported that a targeted marketing campaign for 
pensioners resulted in 14,659 claims being received, of which 8,000 were successful. 
However, publicly available information about the success of state agency 
information campaigns is generally very limited. The NAO in the UK cites national 
advertising as having the advantages of a large audience and raising general 
awareness, and that it can assist alongside more specific measures. However, 
information geared for a wide audience is rarely specific enough; it can confuse and 
raise false expectations, increase the workload of ineligible applications and 
potentially discourage people from making future applications when they will be 
eligible (NAO 2002:44).  
 
The Department for Work and Pensions has produced a “good practice guide” to 
support take-up in Britain. It states that publicity material has less effect than 
outreach or within-government data-matching techniques: “25% of initial contacts 
from publicity may go on to make successful claims”; compared to 50% of people 
who seek advice after outreach work. However, targeting outreach and advice work 
using data-matching for particular groups results in 80% of people targeted and going 
on to make a successful benefit claim (Pensions Service 2002). 
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Information has to be comprehensible and information and external publications from 
SSANI and others must be assessed against a plain English standard, with a target 
of 75% achieving the “Crystal Mark” level set by external assessors, which means it 
is satisfactorily readable plain English. 
 
 
Outreach is another potential avenue for increasing information and SSANI 
organised a series of 60 benefit road shows between April 2003 and March 2004. 
Although there is no direct evaluation of their effectiveness, it is stated that: 
“Outreach advice work can be extremely effective” (Pension Service 2002:4). 
Outreach may assist groups such as ethnic minorities with particular needs 
(language, cultural attitudes) or particular barriers to claiming. The ethnic minority 
outreach service for the British Department for Work and Pensions was based on 
advice, referral and information services contracted out to voluntary sector providers 
in areas with a high number of people from an ethnic minority. This service aimed to 
ensure access and awareness on a full range of DWP-based services, especially 
employment services. The evaluation finding, that:  
EMO had a major impact in increasing ethnic minorities’ awareness of … 
opportunities, especially among Indian and Pakistani women. The language and 
outreach skills of EMO workers were crucial in reaching these groups” (Barnes et 
al. 2005:3) 
has implications for wider issues of awareness and access to income maintenance 
services for people of working age.  
 
A different form of “outreach” is to encourage claims linked to trigger points – events 
that will often bring people into entitlement, that occur in a range of services outside 
those that assess and pay transfers. For instance, take-up of child-related transfers 
can be linked to birth, and registration of births ensures high take-up of Child Benefit 
(a universal family allowance) in the UK and of the Canadian Child Tax Benefit. 
Similarly, American hospitals have been encouraging claims for Medicaid during 
pregnancy and birth (see discussion below). The choice is whether to make such 
links purely information based or to encourage a direct element of claiming – to 
additionally reduce transaction costs – through claim boxes on existing forms, 
sharing of databases or other methods discussed below.  
 
The impact of in-work transfers on making work pay and encouraging job entry has 
been shown in the UK to be optimised by individual face-to-face discussions around 
“better off calculations”, where the employment adviser calculates and demonstrates 
entitlement to in-work benefits and their impact on income after entering work. These 
are done for both “theoretical” and actual job opportunities. This approach has been 
found especially helpful for sole parents (Evans et al. 2003), for whom the 
employment adviser (the case manager in New Zealand) has access to a “fast track” 
system of claim and award of in-work tax credits for clients, to ensure rapid and 
accurate payment on beginning work and to avoid delays and “hassle”.  
 
Take-up information campaigns in the UK were originally initiated and organised 
locally. This was done often in conjunction with local authorities who wanted to 
maximise local income (and revenue to themselves), and reduce poverty levels. 
More recently, information partnerships have been set up to ensure that take-up 
activity is planned and implemented in an optimal manner (for pensioners mainly). 
The DWP in Britain works with local authorities in co-ordinated take-up activity, and 
advises:  
Any strategy to improve income take-up requires good forward planning. Local 
authorities often plan activity in annual service plans. In many areas there is 
regular liaison involving the Department for Work and Pensions. It is important to 33 
involve organisations linked to the target customer group and to have 
arrangements in place not only with benefit providers, but also with advice 
agencies and customer groups. It is good practice to establish a project 
management team to oversee the take-up initiative and to draw up a list of 
essential stakeholders. Stakeholders should be involved in the development of 
the project and ideally should include representatives from relevant bodies, such 
as relevant staff from the Department for Work and Pensions. Involvement of the 
Department for Work and Pensions is very important as the impact on call 
centres and claims processing work needs to be safely managed. The project 
management team must assess the impact of any take-up campaign at a local 
level, for example the impact of an influx of enquiries/requests for further advice 
and benefit claims to process. A take-up campaign needs to be managed to 
ensure that the customer’s expectations can be met. (Pension Service 2002:7) 
 
The local authority example of Blackpool shows how information and take-up action 
can be co-ordinated from both central and local levels. The background paper on 
take-up co-ordination lays out the following issues and approaches: 
·  Voluntary, public and Council Groups joined together to become Advice Link 
·  By joining together they were able to use their resources and expertise more 
effectively to address Social Exclusion by increasing the take-up of benefits 
·  Hold regular free advice road shows 
·  Deliver Benefit training to a wide range of organisations and individuals 
·  Fund regular advice sessions in Doctors surgeries 
·  Produce information on benefits and services for people with health 
problems and people in work 
·  Regular column in the Evening Gazette (local newspaper) 
·  Newsletters produced 
·  Website giving information with links to other organisations 
·  2 dedicated staff dealing with benefit take-up in the poorer inner wards 
·  Direct line for residents in the inner wards 




An essential lesson from the British experience is that: 
 
“Specific targeting is by far the best way of ensuring that entitled non-recipients 
claim the benefits that they are entitled to. Targeting is the best method of:  
 
Making sure that the information goes to those who are eligible; and 
reducing the amount of money spent on ineligible claims. (Pensions Service 
2002:5) 
 
2.4.2 Reducing transaction costs 
 
In theory, there is the ability to reduce transactions costs to near zero by automatic 
enrolment in programmes using existing data on incomes and circumstances, either 
from income taxation or other transfer claims. To be optimal such an approach would 
need common definitions of income across different forms of entitlement, or have the 
ability to accurately deduce different income measures from single sources of 
information. There is a practical problem of differences between household, family 
and individual level entitlements. However, electronic data sharing, combined with 
consent and linking across individuals, presents medium- to long-term opportunities 
for improving take-up. The disadvantages and advantages of data-matching are 
discussed by the NAO (2002), who see potential efficiency and effectiveness in 
combining data matching with other take-up measures. The disadvantages are that 
an “assumed claim” may cause offence, additional information is very often needed 
and confidentiality issues are potentially problematic (NAO 2002:44).  34 
 
The general finding from literature on improving take-up is that a passive approach to 
giving information and allowing claim forms to be found, completed and presented for 
administration is sub-optimal (NAO 2002).  
 
The lesson for take-up from claim form design is that simplicity and shortness 
encourage take-up (NAO 2002). However, these factors are to a large extent a 
reflection of the complexity of the overall schemes and are thus partly in the hands of 
policy makers.
25 For instance, simplifying and reducing the claim form considerably 
led to a plethora of pro-forma requests for further information that were sent to 
claimants after their initial claim had been made (NAO 2002). 
 
Even where claims for one transfer programme are not used as claims across a 
range of entitlements, it can still be important for take-up to recognise the links 
between entitlements across a number of programmes in any package of transfers. It 
is a common finding that claiming one transfer will increase the probability of claiming 
other elements (Yelowitz in the USA, and Noble et al. 1992 and NAO 2002 in the UK, 
for instance). This means that different organisational attitudes to claiming and take-
up, differing organisational cultures, and information needs should be strategically 
linked in any cross-programme commitments to take-up (NAO 2002). 
 
There is little evidence that linked administration, beyond the evidence for one-stop 
shops at the front end of the process, is well-received by customers. Where single 
access points bring together very different programmes with different approaches 
and organisational cultures, there is considerable investment required in training and 
expertise for staff involved (NAO 2002).  
 
Telephone call centre and internet access can reduce transaction costs – particularly 
for remote areas and for groups who are best able to use such services. However, 
such services for some groups, for instance pensioners, were found not to be 
universally appropriate (NAO 2002).  
 
2.4.3 Organisational incentives 
 
Currie suggests that higher take-up of some American transfers reflects 
organisational incentives by businesses and public organisations to increase take-up. 
EITC seems to benefit from a large number of commercial “tax-preparers” who assist 
low-income families file taxes and claim EITC. However, Berube et al. (2003) show 
that these services cost significant proportions of future EITC receipt and lower its 
impact on raising incomes, and “that one half of EITC was refunded through high-
priced loans” (p1). Payments for hospital treatment mean that American hospitals are 
also given the incentive to assist patients in claiming Medicaid. This seems to explain 
very high rates of take-up for pregnant women – through hospitals employing private 
firms to enrol women on Medicaid (Currie 2004). Aizer and Currie (2004) show that a 
$US50 payment to hospitals per successful enrolment had a large effect on Medicaid 
take-up, particularly in Hispanic and Asian communities, and was far more effective 
than state-wide advertising. 
 
2.4.4 Potential ways forward 
 
The OECD suggests that improving take-up is not solely a matter of public and 
customer relations activity and improved advertising, but has more structural 
considerations, for instance:  
                                                  
25 See for instance, the discussion in British Parliament at Committee of Public Accounts (2000). 35 
the existence of significant interactions both among different programmes, and 
between the welfare and tax system. Receiving one benefit typically makes it 
more likely that the same person will also apply for other programmes. (Hernanz 
et al. 2004:22)  
 
Table 2.4 shows the suggested policy measures put forward by OECD that include a 
review and simplification of rules, improving interactions across institutions and an 
ongoing commitment to take-up measurement and research. 
 
Table 2.4 Recommendations by OECD take-up review 
 
 
Source: Hernanz et al. 2004:24, table 5 
 
Such an approach has been adopted by the Social Security Agency for Northern 
Ireland (SSANI 2004). The British Department for Work and Pensions has tended to 
take forward such a strategic approach for pensioners only. But in doing so, they 
suggest that to develop take-up work it must be integrated into mainstream services.  
 
2.4.5 Overview of improving take-up 
 
The stated aims of WFF design and implementation – greater simplicity and 
transparency with user-friendly access, combined with a stated policy aim of 
encouraging maximum take-up – are important starting points for a strategic 
approach to take-up. The evidence to date is that a strategic investment across all 
agencies is needed to ensure this occurs for vulnerable groups, where the vast 
majority of literature concerns pensioners. The important attributes of a user-friendly 
application process are low transaction and information costs coupled with 
appropriate organisational incentives. From the documentation provided, it is difficult 
to see how this will evolve in detail with the implementation of WFF.  
 
However, if the measurement and collection of take-up data is regularised and 
performance indicators ensure all policy agencies are working to the same goal of 
maximising take-up, the main elements of structural commitment to take-up are in 
place. The other requirement is one of ongoing review of the operation and of the 
interaction of WFF with other elements of state and voluntary provision, with the 




This section covers a wide field of evidence for the consideration of take-up issues in 
WFF. It brings together tabular and bullet point guides to the international evidence 
for ease of reference. 
 
Table 2.5 shows the main cross-benefit or cross-country studies that should allow the 
greatest level of certainty when weighing up findings for their applicability to New 
Zealand. These studies are themselves literature reviews of different sets of transfers 
(means-tested, categorical and social insurance) for different populations (all, elderly, 
working age, families with children). We have ranked them by their foreseen 
usefulness and general application for New Zealand. The Currie (2004) study is 
ranked highest because it draws together US and UK literature, and looks at not only 
reasons for and findings on take-up but also reviews some US methods to improve it. 
However, this study is strongly based on economic evaluative studies and does not 
mention the richer, more qualitative work that Corden (1999) and Craig (1991) cover 
in their earlier studies. We have thus flagged up some caveats in Table 2.5 to put 
against the strengths of each of the studies. We have also added the Moffitt-edited 
book (2003) to Table 2.5 because the US literature is widely spread and difficult to 
condense. The overviews that often appear internationally through advocacy and 
lobbying can sometimes be over-persuasive towards one or other ideological 
viewpoint. This text, if available, is a remarkable reference point with top quality 
contributions that explain the history as well as performance of all US means-tested 
programmes. It will also assist in literature for employment and child-related 
outcomes. 
 
Table 2.6 cites the selection of empirical studies best placed to answer the questions 
about who takes up assistance and why, and that related most directly to the group 
that most concerns MSD – low-income families with children. Table 2.6 is not a 
comprehensive list of studies on take-up; they represent those that appear most 
useful and most able to be generalised to WFF in New Zealand. The first group of 
studies looks at take-up as a process and what influences take-up; the latter group 
looks at the characteristics of who does not take-up. Again we have added the main 
strengths and weaknesses or caveats for interpretation and use.  37 
Table 2.5 Reference studies for take-up  
Study  Country  Programme coverage  Population coverage  Key strengths/findings  Key caveats 
1) Other literature reviews and overviews 
Currie (2004)  USA and UK  Means-tested  
categorical and insurance 
All  Common US–UK findings 
 
Economic perspective  




OECD  Means-tested 
Categorical  
Social insurance 
All  Strong on approaches and data sources 
Coverage of non-US/UK literature 
Mostly economic literature 
Little on claim process 
Craig (1991)  UK  Means-tested in-work,  
social assistance, housing 
allowances 
All  Brings together theory and evidence 
Good fit for NZ policy perspective 
Dated – no tax-credit 
Corden (1999)  UK  Means-tested in-work,  
social assistance, housing 
allowances 
All  Brings together theory and evidence 
Good fit for NZ policy perspective 
Weaker on economic approach 
Dated – no tax credit 
Moffitt (ed) (2003)  USA  All means-tested 
programmes 
All low income  Major overview of all US programmes 
Comprehensive and detailed 
Major reference text for US comparison 
Take-up covered inconsistently by 
programme. EITC and food stamps most 
relevant 38 
Table 2.6 Non-take-up: reasons and characteristics of families 
Study  Country  Programme coverage  Population coverage  Study type  Key strengths/findings   Key caveats/limits to generalisation
Reasons for non-take-up of means-tested transfers 
Bartlett and 
Burnstein (2004) 
USA  Food stamps  Eligible non-participants 
Elderly and working age 
and social assistance 
Large quant survey  Awareness, attitudes and 
stigma found  
Even with good awareness 
attitudes and stigma matter 
Distinct food stamp characteristics 
– purchase voucher 
US policy context 
Corden (1983)  UK  In-work transfers for 
families 
Eligible working-age 
families with children 
Small qualitative  Delays in claiming 
Trigger events important 
Inter-relation of attitudes and claim 
process 
Old type in-work cash benefit 
Small population of entitlement 
(doesn’t go far up income 
distribution) 
Daponte, Sanders 
and Taylor (1999) 




Information improves take-up 
Transaction costs important 
 
US policy context 
Mixed in-work out of work group
Currie and Grogger 
(2002) 




Increasing transaction costs 
reduces take-up 
Medical care cost programme not 
basic income support 
Linked programme to US social 
assistance. 
Moffitt (2003)  USA  TANF  Low-income families 
with children 
Regression on several 
states’ survey data 
Diversion and other non-financial 
factors affect take-up 
US policy context 
Characteristics of those that take-up 
Dorset and Heady 
(1991) 




Regression on pooled 
survey data 
Income, age tenure and education 
affected take-up 
Old scheme for small number of 
low paid workers. Few part-time 
workers 
Brewer, Suárez 
and Walker (2003) 




Regression on survey data  Income, tenure, education, 
presence of young children under 5 
and lone parenthood affect take-up 
Most relevant to MSD for 
characteristics analysis 
Scholz (1994)  USA  In-work tax credits 
(EITC) 
Low-income families 
with children – tax filers 
Regression on survey data  Self-employment, occupation, 
income, family size, Hispanic 
Only In-work earners 




Alternative theoretical approaches have overlapping merits.  
 
Psychological approaches to attitudes and decision making tend to provide the most 
insightful explanations of the claim decision and claim process. 
 
Economic distinctions between information costs, transaction costs and stigma 
(basically a name for other, perhaps unobserved, costs are clear ways to analyse 
system performance and to use as a basis for strategies to improve take-up.  
 
The institutional view of take-up is useful as a model to build towards – using both 
studies of claiming and analyses of take-up to provide a comprehensive profile. 
 
Both American and British evidence supports a positive answer to the question “Do 
people’s views of delivery agencies influence their decision to access assistance?”  
 
What is known about factors that underlie variance in take-up rates? The main 
universal factors are attitudes, information, the time and hassle costs of application 
and processing, administrative practice and social and individual perceptions of 
status – stigma. 
 
The issue of stigma is important and is mentioned across all literature, but it is difficult 
to measure and capture accurately and separately from other attitudes and beliefs.  
 
Overall awareness of the existence of a programme is important, but the more 
specific problem for non-take-up is awareness of potential entitlement and this is 
linked to perceptions of entitlement. This means there is an overlap between scheme 
complexity, understanding the scheme and how information is tailored to suit the 
individual’s circumstances.  
 
Who is more or less likely to access assistance? Those with the lowest incomes and 
highest entitlements are most likely to claim. However, additional characteristics that 
have been found across studies are age (older people take-up less), size of 
household (lone parents or single earners take-up more) and education (highly 
educated people tend to apply less). 
 
Other characteristics can additionally be found to be associated with take-up – 
minority ethnicity in some cases, although this can be associated with both higher 
and lower take-up. The age of children is also seen in some studies to be an 
independent factor. This means that questions about the important factors that 
determine take-up for different groups of people depend a lot on context. New 
Zealand is in a very good position to explore take-up of indigenous populations, a 
particular concern of MSD, as they qualify equally for a national scheme but their 
take-up profile will depend on their economic and demographic profile and attitudinal 
profiles across the board. 
 
Is there evidence of under utilisation by high-need groups? On the whole such 
evidence relates to imposed transaction costs and stigma rather than on information 
costs. 
 
Evidence on sustained take-up is very limited. There is a finding of long-term loyalty 
to in-work benefits in the UK that matches economic hypotheses about the fixed 
costs to status of receiving benefits. However, lower trade-offs between entitlement 
and transaction costs over time may lower take-up.  40 
 
New Zealand is in a unique position to use the ability of claimants to choose the 
period of payment of their in-work payment receipt to explore issues of both take-up 
and labour supply that this brings about. Emerging evidence from Britain on the 
review and claw back of overpayments of tax credits deserves close monitoring.  
 
The evidence from the review points to areas where problems of take-up can be 
foreseen, both in client groups and in operational terms. It is then a case of 
prioritisation. For instance, weighing up how far an investment in ensuring take-up for 
those entering work from social assistance is a higher priority than ensuring that in-
work payments are given to those already in work who qualify but who have had no 
trigger point to suggest that they are entitled. The first of these will ensure that more 
entries into work are sustainable, and will reinforce the employment and making work 
pay elements of the WFF package, but would be predicted to have smaller effects on 
the overall take-up rates (especially caseload measures). The second choice would 
probably involve focusing more on those already in work and already filing tax 
returns, but could potentially have greater impact on take-up rates for in-work 
payment. These are illustrative suggestions that point to the types of policy initiatives 






A central theme of the WFF reform is to increase the financial incentives for families 
with children to work. By increasing employment rates and supporting employment 
financially through an in-work payment (IWP) there will be additional reductions in 
poverty for families with children. IWP is thus a crucial central element of the WFF 
package. One of the particular problems with families with children is that their out-of-
work transfers takes into account the size of their family, whereas wages from 
employment do not, and the number of potential hours of work is constrained by the 
presence of children.
26 IWP seeks to ensure that employment makes families with 
children better off. 
 
The reason for the importance of such making work pay programmes is that wage 
levels for unskilled work have fallen in recent years in relative and often real terms, 
over a period when labour market rewards for skills have increased. This means that 
those most at risk of being out of work in terms of their skill and education profile face 
poor incentives to return to work because their earning potential is limited. Children 
increase this risk as their presence means that parents can work fewer hours, 
especially when the children are young. 
 
IWP is one of an increasing number of in-work transfers that are being adopted by a 
range of governments across the world. This cross-national practice of intervening to 
change the financial trade-off between being in work or being non-employed and 
receiving transfers has been called “making work pay” in many commentaries.  
 
When we look at IWP and the other WFF interventions alongside similar programmes 
in other countries we encounter serious questions of just how similar they are if we 
take into account a wider underlying policy context. Most OECD countries have 
interventions to assist labour demand and supply and to make work pay programmes 
fit into a package of such interventions – some macro-economic, some based on 
individual incentives. But other interventions that exist, (schooling and nursery 
provision, for instance, and maternity and paternity leave and other family friendly 
employment practices), can make comparison and interpretation of the “making work 
pay” element alone very restricted.  Similar programmes may be compensating for 
problems elsewhere in the system and on the contrary, the absence of such 
programmes in countries may point to significant alternative interventions that ensure 
parents can enter and retain employment.  
 
Our task in this section is clear. We review the general evidence about how these 
making work pay transfers exist alongside other ways of making work pay. Then, we 
select countries – the UK, USA and Canada – which have similar programmes in 
similar contexts and have sufficiently robust evaluation evidence to make its inclusion 
worthwhile.  
 
We first need to cover four concerns: the theoretical basis and limitations of 
interventions such as IWP; the relationship of in-work programmes to what happens 
in terms what have come to be called “activation” programmes and interactions with 
                                                  
26 We will not enter into detailed discussion of household labour supply, but female labour supply is 
usually more constrained than male labour supply, in a couple. However, the differences depend very 
much on earnings and education and differ greatly between countries. In some countries it has been 
found that male’s labour supply can actually increase after having children, for instance. 42 
other public policy. This “activation” label (rather inconsistently applied by many) 
refers to the rules of claiming out-of-work benefits and the imposition of employment 
conditions and sanctions. We call this “conditionality”. Conditionality rarely exists 
alone because many of those who claim out-of-work benefits require programmes to 
improve their employability characteristics, to narrow the distance they have to the 
labour market and to assist in job search and job getting. We call these “active labour 
market programmes”. Together these activation characteristics vary greatly between 
countries, even if they have similar looking in-work transfer programmes. Finally, we 
consider the potential for in-work transfers to interact with other forms of policy 
interventions when parents are in work. These are taxes, health care and health care 
charges but also more directly the childcare and pre-school provisions described in 
section 5. 
 
3.1.1 Theoretical incentives and outcomes 
 
There is a sound labour supply rationale for IWP. Raising in-work incomes for families 
with children through IWP will make job entry probabilities higher – as it alters the 
costs and benefits of employment in a number of ways.  
 
First, it can influence the so-called “reservation wage”. This means that a parent 
looking for employment will have in their mind what is needed to ensure their family is 
provided for and will look for a wage that matches these expectations. What IWP can 
do is to lower the reservation wage by ensuring that a lower wage will be topped up 
to make it meet the expectations of required living standards, either in full or in part.  
 
Second, it can also solve the so-called “unemployment trap”. This is where net 
income in work is less than or only marginally different from net incomes out of work. 
If the income from out-of-work benefits is compared to income from work and 
expressed as a ratio, this is termed the “replacement ratio”. The hope is that the 
reforms will decrease the replacement ratio for most families, lowering the 
replacement rate of social assistance from say 80% of net income to 60% of net 
income by raising in-work incomes for the difference; in this example, 20%. 
 
But IWP will not only affect the movement into work (“job entry”), but also those 
already in work. This is a key distinction from other forms of intervention in other 
countries. Some systems allow claimants of social assistance to keep entitlement 
while they work and then withdraw it as incomes rise or after a period of time in work. 
A simple way of thinking about this is that such schemes are primarily focused on 
job-entry transitions, moving people from “welfare to work”. 
 
IWP does more than this because it has an income support and anti-poverty role as 
well. This has important consequences for its evaluation because it will go to many 
low-paid people who are already working. This means the pure net impact on 
reducing non-employment, or “additionality” of the programme, will be less because 
many who receive the programme do not have to move into work. This impact could 
be interpreted as “deadweight” if one ignores the aims of reducing poverty and 
keeping people in work working.  
 
IWP is most generous to those with the lowest earnings and is targeted so that its 
generosity declines as incomes rise. This feature is shared with countries that taper 
out their social assistance to encourage transitions as discussed above. Tapering of 
entitlement as income rises does not happen in isolation, however, but will at some 
point in the income distribution occur alongside other policy interventions. The most 
obvious is income tax, but there may also be housing allowances, and health and 
education charges, for instance. Together with IWP these will reduce gross income 43 
by combining a range of claw-backs as income rises and crosses various thresholds. 
This means that the withdrawal rate for the IWP taper, alongside the tax rate, 
alongside the taper for withdrawal of other programmes, may all add up to a 
substantial effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). Calculating such EMTRs means that 
the net income after all tapers and taxes have been applied is compared to the gross 
income and applied to the marginal additional dollar or hour of work. The 
combinations of taxes and tapers may lead to very high EMTRs – they are as high as 
90% for some in the UK, for instance. This means that working an extra hour only 
leaves you with 10% of what you have additionally earned at the income ranges that 
this rate applies. Because those with lowest incomes are more likely to encounter 
multiple withdrawal tapers, the highest EMTRs tend to be for the lowest earners. For 
this reason in the early 1970s this phenomenon was called “poverty trap”.
27 It made 
escaping from the margins of poverty impossible; each additional hour of work did 
not provide sufficient net income to close the poverty gap significantly or to achieve 
sufficient clearance from the poverty line. 
 
How do all these potential effects and interactions affect the potential outcomes of 
programmes that make work pay? At this point it is worthwhile recapping on some of 
the theoretical expectations for the WFF programme on employment that were 
discussed in part 6 of the accompanying methodology report (Bryson et al. 2006). 
 
The most important point is that increases to employment from the job-entry effect of 
IWP will be offset by potential effects where those in work reduce their hours or stop 
working when faced with the higher EMTRs. Labour supply is based on two 
decisions: to work and, for those who choose work, the number of hours to work. In 
our accompanying report we suggested the following,  
Assume for the moment that these are relatively unconstrained choices of 
individuals and that the choice is determined largely by the net income generated 
by decisions and preferences for work versus leisure at different levels of net 
income. These decisions are affected by what economists call income and 
substitution effects. The income effect refers to changes in desired hours of work 
as individuals’ incomes change, holding the wage rate constant. If leisure is a 
normal good, the effect of higher income (with a constant wage rate) is to reduce 
labour supply. The substitution effect describes the effect on a person’s choice 
between hours of paid work and leisure as the wage rate changes, holding 
income constant. An increase in the net wage rate (with constant income) may 
be expected to increase labour supply. (Bryson et al. 2006:45)  
 
When it comes to choosing hours of work, and especially for those who are entering 
work from benefits, those with the most constraints on their work (and in practical and 
applied terms this is most easily observed with sole parents) often choose to work for 
the number of hours at the threshold of eligibility for in-work transfers. This has been 
called “the backward bending labour supply curve” by for example Blundell (1994).  
 
But many work decisions are not made by individuals but by households, usually, for 
the purposes of WFF, couples (with children). For couples, where both partners are 
facing job entry, there is a dual or single earner choice. Who should work and for how 
many hours –individually or combined? If we assume full IWP take-up and this 
means that all are making the choice with IWP in place, then a weekly 30 hours’ 
eligibility condition at the household level enables both individuals in a couple to work 
for shorter hours. This is different from many other in-work transfer programmes and 
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may help to avoid the “dual earner” versus “no earner” (“work rich and work poor”) 
households that appear in the UK (described below). However, if there is already one 
worker in a household receiving IWP and their partner is considering job entry, the 
high marginal tax rates (EMTRs) described previously may deter them from doing so, 
unless the additional income takes them clear of IWP eligibility. There will be little net 
increase in income if they enter work and remain within IWP entitlement. This 
potentially means there is little incentive for second earners for long periods of time 
while children are present in the household unless income increases through 
earnings progression or the potential second earner can command higher wages.  
 
IWP may also theoretically be seen to reduce existing work participation in couples 
where both already work. Once entitled to IWP it is possible that one parent (with a 
presumption that it is the parent with lower attachment to the labour market – 
possibly working part-time and most usually the woman) will either work fewer hours, 
reduce his/her hours or withdraw completely from the labour market. These factors 
mean that the direct employment effects of in-work transfer policies may produce 
increases in employment rates – but that the overall effect is due to the accumulation 
of a number of underlying effects. 
 
As discussed in part 6 of the methodology report (Bryson et al. 2006) we can predict 
a number of different effects under a range of standard economic models and 
assumptions.  
 
First, the expected effects on those who are out of work are: 
·  a job-entry effect – this means that either those who previously did not choose to 
work now do so or that others bring forward their planned entry into work  
·  a lowering of reservation wages – which may increase the numbers actively job 
searching but may also affect the type of jobs accepted, by attracting people to 
work for less than they would normally demand. This may mean that job matching 
to their skills profile is potentially weakened.  
 
Second, for those already working there are the following expected effects:  
·  a retention effect – WFF will act as a buffer to those in work whose circumstances 
or income changes in ways that would have made them leave work in the 
absence of WFF 
·  an increased hours effect – there will be a group of existing workers whose part-
time hours are below the eligibility threshold, who would gain from an increase in 
their hours to receive a considerable rise in income 
·  a decreased hours effect – as discussed previously, the effect of high EMTRs is 
mainly reducing hours of participation and promoting underemployment 
·  potential effects on individual earnings progression – high EMTRs can, in theory, 
reduce incentives to gain promotion and to invest in skills and other human 
capital that would raise earnings. However, this may be offset by employers 
having lower wage costs and a greater ability to invest in training. 
 
In addition there is a range of general equilibrium effects – WFF may not only affect 
participants but may also have wider effects on non-participants by substituting their 
job-entry or other outcomes through displacement:  
·  the potential exists for WFF to increase aggregate employment. Such job growth 
will put more spending power in the hands of consumers and thus contribute to 
aggregate demand for goods and labour  
·  changes to the aggregate demand for labour where WFF could increase the 
overall labour demand. IWP makes wages relatively cheaper than other labour 
demand factors and may allow employers to employ more people. Similarly, 45 
increased levels of job searching can reduce pressure on wage growth and 
increase the number of jobs offered 
·  changes to general wage setting – subsidies may allow employers to reduce 
wages towards the minimum wage because the difference will be covered for 
many by WFF. Recipients may reduce demands for increased wages because of 
high EMTRs but non-recipients may also be affected 
·  paying for the programme and taxation and the effect of the programme on tax 
behaviour also has to be taken into account. 
 
For fuller discussion of these effects and further clarification read the accompanying 
methodology paper (Bryson et al. 2006). 
 
The key point here is that the international evidence available to answer the question 
of “how far in-work payments increase participation in the workforce” has severe 
limitations. Rarely does a particular national body of evidence cover all these 
potential aspects of outcomes. More importantly, determining how far the particular 
intervention of in-work transfers has independently produced any of this large 
portfolio of potential outcomes is difficult because of the operation of simultaneous 
additional policy programmes. These potential theoretical outcomes for in-work 
supplementation will not occur in isolation, and evidence of the actual outcomes from 
such programmes is influenced by other policy programmes as well as taxation and 
the macro-economic environment. Exactly the same programme but with a different 
method of finance may have very different outcomes. Exactly the same in-work 
programme with different policy assumptions about conditionality and active labour 
market programmes will also potentially have very different outcomes. 
 
These two last areas of policy context are most essential to interpretation, if we leave 
aside the question of finance and taxation. 
 
3.1.2 Welfare populations and active labour market programmes 
 
If one thinks of IWP supplementation as a “pull” factor that improves incentives to 
move from non-employment into work then most countries have policy programmes 
that exert a “push”. Such policies differ greatly – between countries and between 
target groups within countries, and the amount of push can be anything from gentle 
persuasion to a compulsory shove. This means that two hypothetically identical in-
work programmes may have different outcomes purely because of how their target 
group is contextualised and what happens to them (Evans 2001). 
 
Indeed, when we think more broadly about the general policy aim of “making work 
pay” and incentives to work, there is an alternative to increasing in-work support: to 
decrease out-of-work support. OECD countries show a broad pattern of reducing 
periods and generosity of entitlement for core unemployed populations and more 
varied treatment of the wider social assistance provisions. These changes usually 
mean increasing obligations to participate in active labour market programmes rather 
than substantial changes to entitlement. The main outlier is the USA. Before 1996 
“welfare reform” centred on increasing participation in employment-related activity but 
from 1996 has made huge inroads into reducing entitlement. Since then there has 
been no “entitlement” to social assistance at all but a lifetime-limited eligibility of five 
years on the programme (reduced to two years in some states) during which 
employment-related obligations have also been raised significantly (Evans 2001).  
 
This is not the place to discuss such changes in any detail, but rather to emphasise 
that individual and aggregate level employment outcomes result from both push and 
pull factors and that it is essential for interpretation of cross-national evidence on 46 
employment outcomes that such differences in context are understood and taken into 
account.  
 
3.1.3 Interaction with other policy 
 
The implementation and success of in-work transfers also rests on what policy 
framework surrounds and accompanies employment, especially for parents.  
 
As mentioned in section 3.1, some schemes to improve incentives to work may 
involve improving the way social assistance treats earnings to encourage recipients 
into employment alongside their entitlement to social assistance rather than having a 
separate in-work transfer. Some of these schemes are time limited and some are not. 
Much experimental evidence relates to programmes that operated as part of 
American waiver schemes
28 before 1996. This means that some of the evidence on 
in-work transfers is not through separate programmes and relates solely to ex-social 
assistance claimants rather than the more general population of low-paid workers. 
 
Significant emphasis has been put on the interaction of other transfer programmes 
and the combined EMTRs that result from overlapping entitlements and withdrawal of 
means-tested transfers. But there are other interactions with potentially important 
effects and that have been found to be important in other systems. Health provision is 
an obvious case. Many parents have a high likelihood of health care needs for 
themselves and their children, and paying for user charges and prescription costs 
can be important factors for those faced with potentially high costs. Similar 
considerations apply more widely across parents for school-related costs. 
 
Maternity leave and childcare provision both strongly influence underlying parental 
employment rates and the impact of in-work transfers. Maternity leave provisions in 
some countries allow for up to three years’ leave during which the parent can 
continue to be counted as “employed” – this makes direct comparison of parental 
employment rates difficult. Provision of pre-school childcare differs hugely between 
countries from universal free full-time provision at the age of three or less in France 
to more restricted and selective private provision in others. Such differences hugely 
alter the costs of parental employment and the need for and generosity of in-work 
transfers.  
 
These three considerations show that while there are clear theoretical outcomes that 
can be expected to be common across countries with in-work transfer schemes, 
comparing the outcomes and interpreting their relevance for WFF in New Zealand 
can be very difficult and has to be carefully contextualised. Our approach is to first 
outline general cross-national evidence on in-work transfers and making work pay. 
Next we focus on three countries with a good quality of evidence about how changes 
in policy over time have affected employment. 
 
3.2. Making work pay, making work possible – OECD and general cross-
national evidence 
 
The OECD put the issue of in-work transfers and financial incentives neatly into the 
wider context with the phrase “Making Work Pay, Making Work Possible” (OECD 
2003b), encompassing both supply and demand side characteristics that can raise 
                                                  
28 States in the USA were encouraged to introduce innovative changes to AFDC programmes under a 
waiver of federal rules if they also employed experimental evaluation of such innovations. 47 
employment rates for women, lone parents and others who have particular labour 
market disadvantage.  
 
The common characteristics shared by WFF reforms and American and UK systems 
are their scope and size. They are all “generous” and generally available across the 
low-paid target group rather than linked specifically to social assistance receipt. 
Making a substantial difference to incomes at the margins, ie relative generosity, 
does seem important. Evaluation of less generous schemes, such as the French 
Prime pour l’emploi (PPE) where support is between 4% and 7% of recipients’ 
income, suggests it has low employment impacts (Cahuc 2002, OECD 2003b). In 
contrast, American and UK schemes contribute around 40% of income or more for 
those at the lowest earnings. 
 
Other policies to make work pay have focussed on lowering tax for the low paid – 
either for employers, employees or both. The UK has done this alongside introducing 
a minimum wage and improving the generosity of in-work transfers. Evaluations tend 
to show such schemes provide aggregate increases in employment on the basis of a 
general equilibrium assumption. Belgian schemes raised all employment by 3.2% 
and low-paid employment by 6.7% (Sneessens and Shadman 2000, OECD 2003b). 
French schemes had broadly similar results (OECD 2003b) while Dutch schemes 
saw overall employment raised by 1% and low-skilled employment by 5% (Műhlau 
and Salverda 2000, OECD 2003b).  
 
The most interesting points for international comparison come from how such 
schemes compare with the approach of using income transfers. O’Donoghue and 
Utilli (2000) suggest that their analysis shows more commonality across “Anglo-
Saxon” type policy regimes (US, UK, Eire) and “Continental European” policies on 
their impact on wage distribution, and on poor incentives to enter low-paid work. But 
they found greater differences between schemes for second earner effects and on 
incentives for longer hours and income progression where those systems using 
means-tested in-work transfers fared worse. In the words of Fitoussi (2000), such 
schemes are not a “miracle solution” to solve employment and distribution problems, 
but have the potential to increase the actual volume of employment by around 2% in 
France and similar economies. Gradus and Julsing (2001), looking across five 
European systems, demonstrate that tax-credits are more effective than reductions in 
taxation for job creation.  
If the main objective of reform is to reduce the unemployment among the low-
skilled, an in-work tax credit is more effective than reducing the basic rate. A tax 
credit is at least two times as effective as reducing the basic rate. Phasing out 
the tax credit makes it even more effective in reducing unemployment among the 
low-skilled, although there can be some drawbacks in incentives for training and 
labour supply in hours for the low-skilled workers.” (Gradus and Julsing 2001:22) 
 
Looking across the range of policies that make work pay, Pearson and Scarpetta 
(2000) find that the theoretical predictions outlined in section 3.1 are largely 
vindicated. They summarise:  
the overall message ... is fairly optimistic. Make work pay policies promote 
employment of the target group of those who might otherwise be trapped in 
joblessness. As a result of MWP policies, there is some reduction in hours 
worked or employment by those already working, even though such negative 
effects can be mitigated by judicious design of the scheme. (Pearson and 
Scarpetta 2000:16) 
The main finding from the OECD and other cross-national reviews is that 
employment conditional benefits provide better work incentives and an important 
redistributive programme (this is discussed more in section 4).  48 
While being both a pillar of their redistribution systems and accounting for 
substantial transfers, evaluations have shown them to provide effective 
incentives to return to employment. (OECD 2003a:3)  
 
The review of OECD members with programmes that make work pay leads us to 
define more closely what is appropriate for review for MSD. First, there is the 
question of the form of intervention – a refundable tax credit or in-work cash transfer 
paid to low-paid families with children. Next is the issue of accompanying policy 
assumptions and policy context. Australia, the UK, the USA and Canada all share 
some standard assumptions about liberal labour market policies, have more limited 
interventions for pre-school and childcare than continental European schemes, and 
have similar approaches to means-testing as the major targeting mechanism for 
transfers for working-age families. Third is the availability of evidence, not just on 
employment outcomes but also on the linked aim of poverty reduction, so that results 
can feed in to discussion in section 4 more easily. This last criterion leaves us with 
three countries that have refundable tax credits or in-work cash transfers 
(increasingly the former) with a sufficient evidence base: the US, the UK and 
Canada. 
 
3.3 Refundable tax credits to families with children 
 
We now turn to the in-work transfer systems that look most like the WFF programme, 
especially to two countries with the longest experience of running such programmes 
and with the greatest amount of evaluation evidence: the UK and USA. We will also 
look at two schemes in Canada with good evaluation evidence. 
 
3.3.1 The United Kingdom 
 
The UK has the longest history of in-work supplementation of wages for low-paid 
families with children, beginning with the introduction of Family Income Supplement 
in 1972. This scheme was replaced by Family Credit in 1988, which made in-work 
benefits more generous and targeted sole parents and part-time work by reducing the 
weekly hours of eligibility to 16 in 1992. Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) 
replaced Family Credit in 1999 with a more generous system and clearer subsidies 
for childcare costs. This also marked a change in payment form, from weekly benefit 
paid by the Department for Social Security directly to the individual, to a tax credit 
administered by Inland Revenue and payable via the wage packet (the UK has a “pay 
as you earn” system that deducts weekly income taxation liability at source from 
employees together with social insurance contributions) or to the individual. One 
crucial characteristic of the old system was kept: WFTC stayed as an immediate 
weekly payment, unlike other tax credits in other countries, which are claimed at the 
end of the year.  
 
A new system of tax credits in April 2003 brought a Child Tax Credit payable to all 
who are in and out of work with children, but withdrawn at higher incomes. This was 
accompanied by a Working Tax Credit, payable to all low-paid, with or without 
children. There is no labour supply evaluation evidence for this latest scheme yet. 
Our approach with the UK evidence is to review the most recent literature on the 
change from Family Credit to WFTC since 1999, because it benefits from more 
recent methodologies and approaches.
29 We then assess how far the evidence is 
consistent with earlier literature on effects of Family Credit and FIS. An important 
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point to note (in contrast to the USA), is that a universal non-means-tested child 
benefit programme in the UK pays weekly benefits to those with children aged under 
16 and to those with older children under 19 in secondary education.  
 
Both Family Credit and WFTC ignore all income from child support maintenance 
payments, sums that are taken into account when calculating social assistance and 
thus contributing strongly to incentives to work in combination with earnings. Several 
important points of policy context that affect interpretation of evaluation evidence of 
WFTC have arisen from 1999 to 2004: these changes were accompanied by the 
contemporaneous introduction of a national minimum wage, reductions in social 
insurance liabilities for employees and employers for the lowest paid and the 
development of national active labour market policies for lone parents and partners 
(usually female) of those claiming unemployment and other out-of-work benefits. The 
“New Deal for Lone Parents” (Evans et al. 2003) is the most important of these for 
discussion. Less clear but also present was an increased commitment to childcare 
provision through a National Childcare Strategy and accompanying area-based 
programmes to improve childcare in the poorest communities. The supply of 
childcare was also stimulated by the elements of WFTC now available to meet 
childcare costs. Additionally, the UK had entered the longest continuous period of 
economic growth and job creation in the 20th century. One policy change reduced 
theoretical incentives to work for families – the significant increase in social 
assistance (income support) rates for children implemented simultaneously in order 
to decrease severe monetary hardship and referred to earlier.  
 
Figure 3.1 Generosity of Working Families’ Tax Credit compared to Family 
Credit 
 
Source: Dilnot and McCrae 1999  
 
The change from Family Credit to WFTC raised the amounts of in-work benefit 
awarded and lowered the tapers of withdrawal (from 70% to 55%). This increase in 
generosity enabled many recipients to no longer require means-tested help with 
housing costs, a factor in producing very high EMTRs under the Family Credit 
scheme. An extra element of tax credit was also available to meet up to 70% of 
childcare costs, to a stipulated maxima for lone parents and couples where both 
partners work more than 16 hours per week. This replaced a “childcare disregard” in 
Family Credit that suffered from very low levels of take-up. Figure 3.1 clearly shows 
the increased generosity of WFTC, with and without childcare credit, compared to the 
previous scheme. 
 
Ex-ante simulations of the WFTC changes came up with a range of predicted 
employment outcomes, summarised by Blundell and Reed (2000) and shown in table 
3.1. 50 
 
Table 3.1 Predicted impacts of Working Families’ Tax Credit  
  Number employed 
(000s) 
% 
Sole parents  +24.7 to +34.0  +1.6 to +2.2 
Women in couple – non-working 
partner 
+11.0 to +14.6  +1.3 to +1.8 
Women in couple – working 
partner 
-20.1 to -29.0  -0.6 to -0.8 
Men in couple – non-working 
partner 
+13.0 to +16.8  +0.4 to +0.5 
Men in couple – working partner  -10.5 to +1.8   -0.3 to +0.05 
Source: Blundell and Reed 2000, table 1
30 
 
The comparative modelling suggested an “unambiguous positive impact” for lone 
parents and a sizeable impact on women in couples with a non-working partner (ie 
both positive job-entry effects). However, in couples where there were already two 
earners the general predictions were of a negative effect. There was some 
disagreement between different models on exits from work for men with a working 
partner. How were such predictions supported by subsequent evaluation and how do 
they compare to other previous research? 
 
This potential unambiguous success of increased employment for sole parents has 
been born out in fact by a number of studies. Gregg and Harkness (2003) look at the 
overall policy package for lone parents only and show that employment rates raised 
by around 5% since 1999, with a 7% rise for those working over 16 hours a week. 
They found evidence of an increase in hours of work, “a consequence of lone parents 
shifting from short hours to over 16 hours a week in order to become eligible for tax-
credits” (Gregg and Harkness 2003:27). They found no increase in hours for those 
working more than 16 hours a week: 
These employment gains appear not to have come at the expense of lower 
earnings, and it appears that the least educated have not been more responsive 
to the reforms than better educated lone parents (Gregg and Harkness 2003:27)  
 
Gregg and Harkness make no attempt to separately identify impacts from WFTC and 
other contemporaneous policy changes. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004) 
focus on sole parents. They estimated a similar overall impact in additional 
employment of 16 hours a week and over – a 7% increase, but estimated this 
increase was mostly accounted for by work of 30 hours a week or more. They found 
an entry and retention effect produces higher employment rates. Next they found that 
mothers with young children aged under five years, raised their employment rate by 
12%. Last, they found that sole parents benefited particularly from childcare credit 
provisions (especially those with pre-school children) for both job entry and retention:  
More than 50% of the increased entry rate in eligible employment was 
attributable to lone mothers who also chose paid childcare arrangements,
31 and 
the effect was stronger for mothers with pre-school aged children. Similarly, 
among single mothers who continued to be in employment, 50% of their greater 
post-reform labour market attachment is observed in conjunction with paid 
childcare services. (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw 2004:50)  
 
Leigh (2004) looks across all eligible families and finds an overall positive effect on 
employment participation and hours worked. His results confirm those of Gregg and 
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Harkness (2003) and Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004) on sole parents, but 
also appear more positive for other groups than predictions suggested: “Across 
family types, the tax credit appeared to have increased hours worked for eligible 
single women, as well as for both men and women in couples” (Leigh 2004:18). 
Indeed, on hours worked, Leigh finds no evidence of bunching at the 16-hour 
entitlement threshold or at the other threshold in the system at 30 hours.
32 This 
contradicts previous findings for Family Credit discussed below.  
 
Brewer et al. (2003), using a structural modelling approach, also looked across all 
entitled groups. They confirmed the positive findings for sole parents, with a 4.7% 
increase in employment. They also found increases in employment of men in couples 
by 0.8% but a reduction of 0.2% for women in couples. Looking back at the predicted 
outcomes shown in table 3.1 above, they state: “Our results are the same in sign, 
although larger in magnitude” (Brewer et al. 2003:40). They estimate that increased 
social assistance rates for children aged under 11 years reduced WFTC work 
incentives. On a wider analysis of associated reforms alongside WFTC, the positive 
employment effect for sole parents remains (3.4%) but there is a negative effect on 
both men and women in couples of around 0.4%. 
 
The evidence of WFTC on employment rates and hours points to gains for lone 
parents, with more mixed results for men and women in couples. There is some 
variance in the findings on hours. Other evidence of effects on earnings also indicate 
positive outcomes, contrary to the simplistic theory that EMTRs will encourage 
individuals and employers away from earnings growth. Leigh (2004) finds a pre-tax 
growth of 4% on average. Lydon and Walker (2004) also found wage growth:  
The reform left those in receipt of the maximum FC [Family Credit] with 
unchanged incentives for wage progression and no significant change in their 
wage growth. While those who became eligible for WFTC and who had not 
previously been eligible for FC face greater incentives for wage progression and 
we do find a change of 2.7% – which is large in the light of the overall mean real 
wage growth of just over 3%. (p31) 
 
In addition to the econometric modelling of labour supply, there is a steadily growing 
pool of evidence from surveys that help to contextualise the employment impacts of 
WFTC. WFTC is highly visible – only eight months after its introduction, three-
quarters of lone parents and two-thirds of low- to moderate-income couples knew 
about eligibility for WFTC, and five times as many preferred WFTC to Family Credit 
than the reverse. WFTC also seemed to encourage uptake of childcare (McKay 
2001). The evidence clearly shows that lone parents prefer to use WFTC alongside 
part-time work – with most (64%) working 16–29 hours a week. This compares with 
32% of eligible non-recipients of WFTC working these hours (Marsh and Rowlingson 
2002).  
This suggests that many of this group are working near to what most people 
recognise as a ‘full-time’ working week and may not feel in need of a wage 
supplement that is anyway smaller than other entitlements. Eighty three per cent 
of those who had incomes above WFTC were working 30 hours a week or more. 
(Marsh and Rowlingson 2002:7)  
 
Subsequent analysis in later years confirmed this (McKay 2003, Barnes et al. 2004). 
Over a year, half the lone parents moving into paid work had jobs 16–23 hours a 
week and 63% were receiving WFTC (McKay 2003). There was also a strong 
association among participation in the active labour market programme, moving into 
paid work of 16 or more hours, and WFTC. The levels of increased income from the 
                                                  
32 Both family credit and WFTC had higher rates of eligible credit for those working 30 hours or more to 
attempt to stop incentives to reduce hours to part-time work  52 
combination of earnings and WFTC were often proportionally very high – around 
50% of previous out-of-work income (McKay 2003). 
 
How does this latest body of evidence relate to the previous policy of in-work 
transfers in the UK, namely Family Credit? Family Credit was more generous than its 
predecessor, Family Income Supplement. It was introduced to improve incentives to 
work by removing unemployment traps and aligning income definitions (used across 
the system) of means-tested provision for social assistance and housing allowances, 
in order to avoid EMTRs of over 100%, which existed previously.
33 Income became 
net of taxes, and eligibility moved from 30 to 24 hours of weekly work. For families 
with children, it was estimated that full-time, low-income earners would lose (primarily 
because gains from Family Credit were eroded by reduced housing allowances). 
Eligibility for Family Credit doubled previous Family Income Supplement estimates 
(Dilnot and Webb 1988). The first simulation of Family Credit effects on labour supply 
came in 1992 when the government reduced the weekly hours of eligibility from 24 to 
16. Dilnot and Duncan (1992) showed that this change to Family Credit would 
encourage between 30,000 and 40,000 lone parents to enter employment. These 
estimates allowed no reduction for failure to take-up Family Credit and assumed the 
labour market was flexible enough to provide for “16 hours” jobs.  
 
Bingley and Walker (1997) were early modellers of the effect of Family Credit on sole 
mothers, and early explorers of options that were later taken on with the introduction 
of WFTC. They found that for lone parents, increasing Family Credit levels  
has a large impact on the probability of taking up part-time work and some 
impact on wanting (but not being able) to participate but essentially no adverse 
effect on the probability of working full-time. (Bingley and Walker 1997:1387) 
 
Much evidence about the impact and success of Family Credit came from surveys 
rather than from econometric modelling. Marsh and McKay’s (1993) analysis of a 
specific survey of low-income families between 1988 and 1991 (prior to the 
introduction of the 16-hour change) found that  
Lone parents were, on average, about £30 a week better off in work and claiming 
family credit than they would have been out of work and claiming income 
support. The net gain amongst couples was less: about £18 a week, shared 
between two adults. However, to this extent, family credit springs the 
unemployment trap that might otherwise have left many families with higher 
incomes out of work. (p186) 
They found that 45% of claimants were on Family Credit for all the intervening four 
years and that there was more of an argument for Family Credit to improve 
incentives for a step change from non-employment and unemployment into work than 
an “up-escalator”. They also found a minority of claimants where Family Credit 
actually prevented household worklessness; where, for example, two-earner couples 
lost one of their jobs and could rely on FC as a “parachute” to supplement the single 
earner. Family Credit was seen to operate as a strong source of employment 
retention in other surveys as well (Kempson et al. 1994).  
 
Ford, Bryson and  White (1997), looking at the period 1991 to 1995, found that 
“family credit … had a positive impact on lone mothers’ employment. But these in-
work benefits encouraged lone mothers to stick in low paid jobs for long periods” 
(p4). This latter finding is undermined somewhat by the later Lydon and Walker 
(2004) analysis cited above.  
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Survey evidence also pointed out the limitations of Family Credit alone in moving 
lone parents into work. Even with such obvious success as incentives to take up 
employment, economic incentives were secondary to many lone parents:  
The majority of lone parents did not work and most of them were resigned to that 
position for the while, family credit or not. At the margins of work, as their 
children started school, the availability of affordable but preferably free childcare 
was crucial to whether or not they could move into range of family credit. 
[emphasis original] (Lydon and Walker 2004:189) 
 
Later work on a cohort of lone parents between 1991 and 1998 confirmed the 
importance of employment and of Family Credit supporting employment, but also 
found that many claims for Family Credit came after re-partnering and were 
associated with the new partner’s earnings (Finlayson et al. 2000). Other surveys 
have shown the importance of Family Credit to entering employment for lone parents: 
Among lone parents who moved into work over the two years before the survey 
interview, 69% had claimed family credit at the same time they started their job 
and nine per cent claimed a few months later. Only 22% of lone parents moving 
into work got a job that did not involve claiming Family Credit. (Marsh et al 
2001:11) 
 
3.3.2 The United States of America 
 
One federal level in-work transfer has operated across the USA since 1975 – the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
34 This programme’s most rapid expansion has 
occurred since the mid-1980s over a period in which there were significant political 
and fiscal restraints on social assistance safety net programmes. Original 
implementation in 1975 was temporary and very limited in scope; the programme 
was made permanent in 1978 but allowed to decrease in real value as tax codes 
were not indexed to inflation. Changes in 1986 increased it back to its original relative 
value and ensured its later indexation. Further changes in 1990 saw EITC reflect 
family size by increasing generosity for families with two or more children over single-
child families. Reforms in 1993 made EITC a major initiative to make work pay and 
combat poverty: EITC was made more generous, increased more again for families 
with two or more children and extended to cover families without children (who 
represent a very small proportion of eligible people).  
 
EITC is only payable to taxpayers with earnings and provides a refundable benefit of 
40% up to an earnings threshold. It then phases this maximum credit out with a taper 
of 21%.
35 As US income taxation is family based (rather than using individual-based 
tax credits), EITC is carefully targeted at low-income families. EITC is payable on a 
regular basis at any point of time in the tax year but 99% of claimants wait until the 
end of the year to claim – indeed, loans and one-off purchases in many low-income 
household budgets are now predicated on an EITC claim producing a large one-off 
payment. 
 
A number of states operate their own tax-credit schemes, for their own income taxes, 
alongside EITC. However, the generally low provision of American transfers and 
taxation means that the problem of very high EMTRs is largely avoided. Since the 
early 1990s, “Welfare Reform” – that is, the reform of social assistance paid to 
families with children, most of whom are sole parents – has led to many states 
adopting phased withdrawal of social assistance benefits as earnings rise. This 
enables the provision of more immediate incentives to work at the margins without 
having to wait until the end-of-year EITC. An additional major structural problem for 
                                                  
34 For a full policy history of EITC see Hotz and Scholz (2003). 
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low-income families in America is paying for healthcare coverage. Low-paid jobs 
rarely provide employer-subsidised health care benefits, but means-tested Medicaid 
entitlement is available alongside specific coverage for children in low-paid families 
not claiming welfare. This means that in some states, the combination of state-based 
rules, Medicaid and EITC withdrawal rates can lead to very high EMTRs.
36 Since 
1996, individual states are also able to decide rules for eligibility for TANF and can 
count EITC as income or even notional income (if not claimed) if they wish (Hotz and 
Scholz 2003). 
 
How has EITC influenced participation in employment? There is now a sizeable 
economic literature on the direct effects of EITC. The main original focus of 1980s 
and 1990s expansions of the programmes was to “make work pay” in relation to Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which is mostly paid to sole parents. 
Much of the literature has therefore focused on the impact of EITC on sole-parent 
employment. Each change in the rules enables analysts to estimate the impact of the 
policy change. 
 
Changes in 1986 were estimated to improve sole parent employment by 2.8% (from 
73% to 75.8%) overall but to disproportionately improve employment for those with 
poor education by 6.1% (Eissa and Liebman 1996). This finding was supported by 
Dickert et al. (1995) who estimated that the subsequent 1993 reforms would increase 
sole parent employment rates by 3.3% (from 56.4%).  
 
Other analysts have taken a longer view across EITC reforms on sole parent 
employment rates. Keane (1995) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) used a structural 
modelling approach to look at EITC and other programmes across time. They 
estimated that changes in EITC between 1984 and 1996 increased participation rates 
by 10.7% for sole parents (from 65.4%). Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found an 
increase of between 2.3% and 2.9% for the 1985–1997 period. The analysis by Hotz 
et al. (2001) used ex-AFDC administrative data – and thus mainly dealt with sole 
parents – and found a 6% increase in employment for families with two or more children. 
 
The American evidence shows a similar unambiguous increase in employment for 
sole parents to that seen in British studies. However, the scales of effects should not 
be directly compared. Blundell and Hoynes (2004 note that the expansions to the in-
work benefits in the US occurred at a time when the out-of-work benefits were being 
reduced but there was no corresponding reduction in the United Kingdom.  
 
We now turn to see if there is evidence from EITC of changes in hours worked by 
sole parents or of reduced participation by other groups. There is, but there is also 
greater variability in results. Eissa and Liebman (1996) found no evidence of 
accompanying decreasing hours of work for the 1986 changes for lone parents. 
Keane (1995) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) found average increases in hours from 
24.1 hours a week to 26.5. And, research cited by Hotz and Scholz (2003), by the US 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Department of Human Services, found 
reductions in hours of between 0.5% and 4.0% for sole parents.  
 
There is greater consistency on findings of the effects of hours worked for couple 
families. Both the GAO and DHS research cited by Hotz and Scholz (2003) and a 
study by Eissa and Hoynes (1996) find reductions in hours. These reductions for 
married men were 2% (Eissa and Hoynes, 1998) and from 0% to 3.2% in the other 
studies. Reductions for married women were larger – between 0.8% and 6% and 
between 1.5% and 11.4% respectively. 
                                                  
36 Wisconsin is an example (Evans 2001). 55 
 
3.3.2.1 The New Hope programme  
 
The New Hope programme was an employment-focused, experimental project during 
1994 to 1998. It was not a “welfare-to-work” programme per se, but had a wider 
eligibility for low-income people regardless of whether they received welfare. The 
programme provided an in-work earnings supplement designed to raise incomes 
above the American poverty line, along with subsidised health insurance, childcare 
and job-search assistance. The programme operated for a fixed period of three years 
in two inner-city areas of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Eligible people worked at least 30 
hours a week and had incomes at or below 150% of the federal poverty line. All 
participation was voluntary and random assignment into the programme produced 
identical treatment and control groups. 
 
Bos et al. (1999) state that after two years, compared to the control group, New Hope 
halved the number of those who had never been employed from 13% to less than 
6%. Work entry improved, participants who were not employed full-time at random 
assignment worked in 5.5 out of eight quarters compared with 4.8 quarters for the 
control group. The programme increased average two-year earnings by 13% which, 
boosted by the earnings supplement, resulted in a substantial income gain of $2,645 
over the two-year follow-up period. However, to a third of the participants in work at 
the point of random assignment the programme produced modest reductions in 
hours worked and earnings. These participants were less likely to work more than 40 
hours a week and had a reduction of income by 7.5%. The five-year impacts of New 
Hope, impacts that continued after the programme had finished, are more focused on 
child and family development. Huston et al. (2003) reported that New Hope 
participants worked and earned more, but those effects tended to last during the 
three years of the programme only. For Hispanic parents and others with moderate 
barriers to work, the impacts lasted throughout the five-year evaluation period. 
However, some of these impacts were linked to the provision of community service 
jobs within the fixed three years of the programme. In the fifth year, 26.6% of 




The third country from which specific evidence is taken is Canada. We look at 
evidence from two programmes: an experimental, demonstration earnings 
supplementation programme for social assistance claimants, and a federal 
programme of tax credits. 
 
3.3.3.1 The Self-Sufficiency Project 
 
The Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) provided financial in-work payments to sole 
parents who had been claiming social assistance (Income Assistance or IA in 
Canada) for 12 months or more. It operated in two Canadian states, British Columbia 
and New Brunswick, and offered a maximum of three years’ time-limited financial 
supplements to full-time work of 30 hours or more. The financial incentives were 
substantial. SSP payments equalled half the difference between a participant’s 
earnings and an “earnings benchmark” ($30,000 in New Brunswick and $37,000 in 
British Columbia in year one). Other forms of income had no effect on SSP, with the 
outcome that SSP payments roughly doubled the earnings of many low-wage 
workers (before taxes and work-related expenses). The programme was voluntary 
but all participants had to take advantage of the offer within one year of entering the 
programme. A person could sign up for the supplement if they found full-time work 
within the year after random assignment. A person could collect the supplement for 56 
three calendar years from the time they began receiving it, as long as they were also 
working full-time and not receiving IA. After beginning SSP receipt, participants could 
return to IA as long as they gave up SSP and met the IA eligibility rules. 
 
Figure 3.2 Self-Sufficiency Project: percentage employed full-time, by months 
after random assignment 
  
Source: Michalopoulos et al. 2002:1 
 
The final report of the impacts of the programme (Michalopoulos et al. 2002) showed 
that SSP increased employment, earnings and income levels, and reduced welfare 
use and poverty (measured according to the Canadian low-income threshold, 
discussed in section 4 below). Within one year of random assignment, SSP 
participants were twice as likely to work full-time compared to the control group. This 
effect on employment continued to be strong through most of the follow-up evaluation 
period (54 months). Earnings were thus increased by more than 20% compared to 
the control group. Over the entire follow-up period, programme group members had 
on average $6,300 more in combined income from earnings, IA payments and 
earnings supplements than control group members.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the effect of SSP on full-time employment participation. During the 
first year (months 1 to 12) employment grew rapidly as participants had to find full-
time work to receive payments. Control group employment, slightly ahead before 
random assignment, grew less quickly. The difference was a 15% increase in 
employment due to SSP at 13 months. This difference declined over the rest of the 
evaluation period – thought to be for three reasons. First, there was no ability for the 
programme group to claim after a year. Second, SSP may have encouraged people 
to bring forward employment entry, with a subsequent effect on job retention. Third, 
the control group catch up – as one would expect from normal movements into work 
from social assistance.  
 
The SSP effect of increasing full-time work was largely a job-entry effect, rather than 
affecting hours of work at the margins of 30 hours a week (Michalopoulos et al. 2002, 57 
table ES1). Card et al. (2001) also demonstrate that SSP did not have an adverse 
effect on wage growth, compared to the control group:  
SSP leads to wage growth among the induced program group that is very similar 
to the growth experienced by people who would have left welfare and entered 
work without the program”s incentive. (p34) 
 
3.3.3.2 National Child Benefit and Canadian Child Tax Benefit  
 
The Canadian system of support for families with children, in- and out-of-work, has 
been integrated and harmonised, but allows each province to adapt its own social 
assistance systems around a unified system of support for children. The National 
Child Benefit (NCB) programme was introduced in July 1998 as a component of the 
Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB).  
 
NCB is actually two programmes, a federally provided, refundable tax-credit called 
the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCB Supplement) and provincially provided 
Social Assistance. The stated goals of NCB are to reduce child poverty, promote 
attachment to the labour force and reduce overlap between federal and provincial 
initiatives (Department of Finance 1997). 
 
The level of transfers for each family is determined by family income and number of 
children. Benefits are paid quarterly, from July. The family income used to determine 
benefits comes from amounts reported on the tax filing of the previous calendar year, 
so benefits starting in July 1999 apply to income from the 1998 calendar. Families 
must apply to receive benefits; applications are typically given to parents with birth 
registration and other government documents at the hospital when the child is born. 
The annual benefit amount in 1998 was $605 for the first child, $405 for the second, 
and $330 for the third and additional children (Canadian dollars). The benefits are 
reduced with family income, starting at a threshold of $20,921 (for 1998). The claw-
back rates were set such that the benefit would be reduced to zero when income 
reached $25,921 for all family sizes, and thus the incentive to work (so long as 
income is less than $25,921) differs sharply by the number of children. In the first 
year CCTB increased spending on transfers to families with children by 32%; this 
was almost entirely from the NCB Supplement in-work payments. 
 
The federal system of NCB Supplement was able to be integrated with provincial 
social assistance programmes by deducting the supplement from social assistance 
payments dollar for dollar. The savings to social assistance spending produced were 
used for programmes to assist low-income families and for provincial income 
supplements. Three provinces (Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Quebec) chose 
to not integrate the supplement with their social assistance benefits, thus blunting 
incentives to work. 
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Figure 3.3 Results on employment (earnings as the major source of  income) 
from Canadian Child Tax Benefit programme (CCTB) 
 
Source: Milligan and Stabile 2004, figure 6 
 
The different provincially provided initiatives comprise the second part of the NCB 
programme. These include services in both kind and transfers – provincial tax credit 
programmes. Child-care subsidies and health promotion programmes are the most 
common services, while tax credits take the form of straight transfers or earned 
income credits. These provincial credits varied the incentives to work across Canada. 
Overall, the NCB programme provides clear incentives for families on social 
assistance to enter work by partially replacing social assistance with a net benefit that 
is received only if they are working. In addition, provincially run earned income 
supplements provide more incentive to join the labour force in some provinces. Of 
course, as has previously been argued, work incentives at the margin are less clear and 
those already working may face higher marginal tax rates and choose to work less. 
 
The provincial differences in policy provided Milligan and Stabile (2004) with the 
ability to model estimates of employment effects as a “natural experiment”.
37 Their 
study compared integrated and non-integrated provinces between 1996 and 2000 
and estimated significant differences in employment effects after the introduction of 
CCTB in 1998 in those provinces that integrated CCTB and optimised job-entry 
incentives. Figure 3.3 shows the differences between the proportions of families who 
have earnings as a major income source (1996–2000), and the step change in 1998 
between provinces that integrated CCTB and those that did not. Milligan and Stabile 
(2004) report their findings as  
a large, statistically and economically significant effect on social assistance take-
up [meaning ‘use’ in this instance] and work. The magnitudes of the effects we 
estimate are within the range of those found in the EITC literature in the United 
States (p27)  
In addition, they find smaller effects for provincial level incentives.  
 
Government evaluation evidence of the employment outcomes of CCTB published to 
date is limited to descriptions of inputs and outputs, and of implementation in annual 
government reports and in a substantial body of literature that discusses the policy 
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design and prospects for reform. We do not cover this literature in any detail because 
it is mostly descriptive and discursive rather than based on evaluation that allows 
generalisation. Interested readers are referred to the following main sources 
(Department of Finance 1997 and Battle and Mendelson 2001). There is a separate 
evaluation for the indigenous communities in Canada that may be of relevance to 





This section covers a wide body of evidence for consideration on employment 
outcomes from programmes similar in nature to IWP and WFF. For ease of reference 
it brings together tabular and bullet point guides to the international evidence. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the studies that can be referred to in future discussion about the 
potential of WFF and its evaluation and to contextualise emerging findings from WFF. 
We have listed only those studies that seek to estimate some net employment effect 
independent of individual and other characteristics. We have not included many of 
the British descriptive, survey-based studies that provide some essential context to 
these findings. 
 
Evidence from across the UK, the US and Canada shows that in-work payments 
increase participation in the workforce for families with children.  
 
Across the UK and American studies it is clear that job-entry incentives are strongest 
and work best for sole parents.  
 
There is mixed evidence on the effect of reduced employment (hours or work) for 
second earners in two-earner couple households. The most consistent finding across 
the UK and US is that there are small but significant decreases in work participation 
for second earners, usually women.  
 
The job-entry effect is also strongest for those who are in workless households. 
Studies that focus on social assistance recipients find consistent improved job-entry 
effects. Evidence is often curtailed, however, because of time-limited interventions 
based on an experimental evaluation. 
 
For those engaged in small hours of work in combination with social assistance, there 
is an increased hours’ effect in most studies that specifically looked for such an effect. 
 
Increases in payments at the margins of social assistance relative to in-work 
transfers seem to have a stronger effect than any secondary incentives within in-work 
transfers to encourage longer hours of work.
39 
                                                  
38 See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (nd) The First Nations’ National Child Benefit Reinvestment 
Initiative – Progress Report for the Year Ending March 31, 2002. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pe-
cp/bri_e.html  
39 Most in-work transfers operate on an income and transfer status (ie by calculating earnings and not 
being on social assistance) rather than any definitions of hours. Only the British scheme has a step 
change in generosity at a “full-time” definition of 30 hours of work, and this in part operates because 
eligibility begins at 16 hours a week, an obvious definition of “part-time” work. Most British evidence 
points to cross-sectional profiles showing a lot of bunching of claims at the 16 to 20 hours’ level, but this 
usually reflects the large and growing proportions of sole parents who claim in-work transfers, especially 
those with young children and hence the most constraints on full-time work. In the econometric 
modelling of employment impacts of the British scheme, the part-time effect of reducing hours has been 
shown to have had little effect to date. 60 
Table 3.2 The employment effects of refundable tax credits and in-work cash transfers to families with children: UK, USA and Canada 
Study  Country  Scheme  Coverage  Methodology  Main findings  Caveats 
Blundell and Reed 
(2000) 
UK  WFTC  All families with 
children 
Comparison of predictive 
econometric models 
Increases to sole parent, single earner 
couple employment, decreases to dual 
earner households 
Predictive modelling 
Brewer et al. 
(2003) 
UK  WFTC  All families with 
children 
Structural model  Find similar pattern to Blundell and Reed 
(2000) but larger net effects 




UK  WFTC plus other 
aspects of reform 
Sole parents  Propensity score matching from 
labour force survey 
Increases of sole-parent employment linked 
to reforms of tax credits and other 
programmes 
Aggregate policy change 
decomposition to find a net effect 
of tax credit effects 
Francesconi and 
Van der Klaauw 
(2004) 
UK  WFTC  Sole parents  Econometric regression 
modelling 
Increases of sole-parent employment from 
both entry and retention, importance of 
childcare, strong effects for those with 
preschool children  
Limitations of survey data




Increase in employment for both single-
earner and two-earner households  
Limitations of survey data
Keane and Moffitt 
(1998) 
USA  EITC  Sole parents  Structural model  Increase in employment rate and increase in 
hours worked 
Social assistance coverage and 
entitlement reduced at same time
Eissa and Liebman 
(1996) 
USA  EITC  Sole parents  Econometric regression 
modelling 
Increases employment rate and statistically 
significant increase in hours worked 
Social assistance coverage and 
entitlement reduced at same time
Dickert et al. 
(1995) 
USA  EITC  Sole parents  Econometric regression 
modelling 
Increases employment rate  Social assistance coverage and 
entitlement reduced at same time
Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (2001) 
USA  EITC and state 
level income tax 
Sole parents  Econometric regression 
modelling  
Increases employment rate  Social assistance coverage and 
entitlement reduced at same
Eissa and Hoynes 
(1996) 
USA  EITC  Married couples  Econometric regression 
modelling 
Small increase in men’s employment rate 
and hours of work and larger decrease in 
women’s rate and hours. 
Social assistance coverage and 
entitlement reduced at same tim





Increase in employment rate. Larger 
increases in employment for families with 
more than one child 
Social assistance coverage and 
entitlement reduced at same time61 
 
Table 3.2 The employment effects of refundable tax credits and In-work cash transfers to families with children: UK, USA and Canada continued 
Study  Country  Scheme  Coverage  Methodology  Main findings  Caveats 
Bos et al. (1999) 
Huston et al. 
(2003) 
USA  New Hope   All low income in 
areas of Milwaukee 
Random assignment experiment  Increased employment of those out of work 





Canada  Self-Sufficiency 
Project 
Sole parents on 
social assistance in 
two provinces 
Random assignment experiment  Increased employment entry from social 
assistance. 
Differences narrowed over time due to time-





Canada  Canadian Child Tax 
Benefit 
All families with 
children 
Econometric regression analysis 
based on provincial differences 
in practice (natural experiment) 
Provincial differences in implementation of 
CCTB led to higher employment rates in 
those provinces that integrated CCTB to 
maximise returns to employment. 
No differentiation between sole 
and other parents 62 
3.4.1 How important is the availability of in-work payments in comparison with other 
influences on the decision to move into employment? 
 
There are several ways of considering this. If we look at structural policy factors, 
such as the design of the overall income transfer schemes in a country, there is real 
reason to believe from the American example that “push” factors, denying and 
reducing entry into social assistance, alongside increases in mandating job search 
requirements and of sanctions, have a separate effect on employment entry. Such 
effects, when combined with in-work payments, are crucial to welfare reform in the 
USA (Blank 2002). However, at the individual level and in the UK (which has a less 
mandatory and restrictive regime of social assistance), the longstanding and 
consistent findings from survey evidence in Britain show in-work transfers can clearly 
tip the balance in decisions to enter work (for instance, Marsh and McKay 1993). 
However, it is also clear from this evidence that other concerns, such as the quality, 
availability and affordability of childcare, what is best for children and “timing it right”, 
are also crucial. It is additionally important to link the decision to “take up” entitlement 
to in-work transfers to the decision to enter work. UK evidence is that clarifying the 
actual and potential position of being “better off” in work to social assistance 
claimants is extremely beneficial (Evans et al. 2003). 
 
3.4.2 Do in-work payments alter people’s location decisions (eg moving from low- to 
high-employment areas)?  
 
Across the evaluation literature there are no studies that take mobility into account in 
evaluating in-work transfers. Many studies look at the incentives to move between 
locations with different social assistance generosity (Moffitt 1992, Meyer 2000, for 
instance). The results from this analysis, where there are substantial differences in 
generosity and rules, is by consensus, “found rather weak or inconsistent” (Meyer 
2000:2). State-based differences in American and Canadian in-work transfers that 
operate alongside consistent federal rules could be, in theory, discernable as having 
an effect in a properly estimated study. But underlying differences in migration to take 
up jobs in any case, and the selective characteristics of such movers, are likely to be 
more important than incentives from in-work transfers. In short, it is as yet an 
unknown area, but in a nationally consistent transfer system with no location variation 
in generosity or design, there is little in the New Zealand scheme to suggest that 
effects would be significant.  63 




The WFF reforms aim not only to increase the employment rates of low-income 
families with children, but also to lower child poverty. The key contributing factors to 
any outcomes of higher living standards and lower poverty are fourfold: 
1.  higher income through the Accommodation Supplement to assist with housing 
costs for those with unaffordable rents  
2.  improving living standards for children in out-of-work families through 
improved rates of payments for children 
3.  higher incomes for those with long-term sickness through encouraging work 
during periods of receipt of invalid’s benefit  
4.  higher incomes in work for low-earning working families with children.  
 
There are three important points to note when looking across other countries to 
assess evidence on the impact on poverty and living standards.  
 
First, WFF is potentially interactive and cumulative, with some families or individuals 
receiving more than one element at any point in time. 
 
Second, there are static and dynamic aspects in WFF outcomes on incomes. Some 
improvements will occur without any change in behaviour or status, such as effective 
lower housing costs for those who qualify for the Accommodation Supplement, in-
work transfers for families already in work on low earnings and increased out-of-work 
social assistance income for families with children. Other income impacts occur after 
a change of status or behaviour – linked to moving in to employment for people 
claiming the invalid’s benefit and for those entering work, increasing hours or 
remaining in work as a result of in-work transfers. 
 
Third, income changes will partly depend on system performance on, for instance, 
levels of “take-up” discussed in section 2 and employment participation changes 
discussed in section 3. 
 
The above points are important to take into account when considering the two main 
questions that underlie the review in this section:  
·  Do welfare reform initiatives or welfare policy changes broadly analogous to the 
WFF package influence income, living standards and/or measures of poverty?  
·  Do some groups benefit more than others from welfare reform initiatives or 
welfare policy changes that are broadly analogous to the WFF package?  
 
Two large bodies of evidence seem most appropriate when looking at policy impacts 
from programmes broadly analogous to WFF: evidence from static international 
comparative profiles of the incomes of those receiving transfer packages; and 
evidence from national-level evaluations of outcomes from programmes that have 
introduced in-work transfers. The review is concentrated on these areas. The 
outcomes of transfers for housing costs and of work incentives for long-term 
incapacitated people have not only smaller literatures but are far less easy to 
generalise from because of underlying housing finance structures and because 
invalidity definitions and recipient groups differ so much between countries. The 
strongest body of evidence and the one most easily generalised from is for families 
with children, which also will be the major element of expenditure and potential 
income impact in WFF. 64 
 
When discussing income outcomes for families with children we need to look at living 
standards and poverty. International comparison of living standards requires a 
consistent comparative benchmark. This tends to be purchasing power equivalent 
budget standards, such as the World Bank poverty lines of $1 and $2 a day (used 
mostly in developing countries to assess basic subsistence standards of living), or 
relative poverty lines based on a point in the income distribution (usually a 
percentage of mean or median income), which are more commonly used to compare 
industrialised economies with significant levels of state transfers. These last 
measures form the vast majority of evidence relevant to WFF. 
 
In national-level studies, other measures of living standards are often used as instead 
of, or in addition to, relative poverty lines. This often reflects the “mismatch” between 
relative poverty measures and deprivation, with a substantial proportion of those 
defined as poor by relative measures not reporting deprivation and vice versa (see 
Perry 2002). Alternatively, national concerns may be focused more on a deprivation-
based poverty measure, as in the US, and rarely use relative measures. Recent 
research in New Zealand has used both approaches, with trends in changes in 
relative poverty between 1997 and 2000 shown by Waldegrave et al. (2003) and 
through the development of the economic living standard index (ELSI).  
 
This section therefore divides the literature into two parts: 
1.  cross-national studies of the impact of transfers on poverty and, in particular, 
child-related transfers on child poverty 
2.  national-level studies from the UK, USA and Canada to look at evidence on 
available poverty standards, relative or other.  
 
4.2 International comparisons on the impact of family transfers on child 
poverty 
 
International comparison of transfer policies and other programmes for families with 
children has three main literatures. First, the description of programmes and their 
intended effects, and collections of national studies – see, for example, the excellent 
volume edited by Bradshaw (2003). Second is the literature on policy design and its 
illustration using consistent “model families” to show the composition of income 
packages and other programmes available to low- and average-income families. 
These are invaluable as illustrative guides to policy design and in assessing the 
potential value and impact on families with children (see Bradshaw and Finch 2002, 
OECD 2004 and Kilkey 2000 for lone parent families). The advantage is that model 
family comparison can be comprehensive across the whole range of programmes in 
a package and can use in-built assumptions about characteristics of families, such as 
the nature and degree of disability, often not found in survey data. The third approach 
uses secondary analysis of survey data to estimate impacts of transfers and other 
programmes on income distribution and poverty. This literature is focused on, 
because it provides more accurate aggregate profiles across countries as well as the 
ability to decompose impacts according to different policy and non policy-related 
effects. 
 
There are some conceptual and methodological difficulties in consistently measuring 
incomes of families with children between countries. These difficulties feed into 
comparison of impacts of transfers on the income distribution and of poverty. First is 
the question of whether provision of services to families with children in particular, is 
made through transfers or through “benefits in kind”. Transfer packages for families 
with children, for instance, often look similar in aggregate, with means-tested social 65 
assistance, universal family allowances, in-work transfers and maternity and paternity 
provision. But the balance and interaction of the total package will reflect 
assumptions about other forms of provision and services. For instance, childcare 
services can be provided at subsidised costs, or parents may alternatively be given 
transfers, tax allowances or other direct income to pay for them. If one measures 
purely income transfers, country A (which has only social assistance and means-
tested transfers for children but pays a large proportion of the costs of childcare for 
low-income families), may spend more than country B (which provides lower 
transfers but provides free full-time childcare provision for all three-year-olds). 
Country A would appear therefore to have a more positive impact on child poverty 
using income measures alone, but this may not accurately reflect the total impact of 
social policy on children and child poverty as country B may well have similar or 
lower poverty rates but spend less on transfers.  
 
Even if the issue of benefits in kind is ignored, there are still considerable difficulties 
in dealing solely with direct income-related transfers and taxes. There is direct fiscal 
targeting to children but often children will also benefit from incomes provided to 
other members of the family/household. For instance, unemployment benefits to the 
unemployed, of whom many may be parents, and even pensions to co-resident 
elders will have impacts on children’s income and poverty risk. Demographic profiles 
are thus crucial to understanding how poverty and fiscal interventions affect the 
income distribution. This is not only true when comparing countries with different 
demographic profiles – such as northern and southern European countries or east 
Asian and European countries – but also when trying to understand within-country 
distributions. Significant differences in household size and composition between 
ethnic groups are potentially important for profiles of children of Māori, Pacific Island 
and Asian families in New Zealand but our knowledge of such particular demographic 
profiles is too limited to be certain.  
 
Recent cross-country micro-simulation analysis has attempted to look at the 
European Union 15 (EU15), to unpick some of these measurement and analytical 
problems (Corak et al. 2005). This firstly analyses the age incidence of taxes and 
transfers and how far these lifetime profiles are targeted at low-income families  
... in most countries children receive a higher proportion of their share of 
household income from government transfers than young or middle-aged adults, 
but this is not universally the case. … Low income children receive 60% to 80% 
of their incomes from transfers in all countries with child poverty rates lower than 
10%. But the proportion is much lower, 20% to 30%, in countries with higher 
child poverty rates. (Corak et al. 2005:34).  
 
The analysis of Corak et al. (2005) goes further by subsequently identifying and 
adjusting for direct child contingent transfers and taxation (only possible through 
micro-simulation). They are thus able to identify net fiscal effects for children alone, 
“In all but five countries child contingent spending is higher for low income children 
than for the average child” (Corak et al. 2005:35), and to identify countries that rely 
on tax concessions rarely focused on low-income children and that are thus non-
redistributive. This enables a comparison of the direct child contingent spending with 
the needs of children – how much of the financial burden of childhood is met by state 
transfers and taxes – and a comparison with other, non-tax and transfer spending. 
Only after such comparisons do Corak et al. assess the relationships between 
government programmes and child poverty profiles.  
We find that poverty rates would be much higher in all countries if there were no 
child contingent transfers being made. But countries with the lowest poverty 
rates are those in which children benefit a good deal from other transfers not 
necessarily directed to them. (p35) 
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Figure 4.1 shows the Corak et al. results for four measures of income – disposable 
income after all taxes and transfers, without child-contingent incomes, without any 
transfers and without any transfers or taxes. 
 
Figure 4.1: Child poverty rates in EU15 2001 on different assumptions about 
transfer and taxation 
 
Source: Corak et al. 2005, figure 7 
 
Such an approach, and the ability to use micro-simulation to decompose tax and 
transfer programmes across countries, is unique and points to more consistent and 
nuanced comparison of effects of tax and transfer programmes on poverty in the 
future. 
 
Förster and Mira d’Ecole (2005) also studied changes in poverty and income 
inequality in the late 1990s. They looked separately at the effects of demographic 
change, especially sole parenthood, and of employment change, especially maternal 
employment. Their cross-sectional figures for 2000 are shown in figure 4.2. They 
show a wider range of countries than the analysis by Corak et al., as they are based 
on all participating OECD countries including New Zealand. The light bars in Figure 
4.2 represent the final poverty rate measured after taxes and transfers; the dark bar 
shows the effect of taxes and transfers. The total height of each bar is the pre-
transfer and tax poverty rate. Förster and Mira d’Ecole (2005) note that, on average 
across the OECD, households without children are lifted out of poverty most by taxes 
and transfers – “more than half” compared to 44% of households with children. They 
record Japan, Italy and Portugal as especially low in the poverty-reduction effect of 
transfers to children. They also confirm a part of the Corak et al. analysis that the tax 
and transfers given to children do not give households the amount that reflects 
children’s needs in the equivalence scales used to make incomes comparable by 
household size and structure. 
 
Key:  
SW – Sweden, DK – Denmark, FI – Finland, AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, LU – Luxembourg,  
GE – Germany, NL – Netherlands, FR – France, GR – Greece, UK – United Kingdom, PT – Portugal,  
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Figure 4.2 Poverty rates before and after taxes and transfers – households with 
and without children 
 
Note: Left column shows households with children; right column shows households without children. 
Source: Förster and Mira d’Ecole 2005, figure 20 
 
Chen and Corak (2005) have looked across 12 OECD countries to examine the 
impact of government transfers on changes in child poverty since 1990. They 
decompose changes in poverty into those due to demographic change, labour 
market changes and changes in government transfers. They find,  
It is changes in labour markets and government support that are the major 
causes of changes in child poverty. … In countries facing severe economic 
crises it does not appear that the amount of income transfers from the state 
increased in a way to cushion children from these changes and put a backstop 
on their risk of low income. Indeed, just the opposite appears to have occurred in 
countries experiencing the largest increases in child poverty. (Chen and Corak 
2005:38). 
 
Chen and Chorak analyse different profiles of economic growth,  
Reforms to income transfers intended to increase labour supply and labour 
market engagement may or may not end up lowering the child poverty rate. In 
the United States important structural changes to income support policies are 
closely wrapped up with significant economic growth in a labour market with a 
large service sector, and are associated with a country that had a very high rate 
at the beginning of the period. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, they 
contributed to a rise in child poverty. At the same time increases in the level of 
support have also been shown to be a central ingredient in lowering the child 
poverty rate, not only when it is very high but also when it is already quite low. 
(2005:38)  
 
Figure 4.3 summarises the Chen and Corak findings (the dark horizontal bars 
represent the actual change in child poverty and the white bars show the changes 
that would have occurred, holding demographic and labour market factors constant). 
The chart provides data for countries other than the 12 OECD countries examined. In 
Hungary, Mexico and Italy, transfer changes contributed to increased child poverty, 
and in West Germany and Finland poverty increased but transfers could not counter 
the impact of labour market and demographic change. In Norway and the UK, 
changes in transfers are the major reason for declines in child poverty. 
 
Key:  
AUS – Australia, CAN – Canada, CZE – Czech Republic, DEN –Denmark, FRA –France, GER –Germany, IRL –Ireland, 
ITA –Italy, JPN – Japan, NLD – The Netherlands, NZL – New Zealand, NOR – Norway, POR – Portugal, SWE – Sweden, 
SWI –Switzerland, UKG – United Kingdom, USA – United States of America 68 
Figure 4.3 Changes in child poverty and the impact of changes in government 
transfers 
 
Note: Canada findings may reflect changing data sources over time. 
Source: Chen and Corak 2005, figure 5 
 
These three comparative overviews are some of the most recent evidence available. 
The wealth of older evidence and comparison is not covered here. Readers are 
advised to look at Oxley et al. (2001) and Atkinson et al. (1995) for summary cross-
sectional profiles from the 1980s to mid 1990s.  69 
Figure 4.4 Impact of taxes and transfers on child poverty rates 
 
Source: UNICEF 2005, figure 9 
 70 
It is, however, worthwhile highlighting the most recent cross-sectional overview from 
UNICEF, into which Corak et al. and the Chen and Corak analysis have fed (UNICEF 
2005). This shows the aggregate impact of taxes and transfers (see figure 4.4) using 
50% of median income as the poverty line. The darker horizontal bars in figure 4.4 
give the final poverty rate and the lighter bars the original poverty rate before 
transfers. 
 
Poverty is not just cross-sectional. Persistent poverty is a greater concern for both its 
short and long-term consequences. Comparative longitudinal studies are rare, 
Duncan et al. (1993) and Bradbury et al. (2001a) being the best with data coverage 
and periods. These papers do not directly discuss the impact of taxes and transfers 
on poverty dynamics, but some of the conclusions qualify previous findings about 
cross-sectional impacts and time series. For instance,  
We do not find any evidence that the less-regulated United States economy is 
associated with greater mobility by children across the income distribution or by 
movements in and out of poverty. Indeed, in some respects mobility in the USA 
appears to be less than in countries such as Britain and Germany. (Bradbury et 
al. 2001a:131)  
One way to further understand such differences is to look more closely at particular 
programme outcomes in such countries. 
 




Studies of poverty within the US tend to use variants of an official poverty line 
originally developed in the early 1960s by Orshansky, a government economist 
working in the Social Security Administration. (See Fisher 1992 for how the measure 
was developed and subsequently price-indexed and amended, and Citro and Michael 
1995 for fuller discussion of its adequacy against other forms of poverty measures.) 
The poverty threshold was estimated using food consumption patterns of low-income 
households in 1955 from US Department of Agriculture (USDoA) survey data. 
Orshansky based her estimations on several different family types but used an 
austere food plan, the so-called “Economy Food Plan”, which represented the lowest 
cost plan from USDoA figures based on “temporary or emergency use when funds 
are low”. Orshansky then used a common multiplier of three to reflect spending on 
other essentials such as housing, clothing, utilities, etc. This multiplier was based on 
consumption patterns across the whole population, rather than for poor families. 
Later evidence showed that this multiplier was too low (Citro and Michael 1995). 
 
Orshansky produced a number of lines for households of various types – working 
age, elderly and female-headed – and according to numbers of children and adults 
present and for farm and non-farm households. Over time the number of different 
thresholds has decreased and price indexation has occurred somewhat differently, 
but the essential basis of the 1965 line remains.  
In the language of poverty measurement, the United States has an “absolute” 
poverty threshold that is updated for price changes but not for real growth in 
consumption. Thus, the poverty line no longer represents the concept on which it 
was originally based – namely, food times a food share multiplier – because that 
share will change (and has changed) with rising living standards. Rather, the 
poverty line threshold reflects in today’s dollars the line that was set some 30 
years (sic) ago. (Citro and Michael 1995:25) 
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The key question for WFF is thus, “How have American policies that resemble WFF 
changed poverty, measured in this way?”
40 Interpretation of the poverty impact of 
such policies, however, needs to be carefully contextualised. We return to look at the 
programmes outlined in section 3, and this consistency allows us to reflect on the 
trade-off between clear evidence of employment gains that lead to associated 
poverty gains and other outcomes that lead to marginal or poor poverty outcomes.  
 
4.3.1.1 The Earned Income Tax Credit 
 
It is important to repeat the caveat that EITC does not operate alone in producing 
entry into and increased retention of employment, but alongside changes to 
underlying social assistance that have severely curtailed entitlement and access and 
have imposed stricter mandatory work conditions and sanctions. This means the 
aggregate effects of EITC and “welfare reform” will combine the “push” effects of 
welfare reform mentioned in section 3, which may not only push people into 
employment and thus increase incomes and reduce poverty but may also push those 
out of work out of entitlement and thus deeper into poverty. Careful consideration 
must therefore be given to average poverty “outcomes” because there are gainers 
and losers, and to the knowledge that headcounts alone are less helpful in 
understanding aggregate outcomes than changes to poverty gaps. However, where 
possible, estimates of the “pull” effects of EITC will be “solely” concentrated on, in 
order to more accurately reflect interests in the reductions in poverty from gains to 
employment. 
 
EITC is only available to low-income families that work and pay tax, and is thus 
targeted at low-income families with children, subject to tax-filing and to having 
employment. Scholz and Levine (2001) find that over 60% of EITC payments went to 
those with original incomes below the American poverty line and that 50% effectively 
reduced poverty gaps. Leibman (1997) has also shown that EITC helped offset the 
growing income inequality between high- and low-earner households by reducing the 
decline in income share of the bottom quintile by 29% and by 9% for the second 
quintile.  
 
The aggregate poverty impact of EITC was highlighted by the Council of Economic 
Advisers to the American president (CEA 1998), and estimates that EITC lifted 
increasing numbers out of poverty between 1993 and 1997 – from 2.1 million to 4.3 
million in the later years. Overall the impact on poverty of EITC has been rarely 
studied in recent years but there has been a large body of evaluation of the 
combined impact of welfare reform, EITC and other contemporary measures such as 
rises in minimum wages in the 1990s. This literature is not covered in great detail 
because the overall package of polices is very different from those put forward by 
WFF, despite common elements such as EITC and in-work payment.  
 
Any overview of recent American policy change in the area should note that one of 
the main driving forces was to “end welfare as we know it”. The major emphasis on 
evaluation has been on caseload reduction and employment effects. Unlike British 
and New Zealand approaches there is no overall objective related to child poverty. 
This means that evidence of reduced participation on social assistance and 
increased employment are often taken by American policy makers to be enough to 
justify the reforms.
41 Looking back at the period Blank and Ellwood (2001) state: 
                                                  
40 The limitations of this question, however, do suggest the potential importance of further secondary 
analysis of US data to show policy impacts on poverty measured in different terms and thus more 
internationally comparable. 
41 Indeed, changes to marital status probably rank higher than poverty in US policy makers’ policy and 
evaluation aims. 72 
The result was a transformation of behaviour among low income single mothers. 
They left welfare (or avoided entering welfare) in much larger numbers than 
anyone expected. This produced a substantial increase in their earnings, which 
was reinforced through expanded work related supports such as EITC. Their 
overall disposable income grew less than their earnings, in part because they 
lost public assistance income and in part because work expenses such as child 
care ate into their dollars. But this major transformation off welfare and into work 
did not produce increases in poverty, and in fact, most of their families appear to 
be doing at least as well or a little better (based on cash income measures). 
(p52) 
Table 4.1 Impact of government programmes on children’s poverty gap 
  
Source: Haskins and Primus 2001, table 1 
 
Estimates of poverty are dangerous if not accompanied by an approximation of how 
many of the poor have got poorer, richer or stayed the same. Estimates of the 
erosion of the American safety net by Porter and Primus (1999) showed that 
participation in safety net programmes by children fell faster than child poverty over 
the mid to late 1990s. Both social assistance (AFDC and TANF programmes) and 
food stamp programmes saw significant falls (by 36% and 27% respectively) while 
the number of poor children fell by only 10%. On the other hand, the proportion of 
children in families with earnings represented very significant proportions of those 
lifted out of poverty by government transfers (85.4% according to Porter and Primus 
1999), with 79.1% having earnings plus EITC. Haskings and Primus (2001) show the 
total impact on the poverty gap for children in poverty from government programmes 
(see table 4.1). The total reduction of poverty gaps from market income, the first line 
in the table, has risen remarkably from 1993 to 1999. Means-tested benefits reduced 
the poverty gap by over $23 billion in 1993 but by only $12 billion in 1999. Despite 
improvements in EITC (see “federal taxes” in the table), means-tested programmes 
were less effective in reducing poverty gaps after welfare reform; Hastings and 
Primus estimate that 0.7 million low-income families with children were worse off 
(2001:6). It is worth remembering that incomes of such families fall far below the 
American poverty line. Zedlewski et al. (2002) found that the numbers of sole parents 
in extreme poverty rose between 1996 and 1998. 
 
The best evaluative overview of all aspects of welfare reform is by Blank (2002a), 
who admits that information is quite limited. Incentives and structures of welfare 
reform and EITC should make people who leave social assistance for work, better off 
(see Acs et al. 1998, for instance). Survey evidence, according to Blank, shows 
income increases not only for those who leave welfare but mostly for those who 
would have claimed previously but now do not – such as frictionally unemployed 
single mothers. This effect is expected, such potential claimants have work 
experience and can find other jobs, but it also points to the fact that many have lost 
support for short periods out of work and that increases in income can come from 
shorter periods of absence from work as well as continuous employment. The 
Grogger findings from analysis of the current population survey supports findings on 
the effect of EITC within the whole welfare reform package: 73 
Recent EITC expansions have had substantial effects on all dimensions of 
behaviour. In fact, the EITC may be the single most important policy measure for 
explaining the decrease in welfare and the rise in work and earnings among 
female-headed families in recent years. (Grogger 2003:408) 
 
Survey evidence also suggests that increased incomes for ex-welfare recipients 
come from earnings or other forms of income from other family members in many 
cases (Blank 2002b:61). Lichter et al. (2005) find little evidence for differential impact 
on ethnic minority and immigrant children in overall poverty profiles. They found 
income change over the 1990s as maternal employment increased, helping to reduce 
poverty for all groups, while racial differences in family structures were significant in 
explaining differences in ethnic profiles of poverty. 
 
Meyer and Sullivan found no evidence of lower consumption levels for single mothers 
in the first years after reform but found in the period before time expiry began to 
occur on a large scale that: 
The level of total expenditure for single mothers increases slightly in real terms 
throughout this period. In relative terms, there is some evidence that 
consumption for single mothers near the bottom of the consumption distribution 
increased over the 1990s, and this increase is also noticeable for less skilled 
single mothers. In most cases, we see a statistically significant increase in 
relative total consumption for single mothers between … 1996–1998. (2001:31)  
 
Other evidence focuses on longitudinal profiles, of either “welfare leavers” – 
recipients who cease claiming social assistance – or from a specially commissioned 
longitudinal survey of low-income American families (the Survey of American 
Families). Welfare leaver studies usually follow individual ex-recipients through 
administrative data, and are thus unable to join other family members into profiles 
and analysis. This makes poverty assessment difficult in many cases. Even so, Blank 
notes that most studies that analyse poverty find “quite high poverty among leavers” 
(Blank 2002b:59). Acs et al. (2001) find the average monthly family income for 
welfare leavers hovers near the poverty line and that where poverty rates are 
measured, over half of leavers, on average, are poor. Two studies find that the 
majority have incomes below 185% of the federal poverty line. However, this 
synthesis study of leavers found one quarter or more leaver families experience food 
hardships at some point after leaving welfare. Such evidence is supported by 
Danziger et al. (2000) who found that while those leavers who worked most 
consistently had higher levels of both material and subjective wellbeing, there was a 
substantial proportion who reported respondents had serious economic difficulties 
and subjective financial strain, with a poverty rate of 36.9%. 
 
Evidence from the Survey of American Families shows poverty, food and housing 
hardship fell overall between 1997 and 2002 (Nelson 2004). Poverty among sole 
parents fell from 38.7% to 28.8%, and among married parents from 8.6% to 6.6%. 
Food hardship among low-income households (those with incomes less than twice 
the poverty line), fell from 62.4% to 59.4% between 1997 and 2002, not enough to be 
statistically significant. Food hardship for married parents fell from 46.4% to 45.8% 
over the same period. Housing hardship for low-income sole parents grew over the 
period, from 32% to 35%, but fell for married parents (from 25.8% to 23.1%). These 
findings support the findings from the first waves of the survey (Loprest 2001) that 
earlier cohort welfare leavers (1995–1997) fared slightly worse than those who left 
between 1997 and 1999, but that overall there is still significant and widespread 
hardship among leavers with earnings.  
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4.3.1.2 New Hope project 
 
These findings for national welfare reform across the USA contrast with those from 
the New Hope project described in section 3. This was a service and income support 
scheme for those who were earning, with no underlying changes to entitlement or 
conditions of receipt of social assistance (“welfare” or AFDC). Huston et al. (2003) 
report significant increases in income and reductions in poverty for some groups of 
participants five years after these people entered the programme. Poverty levels for 
the group receiving the programme remained consistently lower overall for all five 
years of evaluation and thus beyond the actual programme being in place. This is 
partly due to the fact that the effects on income in later years were higher but not 
statistically significant and partly because the programme helped to lower the number 
of those with very low incomes. In year five, 52% of the programme group had 
incomes below the poverty line compared with 60% of the control group. Measures of 
material hardship showed no differences between the groups but measures of 
wellbeing – physical wellbeing and lower depression – increased for the programme 
group (Houston et al. 2003).  
 
4.3.2 The UK 
 
The discussion of hardship and poverty continues with evidence from British reforms 
but these terms can mean different things. In the UK, poverty is measured primarily in 
relative terms, through government-produced income statistics that are updated each 
year – Households Below Average Income (HBAI) (Department for Work and 
Pensions 2005). This series of statistics uses before- and after-housing cost 
measures to take account of the means-tested housing allowance programme that 
can skew incomes at the bottom of the distribution, and a variety of poverty lines 
(40%, 50% and 60% of mean equivalised income and 50%, 60% and 70% of the 
median). The UK subscribed to the EU measure of poverty and social exclusion 
indicators based on 60% of median (Atkinson et al. 2002, European Commission 
2005). However, domestic policy on child poverty took a revolutionary turn in 1999 
when Prime Minister Tony Blair promised to end child poverty within a generation – 
by 2020. This policy is now in place, with subsidiary targets of halving child poverty 
by 2010 and quartering it by 2005. This commitment resulted from the recognition of 
the long-term effects of child poverty on life chances and inequality, and the 
economic and social performance of the country, as well as the poor ranking the UK 
had in Europe. 
 
How will child poverty be measured in order to meet this target? The Department for 
Work and Pensions finally decided on three measures in a tiered approach (2002, 
2003): 
·  absolute low income – defined as 60% of median income in 1998/1999 prices 
(£210 for a couple with two children) and adjusted over time by prices  
·  relative low income – defined as 60% of contemporary median income 
comparable with EU standards (with changed equivalence scales to those used 
in the HBAI series and on a before-housing cost basis) 
·  combined material deprivation and relative low income – based on those who are 




                                                  
42 This last measure will be set using data from the 2003/2004 Family Resources Survey that has been 
adapted to capture the required elements of material deprivation.  75 
The final target is still not clear, but “ending” child poverty will probably mean ending 
poverty on the “absolute low income” measure and reducing relative poverty to levels 
found in the best EU countries (4%–5%).  
 
4.3.2.1 Effects of policy change on poverty and living standards 
 
How has policy changed to meet these ambitious policy goals? There have been two 
main changes to income transfers. The first is the increase in child rates for social 
assistance which, in 2004, were brought forward to be included in the unified Child 
Tax Credit (CTC); the second is the increased generosity of in-work payments to 
families with children (which, from 1994, was Working Families’ Tax Credit and from 
2004 was the combination of CTC and WFTC. These tax credits are described in 
section 3. 
 










































Source: Hills 2004, table 9.1 
 
Increases to rates of social assistance (or CTB – Council Tax Benefit for those out of 
work), child benefit and in-work tax credits need further discussion before looking at 
the effects of these changes on poverty and living standards. Hills (2004) calculates 
that increases in real price generosity from 1997 to 2003 have been substantial with 
regard to children, and highest (more than double) for children aged less than 11 
years. Figure 4.5 shows the real increase in transfers for children and families with 
children. 
 
The substantial increases in real generosity of means-tested assistance and tax 
credits have been focused on young children (under 11 years) and for assistance in 
work. However, for families out of work, the large increases in real terms in child 
components of their transfers is offset by a lack of real increases to the amounts for 
adults. This means that while support for children under 11 years has risen by 102%, 
when these children are placed alongside their parents, the increase is far less – 
17% for a sole parent and 29% for a couple with two young children. At the same 76 
time, universal benefits for the first child have risen by 27% (although this rise has no 
impact on families claiming social assistance as this income is taken pound for pound 
from benefit). The combined impact is to raise incomes in real terms by at least one-
sixth for families out of work but to also improve incentives to work by large increases 
in in-work support.  
 
As seen in section 3, the effect of tax credit incentives to take up employment is 
working. This, with increased job entry rates (especially for sole parents), should 
show real progress in reducing poverty. The difficulty is that real price increases in 
transfers are not keeping up with the growth in median income. Elements of CTC are 
annually up-rated to match earnings growth, but as underlying income thresholds are 
up-rated only with prices (along with all other elements of the package), this does not 
hold the relative positions of low-income families over time. Evans and Eyre have 
demonstrated this through hypothetical medium to long-term projections based on 
lifetime profiles (2004). But, in the short term, and over the past few years especially, 
these changes, accompanied by continued job growth and growing employment 
rates should have delivered significant reductions in both relative poverty and 
reduced material hardship. Is this the case? 
 
A significant body of British literature is monitoring if the government is meeting or 
can meet the poverty target. Much literature uses poverty measures from the existing 
HBAI approach rather than the newly determined policy outcome target measures, 
which in any case, are still in development or have not been completely incorporated 
into HBAI baselines. These approaches use micro-simulation of policy change as 
described in our methodology review. The two main sets of analysts are attached to 
either the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Brewer and Gregg 2002; Brewer, Clark and 
Goodman 2003; Brewer 2004; Brewer, Duncan et al. 2003) or to the micro-simulation 
work of Sutherland based with colleagues at the London School of Economics 
(Sefton and Sutherland 2005, Piachaud and Sutherland 2003, Piachaud and 
Sutherland 2000). Stewart (2005), looking across the evidence points out that they all 
find the 2005 target to quarter child poverty will almost certainly be met under one 
measure – 60% of median income before housing costs – but are less certain about 
meeting the same relative measure using after housing cost incomes.  
 
It is thus too soon to know whether the 2005 targets will be met, but progress on 
poverty appears clear. Figure 4.6 shows the Stewart figures for changes in poverty 
since 1996/1997 to 2002/2003. 77 
 





































































































































































































































Note: Proportional change in rates of after housing costs income measure
43 
Source: Stewart 2005, table 7.3 
 
Figure 4.6 shows there is an almost unambiguous improvement on the most difficult 
of relative poverty measures (after housing costs) for all families with children. The 
only exception is couples who are not in work (this reflects that their income is largely 
made up of adult allowances for social assistance, which have not been increased 
beyond price inflation). Overall poverty for all children has fallen by 18% with the 
greatest falls in larger families and part-time working families (either lone parent or 
couple families). 
 
Has the additional money to families with children actually been spent on children’s 
needs? Gregg et al. (2005a, 2005b) analysed spending by families over the 
1996/1997 to 2000/2001 period using the family expenditure survey, the key survey 
in the UK that collects income and spending data. They found that many of the 
increased resources put into households with children by additional transfers, (often 
combined with earnings), has been put to good use.  
Low income families have always prioritised spending on necessities such as 
housing and food, but our results indicate that as incomes have risen the extra 
income has also been spent disproportionately on items for children, in 
particular, clothing, footwear and toys and games. Families have also spent 
more money on clothing for the adults in the household, an area where their 
spending had lagged. Families have not spent more money on alcohol or 
tobacco or housing. (Gregg et al 2005b:273–4)  
These findings are supported by analysis of family circumstances in the longitudinal 
family and children’s survey (FACS) (Vegeris and Parry 2003). 
 
                                                  
43 The equivalent before housing cost measures have the same signs for each sub-group and group but 
have different values. 78 
Smaller scale qualitative survey evidence by Farrell and O’Connor (2003) also 
confirms the finding that income improvements led to less constrained spending on 
food – and also less frequent spending as households began to bulk purchase. 
Quality of food increased first, with more meat, fish, fruit and vegetables, and “treats” 
became more common. Clothing was purchased for children before adults and 
improvements to housing conditions focused on improving warmth, decoration and 
furniture. Holidays, where experienced, “were generally a new experience to all” 
(Farrell and O’Connor 2003:5) and more luxuries were taken up by higher income 
households. 
 
The impact of improved incomes and increased spending for families both in and out 
of work has resulted in falling material deprivation and “hardship”, according to 
longitudinal survey evidence from FACS (McKay 2001, McKay 2003, McKay and 
Collard 2003, Barnes et al. 2004). Table 4.2 shows a time series for lone parents (the 
most consistent part of the longitudinal panel across these years) that clearly shows 
measures of material deprivation have fallen since more generous transfers were 
made. 
Table 4.2 Lone parents’ material deprivation and financial stress indicators 
  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Proportion unable to afford selected items 
Cooked meal every day  8  6  5  3 
Fresh fruit on most days  17  13  11  9 
New, not second-hand, clothes  41  35  28  25 
Best outfit for children  20  19  15  13 
Celebration with presents on special 
occasions 
27  23  17  14 
Money for outings and trips  59  52  46  41 
One week holiday away  74  69  62  58 
Indicators of financial stress 
Problems with debts most of the time  15  13  10  12 
Run out of money before the end of the 
week/month 
27  24  21  19 
Worry about money almost always  45  38  33  30 
Never has money left over  48  40  34  17 




Canada too has given a promise to work towards ending child poverty by way of a 
unanimous House of Commons agreement in 1989 “to seek to achieve the goal of 
eliminating poverty among Canadian children by the year 2000” (cited in Campaign 
2000, 2005). Canada still has a way to go. Canadian census figures for 2000 show 
that 19% of all children are in poverty, and that rates are far higher for aboriginal 
populations (41%), other minorities (34%) and immigrants (42%) (Campaign 2000, 
2004). Child poverty rose in the latest statistics available (2002) after declining since 
1996. 
 
Canada has no official poverty line but has historically measured income and 
changes in poverty against a low income cut-off (LICO). This resembles the American 
poverty line in many respects as it is based on patterns of constrained spending by 
low-income families. On the basis that the average Canadian family spends about a 
half of its income on food, clothing and shelter, it was estimated that if a family spent 
significantly more (ie 20% more) than half its income on essentials it was living in 
poor circumstances. Seventy percent of income was adopted as the cut-off point in 
the 1960s. This reflected the fact that families that spend more than 70% of their 
income on essentials would have little or no income left to spend on transportation, 
health, personal care, education, household operation, recreation or insurance. 79 
Unlike the US, this proportion has been updated to reflect changes in consumption 
patterns, so that it moved to the current 54.7% following the 1992 expenditure survey. 
This reflects relative changes in consumption and incomes. The LICO cut-offs are 
calculated according to location and family composition and result in 35 separate 
low-income cut-off points across Canadian survey data for national income profiles. 
However, since 1991, Canada has also adopted a low income measure (LIM) (a 
relative poverty line based on 50% of median equivalised income) for international 
comparison. Giles (2004) points out that the official Canadian statistical view is, “The 
primary reason for its popularity is its simplicity of calculation, unfortunately not 
because of a sound scientific justification” (p6). Since 1997 Canada has adopted a 
“basket of goods” approach, the market basket measure (MBM) based on a costed 
set of essential goods and services. Most evaluation research on poverty in Canada 
has used the LICO – especially the after-tax LICO – measure. 
 
4.3.3.1 The Self-Sufficiency Project 
 
Details of the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) are given in section 3. SSP was an 
experimental, time-limited in-work supplement that had significant impacts in 
increasing employment for its target group, sole parents on social assistance. 
Michalopoulos et al. (2002) show that impacts on poverty, measured against the 
LICO standard on annual incomes, were considerable. SSP, which operated in two 
states, lowered poverty by 12% at 18 months and by 9.4% after 36 months compared 
to the control group. As the SSP supplement was time-limited there was only a small 
(0.9%) and insignificant difference after 54 months, 18 months after treatment ended. 
These results are clearly and obviously linked to underlying incomes. At 36 months, 
after-tax incomes were around 8.5% higher for those receiving SSP. The impact on 
incomes at 54 months was negative, with lower unearned income for the treatment 
group but also lower usage of social assistance payments (income assistance).  
 
The results from SSP clearly show that supplementing earnings has a positive impact 
on poverty but that a longer term is required for long-term impacts on poverty; three 
years is not long enough to make an impact much beyond the end of the time-limited 
programme. 
 
4.3.3.2 Canadian Child Tax Benefit 
 
Official evaluations of the effects of CCTB on incomes and poverty are currently 
limited to a simulation exercise that applied the changing policy regimes of 1996, 
1999 and 2004 on a constant 1999 population and compared this to a zero-benefit 
position. This exercise (Department of Finance 2002) shows that the baseline 
headcount of families with children with no child benefits is 16.8%. With the 1996 
CCTB system this falls to 13.9%. With the revised structure of CCTB and the 
increase in generosity of in-work transfers through National Child Benefit 
Supplement, rates fall to 13.1% in 1999 and to 12.4% in 2004 (projected) 
(Department of Finance 2002, table 3).  
 
The Centre for Study of Living Standards report of a fuller range of micro-simulation 
exercises that examined different poverty measures, and both poverty headcounts 
and poverty gaps, provide very similar, if a more contextualised, set of results (2002). 
Using the after-tax LICO poverty measure (the one that is easiest to set alongside 
other Canadian evidence), it was able to estimate post-facto changes between 1996 
and 1999 and attribute them to the introduction of the National Child Benefit 
Supplement across Canada. These estimates took into account the different 
provincial level implementation of social assistance claw-back and found that poverty 
headcount rates fell by 4.6%. The fall in poverty gaps, at 8.7%, was greater. These 80 
micro-simulations however were limited by their ability to capture cash transfers only 
and not the accompanying investment in support programmes that provinces enacted 
with the savings to social assistance budget. Estimates would be larger if these were 
taken into account. 
 
Other direct evaluation evidence of CCTB is extremely limited. Lefebvre and 
Merrigan (2003) argue that the financial employment incentives from current CCTB 
structures are too weak, even in provinces where they do not claw back the CB 
supplement (see section 3 for discussion). They point out that labour market entry 
levels have not matched predictions and that gains from employment for such job 
entrants are below predictions – by 32% for women sole parents and 28% for women 
in couples (Lefebvre and Merrigan 2003, table 1).  
 
Publication of the Canadian government evaluation has been “imminent” throughout 
the writing of this review and will greatly bolster the evidence base from Canada on 
its eventual release. There is a plethora of commentary in Canadian literature (eg 
Battle and Mendelson 2001, Mendelson 2005), but little good quality evidence that 




Overall the evidence on poverty outcomes is of a lower quality than evidence so far 
on take-up and employment – for several reasons. There are fewer economic 
assessments of poverty outcomes from policy change in the USA; the large body of 
econometric estimation on labour supply effects, for instance, is simply not replicated 
for poverty and income change. There is US experimental evidence but no large-
scale econometric modelling of the quality that surrounds labour supply. This is partly 
due to the pre-occupation with economists active in analysis of transfers in the USA 
where the majority of work is on behaviour, employment, marriage, take-up, etc, 
rather than on living standards and outcomes. It is also because the American policy 
debate is focused less on poverty and more on employment and on reducing the 
caseload of social assistance. For instance, President Clinton’s investment in EITC in 
the early 1990s was an explicit programme of poverty reduction but was 
accompanied by other policies driven by alternative aims and which undercut an 
overall anti-poverty approach. In contrast, the UK has adopted a clear policy target of 
ending child poverty and has to more carefully balance employment and social 
assistance policy to achieve this. Canada stands mid-way, with a highly visible anti-
poverty policy agenda but with programme investments most likely to lower poverty 
without a great structural realignment that either ends considerable social assistance 
use or ends poverty entirely.  
 
Another reason is that poverty and living standards are an aggregate outcome, a 
combination of income changes arising from changes to employment behaviour and 
consumption, as well as from changes in underlying demographics as children get 
older, more children are born and parents join and separate. The ability to isolate the 
policy impact is more constrained and explains why, apart from experimental 
evidence, studies that use micro-simulation form a larger body of the research 
evidence, as they can control for other changes and concentrate analysis on the 
outcomes of policy change alone. However, micro-simulation studies are not solely 
empirical in their analysis of poverty outcomes but are a hybrid of empirical and 
hypothetical analysis. 
 
Table 4.3 summarises the most generalised and usable research evidence for New 
Zealand from the UK, USA and Canada. Readers are advised to monitor Canadian 81 
government websites for publication of the long-anticipated official evaluation of the 
Canadian Child Tax Benefit, which should be a significant addition to the literature. 
 
Additional questions should be considered. Do welfare reform initiatives or welfare 
policy changes that are broadly analogous to the WFF package influence income, 
living standards and/or measures of poverty? 
 
There is clear evidence that reforms of this type alter living standards and poverty 
headcounts and poverty gaps. 
 
The most consistent income gains of considerable size follow from an individual 
entering employment and changing the individual’s reliance on social assistance to 
the combination of earnings and in-work transfers. 
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Table 4.3 Overview of studies that examine poverty outcomes from policy changes similar to WFF 
Study  Country  Scheme  Coverage  Methodology  Main findings  Caveats 
Brewer (2004) 
Brewer, Clark and Goodman 
(2003) 
UK  Combined effect of 
WFTC and other 
policy change 
All families with children 
within whole population 
Micro-simulation  Relative poverty falling as a result of 
change 
Difficult to identify role of 
behavioural change versus 
income change 
Sefton and Sutherland (2005), 
Piachaud and Sutherland 
(2003) 
UK  Combined effect of 
WFTC and other 
policy change 
All families with children 
within whole population 
Micro-simulation  Relative poverty falling as a result of 
change 
Difficult to identify role of 
behavioural change versus 
income change 
Gregg, Waldfogel and 
Washbrook (2005a, 2005b) 
UK  Combined effect of 
WFTC and other 
policy change 
Poor families with 
children compared to all 
and richer families with 
children  
Secondary analysis of 
expenditure survey data 
Consumption on children increases 
as incomes rise after reform 
Gaps between poor and rich families 
on essential consumption narrow 
 
Michalopoulos et al. (2002)  Canada  Self-Sufficiency 
Project  
Social assistance 
claiming sole parents 
Random assigned 
experiment 
Income increased to control group 
and poverty headcounts lowered. 
Time limited experiment – effects 
dwindle to zero (or –ve) after 
programme ends 
Centre for the Study of Living 
Standards (2002) 
Canada  Canadian Child 
Tax Benefit 
changes 
All families with children  Micro-simulation  Decreases in headcounts and gaps 
using a consumption-based relative 
poverty measure  
Difficult to identify role of 
behavioural change versus 
income change 
Grogger (2003)  USA  EITC and welfare 
reform 
All families with children 
Focus on sole parents 
Econometric regression  Estimates the EITC role in income 
changes and employment separate 
from other aspects of reform 
US policy changes to social 
assistance make findings difficult 
to generalise from 
Meyer and Sullivan (2001)  USA  EITC and welfare 
reform 
Sole parents  Econometric regression  Find no evidence of income losses 
above 5% post-welfare reform 
US policy changes to social 
assistance make findings difficult 
to generalise from 
Zedlewski et al. (2002)  USA  EITC and welfare 
reform 
Families with children  Secondary analysis of 
longitudinal survey of 
American families 
Evidence of severe hardship for some 
families 
Evidence of continuing hardship in 
work for some families who have 
entered or remained in low-paid work 
US policy changes to social 
assistance make findings difficult 
to generalise from 
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There is considerable evidence that raising social assistance rates for families with 
children also reduced poverty gaps and hardship. 
 
Overall patterns of losers and gainers are more widespread in the USA where 
entitlement to social assistance has been removed. This means that reductions in 
headcounts are associated with higher gaps for some of those who remain in poverty.  
 
The additional income received from policy change in the UK has been clearly tied to 
increased spending on children and essential household items. Little additional 
spending on alcohol or tobacco products has been found. 
 
Do some groups benefit more than others from welfare reform initiatives or welfare 
policy changes that are broadly analogous to the WFF package? 
 
There are inherent labour supply effects that benefit single-headed households or 
single-earner households as outlined in the previous section. These give rise to 
greater gains in income, both in absolute and relative terms, to lone parents who 
enter work. 
 
There is little evidence available on how ethnicity independently affects income and 
poverty outcomes from policy changes. 
 
Larger families, those with disabilities and other constraints on working, will have less 
income gain from such programmes than other families. However, changes to 
generosity of social assistance payments to children disproportionately assist those 







This section reviews international evidence to consider how government childcare 
assistance can affect the operations of the childcare market, and more specifically 
the behaviour of childcare providers and parents. As outlined in previous sections, a 
key aim of the WWF programme is to improve the availability of affordable childcare 
by increasing payments to providers of two existing schemes, namely the Childcare 
Subsidy (CCS)for pre-school children and Out-of-School Care and Recreation 
(OSCAR) subsidy for school children up to and including 13-year-olds. Parents in 
work and those in training will be eligible for up to 50 hours of childcare assistance 
each week, while out-of-work parents will be eligible for nine hours (increasing to 20 
hours in 2007).  
 
In considering how the childcare market might change in New Zealand, it is important 
to note that in addition to changes in childcare subsidies, the government launched 
the ten-year strategic plan for early childhood education in 2002. The main aims of 
this plan are to: 
·  increase participation in early childhood education, particularly among children 
currently under represented (ie children from Māori and Pacific communities, low 
socio-economic groups and rural areas) by increasing the funding targeted at 
these groups, promoting culturally sensitive services and providing better 
information for parents 
·  improve the quality of early childhood education by increasing staff qualification 
levels: by 2012 all regulated staff in teacher-led early childhood education will 
need to be registered teachers. Intermediate targets have also been set so that 
by 2007, 50% of regulated services will need to meet this requirement and by 
2010, 80% will need to do so. Measures were also introduced to encourage 
people from under-represented groups to qualify and develop teaching courses to 
meet the needs of different groups (eg Māori immersion services). The 
government also aims to achieve pay parity for kindergarten teachers with 
primary school teachers, and has introduced other measures to improve 
professional development and practice 
·  promote collaborative relationships with parents and a range of other family 
services (eg parent support, parent education, health and social services) 
(Ministry of Education 2002). 
 
Drawing on international evidence, this section explores how the changes outlined 
above might influence the New Zealand childcare market. Key questions addressed 
in relation to childcare providers include:  
·  Does an increase in subsidy lead to an increase in (different types of) provision? 
·  Does an increase in parents’ purchasing power (because of the subsidy) increase 
responsiveness of services to parents’ needs (eg for flexible provision, care at 
atypical hours)? 
·  What problems could providers face in responding to an increase in demand and 
to parents’ needs regarding the nature of the service (eg opening hours, ages 
catered for, flexibility)? 
·  What is the relationship between childcare costs, subsidies and quality? For 
example, is an improvement in the quality of provision likely to lead to an 
increase in fees? Do subsidies have a positive effect on the quality of services? 
·  Is the increase in the availability and level of childcare subsidies likely to lead to 
an increase in fees? 
·  Could childcare subsidies increase the availability of places for subsidised 
parents at the expense of unsubsidised parents? 
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When exploring how government intervention might influence parents’ childcare 
choices,
44 the section focuses on key questions including: 
·  Do childcare subsidies lead to an increase in participation in early childhood 
education and out-of-school care? 
·  Does this increase vary among different groups? 
·  What (if any) childcare arrangements did families have before they started using 
subsidised care? 
·  Do childcare subsidies increase parental employment? 
·  Are there other obstacles to accessing childcare and entering work that are not 
dealt with by the subsidies? 
 
5.1 Understanding childcare markets 
 
Figure 5.1 summarises the main factors that influence the shape of childcare 
markets. Like all markets, childcare markets are influenced by supply and demand, 
directly or indirectly. However, the behaviour of “suppliers” and “customers” can be 
influenced by government intervention at national and local levels. The level and 
nature of government intervention varies considerably across countries and to some 
extent within countries as well, but the most common forms of intervention include:  
·  providing supply-side and demand-side funding 
·  establishing regulatory frameworks 
·  providing childcare services 
·  ensuring an adequate supply of childcare staff 
·  disseminating information about childcare services and funding.  
 
While in all markets childcare supply is influenced by government policies, the extent 
of this influence can vary considerably. Countries such as the USA and UK where the 
government has encouraged market-driven approaches to childcare expansion, for-
profit services and the voluntary sector play a dominant role in the market and the 
role of the government, particularly in some “market segments”, can be rather limited. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in some Nordic countries, concepts such as market 
and market forces are mostly absent from the childcare discourse. Services in these 
countries are publicly funded and provided, and access to childcare tends to be seen 
as an entitlement. 
 
On the demand side, probably the single most important factor associated with 
patterns of childcare use is maternal employment (as discussed in section 5.7, where 
countries with high levels of participation in early childhood education are also 
countries with high rates of maternal employment). Similarly the nature of provision 
(eg opening hours, location of service) is usually closely linked to mothers’ working 
patterns: full day-care services are more likely to be found where a large proportion 
of mothers work full-time; on the other hand, where most early childhood education 
does not cover the typical working day, maternal part-time employment is very 
common. Causality between employment participation and childcare use is likely to 
run in both directions: mothers’ desire to take up paid employment can result in an 
increase in childcare and can also affect the extent to which this is required on a full-
time basis; at the same time the provision of (affordable) childcare can lead to an 
increase in maternal employment (and full-time employment in particular), as it 
makes it both possible and financially advantageous for mothers to go out to work. 
                                                  
44 The focus of the chapter will be on formal provision, that is: group-based early childhood education, 
out-of-school care and registered family care. The chapter will discuss the role of informal care provided 
by relatives and friends, mainly as a factor that can influence parents’ views and decisions regarding the 
use of childcare services. 86 
 
Because of the close link with maternal employment, patterns of childcare use are 
also usually associated with factors that influence labour market participation. This 
includes parents’ educational background and employment history. Generally, 
childcare use is highest among highly educated and skilled parents and lowest 
among those from lower socio-economic groups (OECD 2001a). Geographical 
location can also affect demand for childcare, mainly reflecting employment 
opportunities for mothers in different labour markets. Furthermore, even within the 
same country childcare services might develop at different paces and in a variety of 
ways in different geographical areas, which in turn can influence the extent to which 
use of childcare services has been “normalised” and seen as desirable (Harries et al. 
2004). Cultural norms, and attitudes towards parenting and use of formal and 
informal non-parental care can also be influenced by other factors, including social 
class and ethnic origin; these can considerably influence the kind of care parents 
consider acceptable and desirable for children at different life cycle stages (Bell, 
Finch et al. 2005; La Valle et al. 2000).  
 
5.1.1 Countries reviewed 
 
The factors that shape childcare markets will be reviewed here, focusing on two 
contrasting groups of countries: three English-speaking countries (in addition to New 
Zealand), and four Nordic countries. The English-speaking countries include 
Australia, the UK
45 and the USA, chosen because they share many of the 
characteristics of the NZ childcare market, particularly in relation to funding 
strategies, childcare policies and patterns of participation in early childhood 
education. While these countries are different from New Zealand in some respects 
(for example, Australia and the USA are federal states), similarities in relation to the 
development of childcare services mean they have had to confront some of the 
challenges that New Zealand might experience in trying to increase childcare use 
(and parental employment). The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) have been included because childcare services here have developed in 
very different ways, and both childcare use and maternal employment are 
considerably higher than in English-speaking countries. They can therefore provide 
useful lessons for a country like New Zealand, which is trying to expand childcare 
provision and increase parental employment. Another reason for comparing these 
two groups of countries is that they have very different welfare regimes, which 
account for many of the similarities between countries in each group, as well as the 
variations between the two groups. 
 
                                                  
45 The UK includes England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales unless otherwise stated. 87 
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5.2 Childcare policy objectives  
 
In comparing different childcare markets and the policies that have influenced them, it 
is useful to distinguish between children at different life cycle stages and ages. That is:  
·  infants and toddlers – comprising children under the age of three 
·  pre-schoolers – children from the age of three until they start compulsory school 
(this ranges from five in Britain
46 to seven in Denmark and Sweden)  
·  primary school-aged – above pre-school age to the ages of 10–12. 
 
This distinction is necessary as in many countries the policy objectives, funding 
strategies, the locus of policy making and administrative auspices vary according to 
children’s age group.  
 
Two overarching themes have influenced the development of childcare policies in all 
the countries in this review: children’s wellbeing and parental employment. These are 
discussed in the rest of the section. 
 
5.2.1 Children’s wellbeing 
 
                                                  
46 Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales, but excludes Northern Ireland. 88 
There is now widespread recognition that early childhood education has a 
considerable positive influence on a child’s development (see section 6.5) and all 
countries reviewed have achieved or are moving towards universal early childhood 
provision for pre-schoolers. However, historical differences about views on the role of 
children and childhood have resulted in considerable variations in the ways services 
have developed and the philosophies underpinning these developments. One 
difference relates to the extent to which early childhood is considered a special time 
with intrinsic value, and the degree to which childhood is considered a preparation for 
the future, that is: whether a child is “being” or “becoming”. Nordic countries place an 
emphasis on the child as “being”, as the quote below from the Norwegian framework 
plan illustrates: 
 …childhood as a life-phase has a high intrinsic value, and children’s own free 
time, own culture and play are fundamentally important…the need for control and 
management of the [barnehager
47] must at all times be weighted against the 
children’s need to be children on their own premises and based on their own 
interests. (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs in Norway 1996, cited in OECD 
2001a:42) 
 
This emphasis is evident in the way early childhood services have developed in 
Nordic countries; from the beginning they have combined education, care and 
upbringing in an integrated pedagogical approach (Moss et al. 2003). They are also 
less likely to stress the formal “curriculum”, partly reflecting variations in educational 
philosophy, and partly from a conviction that children brought up in a highly organised 
and pressured society need opportunities for less structured daily experiences and 
for exercising some control over the activities they engage in (Kamerman 2000).  
 
While children’s wellbeing has also influenced childcare policies in English-speaking 
countries, programmes have developed in different ways. An important difference 
relates to the historical distinction in these countries between “education” and “care”, 
which has resulted in a “two-tier” system and policy and administrative 
responsibilities being divided between different government departments (see section 
5.4). On one hand, part-time early childhood education has been targeted at pre-
schoolers; this type of provision is now publicly funded and universally available in 
some of these countries,
48 and levels of participation among (older) pre-schoolers are 
very high in all English-speaking countries. On the other hand, childcare services 
have developed mainly to cater for the needs of children under three. Historically, 
government intervention has tended to be limited to funding and providing care for 
children and families in need (eg children at risk, abused children), and more recently 
to encourage out-of-work mothers on benefits to take up paid employment.  
 
Another way in which services in English-speaking countries differ from those in 
Nordic countries is that in the former there is more emphasis on the role of early 
childhood education in preparing children for school. This can result in the adoption 
of formal curricula for pre-schoolers. The emphasis is evident when looking at the 
literature on the impact of early childhood education on school readiness and 
educational outcomes – most comes from English-speaking countries, the USA and 
UK in particular. 
 
It should be noted that some of the above differences between English speaking and 
Nordic countries relate more to the past, and some may become less marked or even 
disappear in future. For example, there is a growing consensus that “care” and 
“education” are inseparable concepts and a high-quality service should provide both. 
                                                  
47 The barnehager is a day centre for children aged 0–6. 
48 In the UK all three- and four-year-olds are entitled to a part-time early childhood place. New Zealand 
has a target of achieving this by 2007. 89 
New Zealand has already integrated these two aspects of service provision (Meade 
and Podmore 2002), and the UK government has recently announced its intention to 
do the same in England (HM Treasury 2004). Similarly, while there is still a difference 
in emphasis between the role of early childhood education and care, it has been 
argued that: 
 …a growing number of countries are seeking a balance between providing 
opportunities that will enable children to thrive in the next stage of education and 
adulthood and, at the same time, valuing ECEC [early childhood education and 
care] institutions as places for children to live out their lives in the “here and 
now”. (OECD 2001a:42–3) 
 
The discussion so far has focused on policies that have shaped the development of 
pre-school services, but the expansion of out-of-school provision has a rather 
different “policy history” and is much more recent. As has been noted elsewhere 
(OECD 2001a, Petrie et al. 2003), across most countries out-of-school services are 
far less developed than services for younger children. Information on the former is 
also scarce. Out-of school services have expanded only recently in most countries, 
mainly in response to working parents’ needs, and only in Sweden do children (up to 
the age of 12) have a legal entitlement to this type of provision. 
 
5.2.2 Parental employment 
 
While the rise in mothers’ employment has been a key feature affecting childcare 
policies in all the countries reviewed, policy responses in different national contexts 
vary considerably. In Nordic countries, pre-school services have been developed with 
the dual purpose of supporting children’s development and promoting equal 
employment opportunities for women and men. As discussed later, this has had a 
considerable impact on the features of these services; for example, in terms of 
opening hours, target groups and fees charged. In Nordic countries there is also a 
high level of synergy between childcare and family-friendly policies.  
 
There is some evidence that even in English-speaking countries gender equality has 
influenced childcare policies to some extent; for example, it has been argued that in 
Australia the growth of childcare services in the 1970s was the result of pressure 
from women who wanted to be able to continue to work after becoming mothers 
(OECD 2002a). Similarly, in the UK, after what may be termed years of “neglect”, 
childcare was put firmly on the policy agenda by the new Labour Government in the 
late 1990s, with gender equality being one of the drivers for this change (Department 
for Education and Employment 1998). However, the policy responses have not been 
as coherent as in the Nordic countries. In the US, and, to some extent the UK, sole 
parents (on benefits) have been the main targets of some childcare initiatives. For 
example, when childcare financial assistance (in the form of tax credits) was 
increased in the UK, sole parents were the main beneficiaries (Harries et al. 2004). 
The system has now changed and is expected to benefit a greater number of two-
parent families. Similarly, government intervention in relation to services for children 
under three has traditionally focused on some groups (eg children at risk), with very 
limited support provided for other working parents. In all English-speaking countries 
early childhood education for pre-schoolers is provided during school term-time only 
and on a part-time basis, and in some cases only for a very small number of hours. 
These “partial” responses to families’ needs and a lack of universal well-funded care 
that covers the working day mean that parents in English-speaking countries are 
most likely to report difficulties in accessing childcare. These difficulties can 
considerably limit parents’ (mainly mothers’) employment options or make it 
impossible for them to take up paid work. 
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5.3 Childcare costs and subsidies  
 
In this section, the issue of childcare funding is considered, with a focus on the 
respective contribution that families and the government make to childcare costs and 
the mechanisms used to deliver childcare subsidies. 
 
5.3.1 Who pays for childcare?  
 
A key difference between Nordic and English-speaking countries is the respective 
contributions that parents and the government make to childcare costs. In Nordic 
countries, a maximum parental contribution is established in publicly funded services. 
This ranges from 15% in Finland, 17% in Sweden and 20% in Norway to 30% in 
Denmark. Fee levels are also linked to parental income, so that low-income families 
pay lower fees and sometimes receive a free service. In some of these countries (eg 
Finland) a childcare allowance is also available to pay for private provision, such as 
family-based care (OECD 2001a, 2001c). 
 
In contrast, in English-speaking countries the contribution by parents can be much 
higher; for example, it is estimated to be 75% in the UK (Daycare Trust 2004, cited in 
Waldfogel 2004) and 60% in the USA (OECD 2001a). These estimates are less 
reliable however, as overall figures are more difficult to obtain for these countries due 
to the complexity of their childcare funding systems, which tend to include a mix of 
universal and targeted funding. For example, in the UK, part-time early childhood 
education is free for three- and four-year-olds, while other childcare costs can be 
reimbursed through tax credits to low–middle income families. The proportion of 
childcare costs reimbursed in this way varies with income; it can be up to a maximum 
of 70% (increasing to 80% in 2006) for families with very low incomes. Maximum 
costs covered by this subsidy are also established, which means that even families 
entitled to the maximum contribution of 70% might be paying more than 30% of their 
childcare costs, if their costs exceed the limit allowed.  
 
Although in English-speaking countries a considerable proportion of funding is 
targeted at low-income parents,
49 a relatively high percentage of these families’ 
income is spent on childcare, and affordability is often cited by this group as a major 
barrier to childcare use. For example, in the USA 25% of the income of low-income 
families (with less than $1,200 a month) is spent on childcare, compared with 6% of 
income spent on childcare by parents with high earnings ($4,500 a month) (OECD 
2001a). Similarly in the UK, the poorest families (lowest decile) spend just under a 
fifth of their income on childcare, compared with 8%–10% spent by the richest 
families
50 (highest decile) (Paull and Taylor 2002). In this respect Australia differs 
from other English-speaking countries; following the introduction of the Child Care 
Benefit in 2000, provision has become considerably more affordable, childcare costs 
to families have fallen across different types of services and groups and low-income 
families now spend between 5%–8% of their income on childcare (OECD 2002c). 
Finally, it should be noted that employers play a very limited funding role in all 
countries reviewed. This is a general trend as it is rare for employers to fund 
childcare even where they have been encouraged to do so (eg in the UK), although 
there are some exceptions (eg the Netherlands).  
 
5.3.2 Funding mechanisms 
 
                                                  
49 There has been a move towards extending subsidies to middle income families, for example in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, however, these developments are relatively recent and therefore their 
effects have not yet been fully assessed. 
50 These figures are for families with only one child. 91 
Funding mechanisms vary considerably between countries, reflecting different 
political traditions towards the role of government and public services. In Nordic 
countries the bulk of public funding for childcare is given directly to services, which 
are either run by public authorities or are a mixture of public and private, but are 
mainly not-for-profit organisations regulated by public authorities. 
 
English-speaking countries have much more complex funding systems, with some 
resources universally available and others targeted, usually at disadvantaged groups. 
Resources are also delivered through a mixture of supply-side funding, allocated to 
services to expand provision and develop the infrastructure, and demand-side 
funding, given directly to parents. For example, in the UK universal funding for part-
time early childhood education for pre-schoolers is given directly to providers, while 
other types of funding are available for other forms of registered provision – “pump-
priming” funding, given to services to cover initial start-up costs and encourage 
expansion, and tax credits to low–middle income families to cover a proportion of 
their childcare costs. 
 
In Australia there is also a mix of state universal funding for part-time early childhood 
education for pre-schoolers and more targeted funding based on parental income for 
other types of provision (OECD 2002c). The USA has an even more complicated 
funding system operating at state and federal level, but most funding is targeted at 
low-income families through programmes such as Head Start and the Child Care and 
Development Fund (OECD 2000a).  
 
These funding mechanisms have resulted in a public-private mix in terms of service 
provision, and in all English-speaking countries reviewed private providers are very 
common. For example, 90% of day-care services are private in the USA (60% not-
for-profit and 30% for-profit). In Australia 73% of day-care centres are private and for-
profit, while part-time early childhood provision for pre-schoolers is run mainly by 
community-based, not-for-profit organisations. In New Zealand 23% of early 
childhood education services are private and for-profit. Day-care services in the UK 
are also dominated by the commercial sector. However, government initiatives to 
expand day-care provision (eg the Neighbourhood Nursery Initiative) seem to be 
leading to an increase in the role of community-based, not-for-profit organisations 
(HM Treasury 2004, Mitchell 2002, OECD 2001a). 
 
5.4 Key features of childcare services 
 
We now consider how childcare policies and funding strategies have contributed to 
the development of different types and levels of services. Early childhood education 
and out-of-school childcare are discussed separately, as these two “market 
segments” are different and have developed in different ways. The information is 
summarised in tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Table 5.1: Organisation of early childhood education  
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Sources: Department of Labour 1999, OECD 2001a, 2002d, Petrie et al. 2003 
*A place is defined as full-time (FT) if it provides a minimum of 30 weekly hours and part-time (PT) if it covers less 
than 30 hours a week. 93 
Table 5.2: Early childhood education and out-of-school care provision 
Country and school 
starting age* 
Auspices  Level of provision  Entitlement 
 
Nordic countries 
Denmark 7(6)  Welfare, education  0–3: high 
3–6: high 
6–10: high 
Entitlement to full-time 
childcare 0–6 years 
Finland 7(6)  Welfare  0–3:medium 
3–6: high  
6–10: low 
Entitlement to full-time 
childcare 0–7 years 




Sweden 7(6)  Education  0–3: high  
3–6: high  
6–10: high 
Entitlement full-time 
childcare 1–12 years 
English-speaking countries 












No (but target for part-
time provision for all 3- 
and 4-year-olds by 
2007) 
UK 5*** (4)  England and Scotland: 
education  





Entitlement to part-time 
provision for 3- and 4-
year-olds 
US 5–7, 6 most usual  Welfare, education   0–3: low 
3–6: medium  
6–10: low 
No 
Sources: OECD 2001a, Petrie et al 2003 
* School starting age: the first figure is for compulsory school age; the figure in brackets indicates the age at which 
children may be admitted to primary school on a voluntary basis.  
** The information from this table relates to the mid to late 1990s and therefore does not show any changes in levels 
of provision that might have occurred following the introduction of WFF. 
*** In Northern Ireland the compulsory school age is four. 
 
5.4.1 Pre-school services  
 
As discussed, in Nordic countries services for children under compulsory school age 
are heavily subsidised by the government and charge income-related fees. With the 
exception of Norway, pre-school provision is available as a right and on demand – 
from birth in Finland and from 12 months in Denmark and Sweden (the latter two 
countries have generous and well-paid parental leave and therefore use of childcare 
for children under the age of one is very low). Family day care is a common form of 
provision for children under the age of three in Finland and Denmark, but less 
common in Sweden and Norway (OECD 1999, 2001c). In Sweden 95% of local 
authorities can offer pre-school places within three to four months of parents applying 
for a place. According to the OECD (2001a), in Finland the right to a place is 
“scrupulously respected” and in Denmark only a few local authorities have waiting 
lists for pre-school services (Petrie et al. 2003). While evidence suggests Denmark 
and Sweden are the only countries that provide enough places to meet demand, in 
Finland waiting lists are declining and in Norway addressing shortages in provision 
for under three-year-olds has become a political priority (OECD 2001a).  
 
In terms of policy making and administrative responsibility, Nordic countries have 
achieved a high level of integration, which has resulted in a fairly straightforward 
structure of provision. All pre-school services are fully integrated, administered and 
provided by the education system. Children under the compulsory school age attend 94 
age-integrated,
51 non-school-based centres that cover the working day and are 
available all year round, and many children spend their pre-school years in one 
setting.  
 
Policy and administrative responsibilities for pre-school services is still divided 
between the welfare and education systems in some English-speaking countries, 
notably Australia and the USA, where individual states also share some of these 
responsibilities. In parts of the UK (England and Scotland), responsibilities for pre-
school services have been recently unified under the education system,
52 while this 
happened in New Zealand in 1986. This historical, and in some cases current, 
division of responsibilities has resulted in a rather complex structure of services, 
reflecting the different policy priorities that have influenced provision for pre-
schoolers on one hand, and children under three, on the other.  
 
While levels of early childhood education for pre-schoolers (particularly older pre-
schoolers) are high, this provision is typically available during term time and is often 
provided on a part-time basis; weekly hours range from around 12 in the UK and 
New Zealand (although there are plans to increase these in both countries) to 30 in 
Australia (OECD 2002a, 2002c, 2002d). In all English-speaking countries provision 
for children under three is increasing, but is still relatively low. Government-funded 
provision for infants and toddlers is often targeted at families in need (eg through 
programmes like Head Start in the US, Sure Start and the Neighbourhood Nurseries 
Initiative in England). Historically, expansion of this provision for other families has 
been left mainly to market forces, and has resulted in high costs, which are out of the 
financial reach of many parents. The complexity of the childcare system of these 
countries also means that children below compulsory school age might have to 
change settings as they grow up in order to fit with the structure of an age-
segregated system (Kamerman 2000, OECD 2000a, 2001a, Woodland et al. 2002). 
 
5.4.2 Out-of-school services 
 
Even in Nordic countries out-of-school services have been established relatively 
recently. Generally speaking, levels of provision are low and services loosely 
regulated. In some countries, several government departments might be involved 
with this type of service, but there may be no department with overall responsibility. 
In New Zealand for example, the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) is 
responsible for providing the out-of-school childcare subsidy to low–middle-income 
families while the Department for Child, Youth and Family (CYF) is responsible for 
setting standards the services need to meet in order to qualify for the subsidy. In the 
USA a federal grant is provided to parents with children under 13 years, but individual 
states determine eligibility criteria, and the grant can be paid to parents or directly to 
services. In addition, the US Department for Education provides support for school-
based services in areas with a high proportion of low-income families. However, in 
some countries (Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, England and Scotland) there has 
been a move to bring responsibility for all or most out-of-school services under the 
education system (OECD 2000a, 2002d, Petrie et al. 2003). 
 
Out-of-school services are provided in a range of settings, including family care and 
age-integrated and age-segregated centres. Most provision is based in schools 
although not necessarily run by the schools. School-based provision is most common 
                                                  
51 Denmark still has a substantial number of age-segregated centres, but is moving towards more age-
integrated provision. 
52 In England the Department for Education and Skills still shares responsibility for early childhood 
education and childcare with the Department for Work and Pensions to some extent. 95 
in Australia, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In the USA and UK schools are now 
being encouraged to provide a range of services for parents and children, as well as 
out-of-school care, particularly in disadvantaged areas. New Zealand is one of the 
few countries where out-of-school care is provided in non-school-based centres. 
Although data on out-of-school care provision is patchy, the available evidence 
suggests that only in Denmark and Sweden are levels of provision sufficiently high to 
meet demand, while in all the other countries levels are low (Petrie et al. 2003). 
 
5.5 How funding policies shape childcare provision 
 
Having explored how different policy priorities have led to rather different childcare 
systems, we now analyse the relationship between childcare funding and childcare 
supply more closely, by exploring how funding levels and mechanisms affect: 
·  the level, type and affordability of available provision 
·  the responsiveness of childcare services to parents’ diverse needs 
·  the quality of provision 
·  the prices services charge and the groups they decide to target. 
 
5.5.1 Which childcare markets are considered most “mature”? 
 
A “mature” childcare market has been defined as one where good quality and 
affordable childcare is widely available and meets parental demand (Petrie et al. 
2003). Nordic countries seem most likely to fit this definition, although it has been 
argued that strictly speaking only Sweden and Denmark can be considered “mature” 
childcare markets, as the level of supply meets demand in different “market 
segments” (ie children under compulsory school age and out-of-school care). The 
Finnish childcare market is “mature” in relation to provision for children under 
compulsory school age, but not in relation to out-of-school care (Petrie et al. 2003). In 
Norway there is some evidence of unmet demand for provision for children under 
three and school-age children; however, provision is relatively high and the level of 
unmet demand is considerably lower than in English-speaking countries. Even 
Norway can, therefore, be considered to have a more “mature” childcare market than 
English-speaking countries. The defining features of these markets are:  
·  a political commitment to universal full-time (early childhood) provision 
·  income-related fees  




In English-speaking countries there are three “market segments” that need to be 
considered: services for children under three, early childhood education for pre-
schoolers and out-of-school care. Early childhood education for pre-schoolers is 
widely available but is usually part-time and there seems to have been few incentives 
(and funding) to develop a full-time service to meet the needs of working parents. For 
example, it has been argued that in New Zealand the funding system has favoured 
the provision of part-time services, as “bulk funding” to providers is only available for 
up to six hours a day per child, and any provision above this limit tends to be 
considerably more expensive (OECD 2002a). “Wraparound” provision for pre-
schoolers is being developed in some countries (eg the UK) to provide a service that 
better meets the needs of working and student parents; however, these services are 
still very limited and many parents rely on informal arrangements to cover the gap 
between the hours they need and what is generally available (Bell and La Valle 2005, 
                                                  
53 A professional workforce is another key feature that characterises these childcare systems, although 
issues around childcare staff qualifications, salary and working conditions are not covered here. 96 
Woodland et al. 2002). So, in relation to services for pre-schoolers and despite the 
high level of early childhood education, these markets cannot be regarded as being 
fully “mature” as they do not meet the needs of working parents. 
 
Historically, the development of other services (ie day care for children under the age 
of three and out-of-school care) has been encouraged mainly through the provision 
of demand-side funding, usually targeted at specific groups (eg low–middle-income 
families). The assumption behind this strategy is that giving parents greater 
purchasing power will stimulate an increase in supply, make services more affordable 
and give families greater choice over the type of provision that better meets their 
needs. However, it has been argued that a completely market-driven system could 
only work in a “perfect” market and childcare markets are far from perfect, as 
“consumers” lack the financial resources and the information about services (Dickens 
et al. forthcoming, Harries et al. 2004, Verry 2000).  
 
Evidence from the UK and the USA shows that market-driven approaches can lead to 
the uneven development of services, resulting in shortages in poorer areas where 
parents can not afford high prices, and rural and low population density areas where 
demand is very scattered. Commercial and even not-for-profit providers typically 
encounter considerable difficulties in running a financially viable service under these 
circumstances (Dickens et al. forthcoming, Harries et al. 2004, OECD 2000a). 
Similarly, in Australia in the early 1990s, childcare subsidies were extended to 
parents using commercial provision. This resulted in an uneven growth with 
oversupply in some areas and gaps in others, such as in services for under three-
year-olds (which are considerably more expensive than other types of provision) and 
in poorer areas. Additional incentives had to be provided to encourage the 
development of provision in disadvantaged communities, and to support the viability 
and sustainability of services catering mainly for poorer families. The UK and USA 
have also had to intervene to deal with similar problems, although it is not yet clear to 
what extent these policy interventions are working and whether market-driven 
approaches are suitable to expand provision for the most disadvantaged groups 
(Dickens et al. forthcoming, Harries et al. 2004, OECD 2001a). In the UK in 
particular, a large supply-side funding programme (the Neighbourhood Nursery 
Initiative) providing start-up funding has recently been introduced to expand day-care 
provision. Early findings show that the programme has led to a substantial increase 
in day-care provision and has reached some of the most disadvantaged families, 
suggesting that a combination of supply-side and demand-side funding might be 
more successful than a strategy that relies mainly on the latter. However, supply-side 
funding under this programme only covers a limited period (three years), and it 
remains to be seen whether this strategy can lead to long-term sustainable provision, 
particularly in the poorest areas and among services trying to reach the most 
disadvantaged families (Bell and La Valle 2005, Harries et al. 2004, Smith et al. 
2005). 
 
5.5.2 How responsive are different markets to parents’ needs? 
 
One of the arguments put forward in favour of demand-side subsidies is that they 
give parents the opportunity to “shop around” and choose the service that best meets 
their needs. However, there is some evidence to suggest that this is not always the 
case, and many parents in English-speaking countries still report difficulties in finding 
the type of service they need. For example, difficulties are reported for childcare at 
irregular hours (for parents with variable working hours) and at atypical hours, as a 
substantial minority of parents now work evenings and weekends (Harries et al. 
2004, La Valle et al. 2002, OECD 2000a, 2001a, 2002c).  
 97 
Research on childcare services shows that providing the flexibility some parents 
require (eg different types of part-time arrangements, allowing parents to regularly 
change their requirements, a flexible booking system) can be very expensive and not 
financially viable for most providers. Providing childcare at atypical hours is also 
usually not financially viable. A problem associated with provision of a service at non-
standard times is to find a sufficient number of parents who need childcare at the 
(same) atypical hours. The nature of some atypical work (eg shift work) means that 
parents’ requirements can change frequently, and sometimes at short notice. This 
can make it hard for providers to utilise their staff efficiently. It can also prove difficult 
to find childcare staff prepared to work at atypical times, particularly as many of them 
have young families. Furthermore, childcare at atypical hours tends to be more 
expensive to provide (staff need to be paid at higher rates for these hours), but many 
of the parents who need this kind of provision are in low-paid jobs and least likely to 
be able to afford high fees. These studies conclude that current funding mechanisms 
in the UK are probably not adequate to meet parents’ needs for flexible and atypical 
hours care, and new solutions need to be found (Harries et al. 2004, La Valle et al. 
2002, Statham and Mooney 2003).  
 
While with high levels of full-time provision for pre-school children, parents in Nordic 
countries receive a better service than their counterparts in English-speaking 
countries, the rigidity of some services has caused problems. In Denmark for 
example, opening hours are determined by the local authority or parents’ board, but 
few services open beyond 5 pm and this has been a cause of concern for parents 
and employers (OECD 2002c). 
 
5.5.3 The relationship between childcare cost and quality? 
 
This section considers the relationship between childcare costs and quality, and how 
funding might affect the level and quality of provision. 
 
Much has been written about the quality of childcare and the complexities involved in 
defining and measuring quality, particularly in a cross-national context (for a review 
see Mooney et al. 2003). However, all available evidence suggests that good-quality 
childcare is not cheap, and that high standards are associated with high costs 
(Vandell and Wolfe 2000). More detailed analysis of the relationship between quality 
and costs is scarce and studies that have attempted this have several limitations (see 
Vandell and Wolfe, 2000 for a review of this work). However, in the US, attempts to 
estimate the impact of raising quality on costs show that, for example, a 25% 
increase in service quality (from mediocre to good) is associated with an approximate 
10% increase in costs (Vandell and Wolfe 2000).  
 
An increase in quality therefore means that services become more expensive to 
provide. The extent to which the childcare market is affected depends largely on the 
level of childcare funding available. Nordic countries, with high levels of childcare 
funding, have been able to achieve high standards and high levels of provision. High 
quality combined with low funding levels can inhibit demand and therefore supply: 
New Zealand is considered to have high standards – this has resulted in high fees 
which seem to have discouraged childcare use, for example, among middle-income 
parents, who until recently were not entitled to any subsidies (OECD 2002c). 
However, affordability problems are widely reported by parents in all other English-
speaking countries reviewed, even though quality standards in these countries are 
not generally considered to have reached the same level as in New Zealand (OECD 
2001a).  
 98 
The extent to which raising quality can inhibit demand and therefore supply depends 
largely on funding strategies. Recent developments in Nordic countries show that 
with adequate funding it is possible to increase childcare provision and quality. 
Conversely, when an increase in provision is not supported by adequate funding, the 
quality of care can be negatively affected. For example, in Sweden in the early 
1990s, childcare services rapidly expanded to fulfil the government’s commitment to 
provide places for all pre-school children of working parents. This expansion 
coincided with a period of strict budgetary constraints, and existing staff and facilities 
were stretched to create the new places; this led to a (temporary) quality decline in 
the staff:child ratios and facilities (OECD 1999). There is also evidence that 
inadequate childcare subsidies can mean that parents end up using low quality 
provision. For example, in the USA, where good-quality childcare is usually more 
expensive than lower-quality provision, and where federal and state tax credits cover 
only a fraction of the childcare costs, many low-income families can afford only low-
cost childcare (Peisner-Feinberg et al. 2000). 
 
Evidence from English-speaking countries suggests that in monitoring how changes 
in the childcare market might affect quality, the role of for-profit providers needs to be 
considered. Commercial services tend to score lower than state-run and not-for-profit 
services in critical factors influencing quality, including number of qualified staff, staff 
pay and parental involvement (Mitchell 2002). Research has also found that for-profit 
services score lower on quality assessments than state-run services and most not-
for-profit providers (Sylva et al. 2004). As noted elsewhere (Mitchell, 2002), the 
potential negative impact that for-profit services can have on the quality of provision 
can be tempered by applying stringent regulations for teacher qualifications, staff: 
child ratios and group size.  
 
Finally, an increase in quality is often associated with an increase in staff numbers (to 
improve staff:child ratios) and/or their qualifications. This can affect the provision of 
childcare if the supply of staff is not sufficient to meet the requirements of higher-
quality provision. This is currently a concern in the UK where the government has 
had to intervene to ensure sufficient staff will be available to support planned 
increases in both the level and quality of provision (HM Treasury 2004). 
 
5.5.4 Can subsidies lead to market “distortions”? 
 
Finally, there is a concern that the changes in childcare assistance introduced in New 
Zealand as part of WFF (that is, an increase in subsidy levels and the number of 
eligible parents) might “distort” childcare markets. For example, they could give 
providers a monopoly position, if in some local childcare markets an increase in 
demand is not matched by an increase in supply. This could in turn lead to a rise in 
fees (not reflected in service improvements). Nordic countries are not really affected 
by this issue, as the high level of government intervention means that fees are not 
really influenced by market forces. However, even in English-speaking countries 
where private providers and market forces play such a predominant role there is no 
evidence of this kind of market “distortion”. This is probably because in many 
English-speaking countries the level of subsidy is not very high, and even with 
subsidies some parents cannot afford the “market price” of childcare (Harries et al. 
2004, Dickens et al. forthcoming, Peisner-Feinberg et al. 2000). In response to these 
problems the UK has recently announced an increase in childcare subsidy levels (the 
childcare element of the Working Families’ Tax Credit), but these changes are too 
recent to evaluate. In 2000, Australia increased childcare subsidies to what is 
considered a relatively generous level, but there is no evidence that this has affected 
childcare fees, partly because, as discussed later, this has not resulted in a great 
increase in demand. 99 
 
There is also a concern in New Zealand that giving greater “purchasing power” to 
eligible parents could result in a displacement of families not entitled to the childcare 
subsidies, if providers find it more financially advantageous to cater for subsidised 
parents. We found no examples in the literature of subsidies of this effect on 
childcare markets; again probably because subsidy levels are often insufficient to 
meet the “market price” of childcare. For example, in England early results from the 
Neighbourhood Nursery Initiative (which aims to expand day-care provision though a 
mix of supply-side and demand-side funding) show that “traditional” day-care users, 
(ie affluent working parents), were over represented in neighbourhood nurseries. The 
main concern here, as with many other similar initiatives, is to ensure they benefit 
disadvantaged families, who are least likely to use childcare services (Bell and La 
Valle 2005).  
 
As has been shown, the extent to which increases in childcare subsidies lead to the 
kind of market “distortions” is likely to depend on the level of subsidy and how it 
relates to the childcare market price. Market “distortions” are probably more likely to 
arise where commercial providers are important market players. Given the 
predominance of community-based, not-for-profit services in New Zealand, it seems 
unlikely these problems will occur; these services are largely not profit driven and 
have been set up to cater for the needs of local communities or specific groups (for 
example, Māori or Pacific peoples). However, the UK experience shows that 
intervention and support at the local level is needed to ensure provision is expanded 
in line with local needs and reaches those least likely to access childcare in the past 
(Bell and La Valle 2005, Dickens et al. forthcoming, Harries et al. 2004, Smith et al. 
2005). 
 
5.6 Participation in early childhood education and out-of-school care 
 
This section provides an overview of patterns of participation in early childhood 
education and out-of-school care, and of variations among different groups. One of 
the key questions addressed by the review is then considered – if and how subsidies 
affect the demand for childcare. 
 
5.6.1 Variations in patterns of childcare participation 
 
Predictably, patterns of participation closely reflect childcare policies and funding 
strategies. Participation is higher in the types of provision that historically have been 
given higher priority and are heavily subsidised – for example, full-time early 
childhood education in Nordic countries and part-time early childhood education for 
pre-schoolers in English-speaking countries; while participation is lower in forms of 
provision given lower priority and funding – for example, out-of-school care in most 
countries and services for children under three in English-speaking countries (OECD 
2001a). While it is difficult to establish cause and effect (given the complexity of 
childcare markets and the influences that have shaped them), these patterns suggest 
that demand for childcare can be supply driven, particularly if the supply is supported 
by generous public funding. 
 
In all countries participation levels vary between different groups. Participation is 
strongly associated with a child’s age, for a range of reasons. Policy priorities and 
funding relating to different age groups have certainly contributed. Normative 
expectations about the suitability of non-parental care for children at different life 
cycle stages also play a part. In Nordic countries early childhood education is 
considered very important for a child’s development, while in English-speaking 100 
countries debates about the possible negative effects of non-parental care on infants 
and toddlers are still common (Kamerman 2000, OECD 2001a). Family-friendly 
policies can also influence patterns of participation among different age groups; for 
example, in Nordic countries where paid parental leave covers (at least) the first year 
of a child’s life, participation in early childhood education among children under one is 
very low (OECD 2001a). 
 
There are other factors associated with variations in childcare participation. 
·  Family income: As noted earlier, in English-speaking countries children from low-
income families are far less likely to attend early childhood education. This is 
closely linked to affordability and therefore is not a major issue in Nordic countries 
where fee levels are income related. 
·  Maternal employment: Among children under three and school-aged children 
participation levels are closely linked to mothers’ employment status.  
·  Ethnicity: In England children from some ethnic groups are less likely to attend 
early childhood education. For example, around a fifth of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi children and just over a third of Black African children attend early 
childhood education, compared with nearly half of their white counterparts (Bell, 
Bryson et al. 2005). In New Zealand participation levels are lower than average 
among Māori (53%) and Pacific children (48%), compared to European descent 
pre-schoolers (66%) (Department of Labour 1999). Similar ethnic differentials are 
noted in Australia and the US, while in Nordic countries lower than average 
participation levels are found among children from immigrant families. For 
example, in Denmark, while overall nearly two-thirds of pre-school children are in 
day care, less than 40% of children from immigrant families attend a day-care 
centre (OECD 2002a). 
·  Geographical location: Children in rural and scarcely populated areas have lower 
than average participation rates; this may partly reflect the lack of adequate 
services in these areas (OECD 2001a).  
·  Special educational or medical needs: Children from this group can also be less 
likely to attend early childhood education, although the extent of their 
representation depends largely on the level of additional support available for this 
group (OECD 1999, 2001a, Ministry of Education 2002, Woodland et al. 2002).  
 
5.6.2 Do subsidies affect demand for childcare? 
 
Affordability has been identified as a key barrier to childcare use in English-speaking 
countries reviewed. This is a problem likely to affect low-income families and the 
most disadvantaged groups particularly; for example, sole parents, ethnic minorities, 
parents with low educational levels (La Valle et al. 2000, OECD 2000a, OECD 2001a, 
OECD 2002c, OECD 2002d and Woodland et al. 2002). Evidence is mixed however, 
on the extent to which childcare subsidies can help increase demand for and use of 
childcare among different groups (see box 5.1).  
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Box 5.1 Examples of effect of subsidies on childcare demand 
 
The evidence suggests a number of factors can “mediate” the effects of subsidies 
and contribute to their success or failure. Subsidies to parents alone are unlikely to 
be successful as, while these may stimulate demand, there is no guarantee the 
increase in demand will be matched by an increase in supply. As the Danish example 
shows, an increase in subsidies can lead to an increase in demand and supply 
where there is an adequate infrastructure in place. In English-speaking countries, 
where the infrastructure is less well developed and has historically been geared 
mainly towards meeting the needs of more affluent parents, government intervention 
and some supply-side funding are likely to be required to ensure an even expansion 
of provision to meet the demands of different groups, and particularly the needs of 
more disadvantaged families.  
 
Level of subsidies is also crucial; a large body of evidence shows a very strong link 
between childcare price and use. As has been shown, the highest participation levels 
are in countries with the most generous funding levels. In the UK the inadequacy of 
the subsidy level (as well as the limited number of people eligible for subsidy) 
contributed to its very limited success in increasing demand (before the recent 
reforms were introduced).  
 
However, the Australian experience shows that even when subsidy levels are 
adequate to make childcare affordable and accessible across different groups, they 
may have a limited effect on demand because of normative expectations regarding 
the role of parents, the role of informal carers (grandparents in particular) and the use 
In Denmark in the early 1990s, childcare subsidies were increased and parental 
contribution was reduced from 35% to 30% of childcare costs. A substantial “sibling 
reduction” was also introduced. These measures led to a sustained increase in 
participation in early childhood education: between 1989–1999 there was an 0.8% 
annual increase among 0–2-year-olds and 1.7% increase among 3–5-year-olds 
(OECD 2002c). 
 
In 1999 in the United Kingdom childcare subsidies, in the form of tax credits for 
low- to middle-income families, were increased substantially. Early evaluations 
suggest they had a limited impact on demand for childcare (McKay 2001, Paull and 
Brewer 2003). Several problems were identified with the subsidy system, which 
were believed to have limited its effect on childcare demand, and changes were 
subsequently introduced to tackle these problems. For example, initially mainly sole 
parents benefited from these subsidies, and in 2003 eligibility was extended to a 
greater number of families (including many two-parent families). Another criticism 
was that the subsidies were not sufficiently high to make childcare affordable, 
particularly for those needing a high level of provision or living in areas where 
childcare costs were high; the level of subsidy has since been increased. 
Furthermore, subsidies alone were found not to be sufficient to stimulate supply, 
and two major programmes (Sure Start and the Neighbourhood Nursery Initiative) 
were introduced to expand childcare provision in the most disadvantaged areas. 
Early results indicate this strategy has led to an increase in childcare use, 
particularly among key target groups (Bell and La Valle 2005, Smith et al. 2005). 
While it has been argued that the problem of affordability has largely been resolved 
in Australia with the introduction in 2000 of the CCB, participation levels remain 
relatively low, reflecting difficulties in developing an adequate infrastructure, but 
also a preference for parental care by many parents (OECD 2002c).  
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of formal childcare. Cultural values and attitudes towards parenting, grandparenting 
and formal childcare are shaped by a very complex interplay of factors. Some 
evidence suggests however that these can be influenced by, among other things, 
government childcare policies, which can, for example, contribute to “normalising” the 
use of formal childcare (Harris et al. 2004). As shown, early childhood education is 
considered very important to a child’s development in Nordic countries, which have a 
long history of political commitment and public investment in childcare. In English-
speaking countries, with a shorter and more “patchy” history of childcare intervention, 
debates about the possible negative effect of non-parental care on very young 
children are still common. While recognising that childcare policies can help influence 
parents’ attitudes towards non-parental care, it is also important to be aware of and 
sensitive to parents’ views on the use of childcare and the needs of their children (for 
example, their reluctance to use non-parental care or formal provision before children 
reach a certain age), as policies that do not take these into account might not be very 
effective (Bell, Finch et al. 2005).  
 
Attitudes towards parental and grandparental care, and views about the role of formal 
provision, vary among different ethnic groups and can partly explain some of the 
differences in participation levels among children from different ethnic groups. While 
most ethnic groups are over-represented among low-income families and the 
availability of subsidies is likely to remove a major barrier to participation, the 
development of culturally sensitive services can contribute greatly to the increase in 
participation among children from these groups. For example, in New Zealand 
between 1987 and 1996 participation in early childhood education among Māori and 
Pacifica children trebled. It has been argued that this was due largely to the 
development of services, such as Kōhanga Reo and Pacific early childhood groups, 
which are totally immersed in the language, values and culture of the two respective 
groups (Meade 1999). 
 
Finally, when assessing the impact of subsidies on childcare demand and use, the 
question of substitution needs to be considered. It is necessary to assess if and to 
what extent subsidies lead to an increase in childcare use or to the substitution of 
one form of care for another. For example, subsidies might enable or encourage 
parents to switch from informal care to formal provision, or from a relatively cheap 
service to a more expensive one
54. This issue has attracted little attention so far and 
there is very little evidence available to explore possible “substitution effects”. 
Evidence from the UK and USA shows that overall expansion of formal services has 
been followed by a decline in informal arrangements (OECD 2001a, Woodland et al. 
2002). However, in England a study of the initial impact of the Neighbourhood 
Nursery Initiative programme, aimed at expanding affordable day care for 
disadvantaged families (many of whom use childcare subsidies to access this 
provision), shows a more complex picture.  
·  Forty percent of parents were not using any type of provision before they started 
using the Neighbourhood Nursery, while the others were already using some form 
of care (26% informal, 20% formal, and 14% a combination of the two). 
·  Changes in type of provision reflected a move from term-time and/or part-time 
provision to care that was available all year round and for a greater number of 
hours. 
                                                  
54 This is a concern when the main aim of the subsidies is to increase parental employment. The 
substitution of informal with formal care is generally viewed as positive, if the aim of the subsidies is to 
increase participation in early childhood education because of the benefits associated with this. Similarly 
a move to more expensive provision would also be regarded as positive, if this means a move to a 
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·  Some parents continued or even started to rely on informal arrangements, 
alongside the Neighbourhood Nursery, to “glue” together their formal 
arrangements (Bell and La Valle 2005). 
 
The above results illustrate the complexities involved in exploring possible 
substitution effects; this analysis needs to consider changes not only in the type of 
care used, but also the amount and suitability in meeting the needs of parents and 
children. Furthermore, the formal provision versus informal care dichotomy might not 
prove a useful way of thinking about substitution effects, as some parents are very 
likely to continue to rely on informal arrangements, at least as a contingency solution, 
in addition to using formal provision. Finally, if one of the aims of childcare subsidies 
is to improve outcomes for children, any changes in the quality of childcare also need 
to be considered, as subsidies might enable parents to use higher quality provision 
(this issue is discussed in more detail in section 6).  
 
5.7 Parental employment  
 
As discussed, there is a strong association between patterns of childcare use and 
maternal employment. While all the available evidence suggests that there is a 
causal relationship, it can be difficult to determine the direction of this causation. It is 
very likely that causality between employment participation and childcare use runs in 
both directions: mothers’ desire to take up paid employment increases the demand 
for childcare; at the same time the provision of (affordable) services can lead to an 
increase in maternal employment as it makes it possible and financially 
advantageous for mothers to go out to work. 
 
5.7.1 Trends in maternal employment in different countries 
 
Among the countries reviewed, Nordic countries have the highest levels of maternal 
employment although in some of these countries there are variations between sole 
and partnered mothers. In Norway 79% of partnered mothers are in the labour force, 
compared with 69% of sole mothers, although the latter are more likely to work full-
time (Millar and Rowlingson 2001). In Finland 80% of mothers in couples are in paid 
employment and 50% of sole mothers are employed. (Clearinghouse of International 
Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies 2004). In Denmark nearly three-
quarters of sole mothers are in paid work, marginally more than the employment rate 
of mothers generally (OECD 2002c). 
 
Maternal employment levels are lower in English-speaking countries, although again 
considerable differences emerge between sole and partnered mothers. In Australia, 
New Zealand and the UK around half of sole parents are in paid work compared with 
60%–70% of partnered mothers (Department of Labour 1999, Millar and Evans 2003, 
OECD 2002a). The situation is reversed in the United States where sole mothers are 
more likely to be in employment than other mothers, although there is considerable 
difference between sole mothers who were previously married (nearly 80% in work) 
and sole mothers who never married, whose level of participation in employment is 
similar to that of married mothers (around two-thirds) (Millar and Rowlingson 2001). 
 
5.7.2 Effects of childcare subsidies on parental employment  
 
As well as leading to an increase in childcare demand, subsidies have been found to 
have a considerable positive effect on maternal employment. There seems to be a 
clear link between childcare and funding policies on the one hand, and mothers’ 
employment on the other (Verry 2000).  104 
 
Some studies within specific countries have also found a direct link between 
(reductions in) childcare fees and maternal employment rates. For example, in the 
United States it has been estimated that a 10% reduction in the price of childcare 
could result in: 
·  a 9% increase in the probability of employment among partnered mothers 
·  a 3.5% increase in the likelihood that sole mothers in poverty might take up paid 
work 
·  an increase in the probability of employment of 14% among white sole mothers 
and 4% among black sole mothers (Verry 2000).  
 
In the UK simulations of the impact of increasing childcare subsidies (tax credits to 
low- to middle-income families) show these are likely to result in 3% of non-working 
sole mothers moving into part-time employment and a further 3% moving from part-
time into full-time work. Corresponding increases for partnered mothers are more 
modest (0.6% moving from no work to part-time employment and 0.5% from part-
time to full-time work) (Paull and Taylor 2002). 
 
The evidence also suggests that childcare subsidies can help to support sustainable 
employment. For example, a US study of mothers who received childcare assistance 
as part of a welfare-to-work programme showed that the childcare arrangements they 
made to enter paid employment were very stable. The study concluded it was rare for 
childcare instability to lead to employment instability, while the opposite is more 
common, ie mothers changing their childcare arrangements following a change in 
employment circumstances (Miller 2005).  
 
The above evidence shows that subsidising childcare can impact on participation in 
employment among mothers – sole and low-income mothers in particular. However, it 
must be noted that in all the countries reviewed a range of other initiatives have been 
introduced in recent years that are very likely to have affected childcare provision (eg 
developing support systems for co-ordinating and supporting childcare services and 
increasing quality standards) and the employment behaviour of mothers (eg welfare-
to-work programmes and family-friendly policies). Even in the United States, where 
welfare-to-work programmes (including childcare assistance) have been evaluated 
using randomised trials, it is not possible to isolate the effects of childcare subsidies 
because these are offered as part of a package of employment measures (these are 
discussed in more detail in section 6.4). It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess the impact of the subsidies if these additional initiatives had not been 
introduced. However, all the evidence suggests that, as with supply, subsidies alone 
might not be sufficient to increase the demand and use of childcare and parental 
employment and, in order to be effective, subsidies need to be supported by a range 
of other childcare and employment initiatives.  
 
5.7.3 Other facilitators and barriers to combining childcare and work 
 
This section reviews other factors, in addition to childcare costs (and subsidies), that 
influence parents’ willingness and ability to use childcare and take up paid 
employment. The role of childcare information and quality is discussed and the 
possible role of employment policies considered. 
 
Information (or lack of it) about childcare services and the availability of childcare 
subsidies has been found to affect parental choices of childcare use; this can in turn 
affect decisions about work (Bell, Finch et al. 2005, Millar and Rowlingson 2001). For 
example, a recent study in the UK showed that lone parents found the available 105 
childcare information was “bitty” and “disjointed”, and thought that in order to be 
useful and effective this information should be available from a single, well-publicised 
and easily accessible source. There was also a strong preference for information 
provided by other parents; for example, through local parent networks, which could 
be provided alongside other formal sources. Lone parents suggested that information 
on childcare could be complemented with advice when they entered work; for 
example, a “bumper pack” of information sent annually to parents and a free phone 
advice line advertised on television. The key message from this study was that 
advice and support on work, childcare and other issues should be integrated, and be 
holistic and sensitive to the needs and desires of the individual parent (Bell, FInch et 
al. 2005). 
 
Evidence also suggests that childcare quality affects maternal employment (Vandell 
and Wolfe 2000) and the likelihood of using childcare services (Bell, Finch et al. 
2005, La Valle et al. 2000, Woodland et al. 2002, Finch and Gloyer 2000). As has 
been noted elsewhere: 
Mothers are much more likely to use early childhood education and return to 
work if they are confident that high quality stimulation and learning is being 
provided rather than simply childminding. (Verry 2000:106) 
 
Employment policies can also play an important role in affecting parents’ labour 
market behaviour. Mothers have different levels of orientation towards work and 
towards parental care. Being able to achieve the right balance is crucial for many 
parents, who would not, for example, be prepared to go out to work if this meant 
spending too much time away from their children, or returning to work when their 
children are too young. This means childcare policies alone will not be sufficient to 
increase employment participation among mothers with a strong orientation towards 
parental care, even among those who also have a strong work orientation, as paid 
employment might create too many tensions. All available evidence suggests that 
family-friendly employment policies are required alongside childcare assistance so 
that mothers can achieve what they consider is the right balance between time at 
work and time with their children. In the Nordic countries, as with childcare, family-
friendly policies are more progressive and supported by generous funding (eg for 
extensive parental leave), and levels of maternal employment are highest. These 
countries have a high level of synergy between childcare and family-friendly policies. 
For example, in Denmark and Sweden paid parental leave is available for 12 months 
after the birth of a child, and children are entitled to a publicly funded early childhood 
education place from the age of one. Finland and Norway emphasise parental choice 
more, so while childcare leave or cash benefits allow parents (usually mothers) to 
stay at home and look after their children until they are two or three, publicly 
subsidised services are available for infants and toddlers as well as pre-schoolers.  
 
What is considered the right balance is subjective, and policies need to be sufficiently 
flexible to meet the needs of different parents and children, something that can 
determine not only the effectiveness of family-friendly policies, but also of welfare-to-
work programmes. For example, a comparison of welfare-to-work programmes 
targeted at sole parents in the UK (the New Deal for Lone Parents) and New Zealand 
(the Enhanced Case Management System) found the latter was more effective, 
particularly in helping lone parents at a greater distance from work, partly because it 
was holistic and client led and was seen as having something to offer each individual 
(Bell, Finch et al. 2005, Millar and Evans 2003). 
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5.8 Overview  
 
This final section considers the possible implications of the findings from the section 
for research that will be contracted to evaluate the WFF programme in New Zealand.  
 
Countries with the highest levels of childcare provision, childcare use and maternal 
employment are countries with childcare policies and funding systems rather different 
from those of New Zealand. Countries which, like New Zealand, have not historically 
had high levels of funding and political commitment to childcare are lagging behind in 
terms of childcare supply, use of services and maternal employment. While services 
in all English-speaking countries have expanded considerably in recent years, they 
have some way to go before they become “mature” childcare markets, where good 
quality and affordable early childhood education and out-of-school care is widely 
available and meets parents’ needs. The evidence also shows that attempts to 
expand childcare services by adopting a market approach can create some problems 
and not always lead to the desired outcomes.  
 
Previous research has shown that in assessing how the supply of childcare might be 
affected by subsidies in a market where the private sector plays a dominant role, the 
following need to be considered and monitored. 
·  Geographical distribution of supply: Market forces can lead to an uneven growth 
and under-supply in areas where a service might be less profitable or not 
financially viable. 
·  Growth of provision for children of different ages: Again it can be less profitable to 
provide services that require high staff levels (for example, for under three year 
olds). 
·  Flexibility of provision: Providing a flexible service can be expensive, and 
therefore less profitable, and even when services are not-for-profit it might not be 
financially viable to provide the level of flexibility some parents require. 
·  Provision of services at atypical hours: This can be particularly problematic for the 
reasons outlined earlier and the evidence seems to suggest that no satisfactory 
way of delivering this type of provision has yet been found. 
·  Impact on quality: This can be affected by staff shortages, but the evidence also 
shows that if subsidies lead to a growth in commercial services, quality could be 
affected, and it is particularly important to monitor aspects of quality that are not 
tightly regulated (for example, parental involvement). 
 
On the demand side, in assessing the effects of childcare subsidies, it seems 
important to consider: 
·  how affordable childcare becomes for different groups and for different types of 
provision. As discussed, even with the availability of subsidies, affordability can 
remain an obstacle to access among some families  
·  how the availability of subsidies might be mediated by access to family-friendly 
working arrangements (or lack of them). The evidence clearly shows the 
availability of affordable childcare alone might not be sufficient to enable or make 
it acceptable for all parents to work 
·  how subsidies might affect patterns of childcare use. As discussed, detailed 
information is required to assess any changes in the type and quantity of care 
used and why the subsidies might have enabled or encouraged parents to 
change their arrangements (eg to set up arrangements that better fit with their 
work, to get a better quality service, to move to a type of care that is considered 
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·  how attitudes towards parenting and non-parental care might mediate the effects 
of subsidies among different groups and what, if anything, might contribute to 
affecting attitudes towards childcare services. The evidence suggests that the 
quality of the available provision and information about services could play an 
important role in this respect. 108 
6 Child outcomes 
 
One of the key aims of WFF is to reduce child poverty, and by doing so the 
programme is expected to have an impact on a range of child outcomes that have 
been found to be closely linked to child poverty. The intention of this section is to 
provide an international review of the evidence on: 
·  child outcomes associated with growing up in an income-poor family  
·  the main determinants of child poverty  
·  the effectiveness of different types of policy intervention in reducing child poverty 
and improving different aspects of children’s lives.  
 
The key countries covered were outlined earlier in section 5.5.1. 
 
This section defines the child outcomes commonly identified as areas for policy 
intervention, and then focuses on child poverty, a key child outcome. Child poverty 
has attracted considerable attention in recent years, as it is strongly associated with 
a range of other negative outcomes for children. The correlates of child poverty and 
other negative child outcomes are explored, with a focus on parents’ labour market 
position, family structure, ethnicity and teenage parenthood. The possible causes of 
child poverty and other associated negative outcomes can be extremely complex. 
Policy efforts to reduce (or even eliminate) child poverty and improve children’s 
wellbeing and life chances need to reflect this complexity and be multi-faceted. As 
pointed out elsewhere:  
 
Children are kept in poverty, not by a padlock to which there is a single key, but 
by a combination lock that requires an alignment of factors if it needs to be 
released. (UNICEF 2000:16) 
 
In the last part of the section we focus on two areas of policy intervention that have 
been found to have a considerable impact on children and are particularly pertinent 
to the WFF programme: promoting parental employment and participation in 
childcare. 
 
6.1 Defining child outcomes  
 
In recent years, children’s development and wellbeing have been pushed high on the 
political agenda. This represents partly a shift in attitudes about the extent to which 
children are regarded as a public responsibility (rather than a private one). There is 
also growing recognition that the failure to intervene to improve the environment in 
which children grow up (and reduce child poverty in particular) is partly responsible 
for many of the problems industrialised countries face, such as educational under-
achievement, drug abuse, crime and antisocial behaviour, and alienation from 
common values. 
 
In addition to child poverty, there is a range of other outcomes that are identified as 
priorities for government intervention and are closely monitored. These include child 
abuse and neglect, unsatisfactory child development (socio-emotional, physical and 
cognitive), a range of health measures (eg low birth weight, infant mortality, drug and 
alcohol abuse, depression), crime and antisocial behaviour, and teen pregnancy. Box 
6.1 highlights the action areas identified in the Agenda for Children strategy in New 
Zealand and the different domains of children’s lives that will be regularly monitored 
to assess progress in improving different child outcomes. These are typical of the 
policy intervention areas identified by other countries included in the review. 109 
 
Box 6.1 Aims and indicators of the New Zealand Agenda for Children 
Source: MSD 2002 
 
As has been pointed out before (Phipps 1999), while most industrialised countries 
share the same concerns and goals regarding children’s wellbeing, the policies and 
funding levels aimed at improving children’s lives and opportunities can vary 
considerably. This has resulted in wide variations in child outcomes in countries with 
similar levels of economic development. Nordic countries have consistently good 
(and in many cases still improving) outcomes on the main indicators of child 
wellbeing, including low child poverty, low school drop-out rates, low levels of child 
abuse and neglect, and good levels of academic achievement. They are also 
generally regarded as having gone a long way in giving children the rights enshrined 
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Kamerman et al. 2003). 
In contrast, poor outcomes for children in some key areas have raised considerable 
concern in the English-speaking countries covered by the review. Child poverty is 
perhaps the area of greatest contrast between Nordic and English-speaking 
countries, and this is explored in more detail below. 
 
6.2 Child poverty 
 
Much has been written about how (income) poverty should be defined and 
measured. In terms of definition, poverty can be defined as absolute (the inability to 
buy a fixed minimum package of goods and services) or as relative (falling behind, by 
a certain degree, the average income and life style enjoyed by the rest of the nation). 
The latter is the most common definition and also the one used by the New Zealand 
The Agenda for Children: Making Life better for Children aims to improve all aspects of 
children’s lives and has set out a number of “action areas”, which include: 
promoting a whole child approach 
increasing children’s participation 
ending child poverty 
addressing violence in children’s lives, particularly bullying 
improving central government structures and processes to enhance policy and service 
effectiveness for children  
improving local government and planning for children  
enhancing information, research and research collaboration relating to children. 
 
A range of indicators of children’s wellbeing have been identified and will be regularly 
monitored. These cover the following areas: 
health (low birth weight, infant mortality, immunisation, obesity, hearing and oral health at 
school entry, smoking, drinking and drug use, depression and suicide, teen pregnancy) 
care and support (child abuse and neglect, relationship with parents) 
economic security (children living in low income families, low living standards, food 
security, youth unemployment, earning levels, youth economic activity and unemployment) 
safety (injury mortality rates, intimidation at school, youth criminal victimisation, youth road 
casualties and youth perceptions of safety) 
education (participation in early childhood education, reading, maths and science literacy 
levels, truancy, young people leaving school with no qualifications, tertiary qualification 
completion rates) 
civil rights (young people voting in national elections) 
justice (police apprehensions of 14–16 year olds, cases proved in the Youth Court) 
culture and identity (young Maori who can speak te reo Māori) 
social connectedness (home internet access, participation in sport and active leisure) 


















Government to measure child poverty (Ministry of Social Development 2002). 
Relative poverty is considered to be more useful in understanding the key concern: 
Once economic development has progressed beyond a certain minimum level, 
the rub of the poverty problem – from the point of view of the poor individuals 
and the societies in which they live – is not so much the effects of poverty in any 
absolute form but the effects of the contrast, daily perceived, between the lives of 
the poor and the lives of those around them. (UNICEF 2000:9) 
 
When drawing on international evidence there is also a more pragmatic reason for 
focusing on relative poverty: the lack of a commonly used and generally accepted 
definition and measure of absolute poverty. It is important to note, however, that 
given the complexities involved in understanding the determinants of poverty and in 
identifying effective measures to reduce it, an increasing number of countries have 
started to monitor a range of poverty measures. The range includes absolute and 
relative poverty measures, together with non-monetary indicators of deprivation. In 
the UK, for example, progress in reducing child poverty is measured by using both 
absolute and relative incomes, and a set of other indicators, which include poor 
housing conditions, children’s unintentional injuries, teenage pregnancy and low 
educational achievement (UNICEF 2000). 
 
As shown in figure 6.1, child poverty levels are very low (5% or below) in Nordic 
countries, while in the UK and USA one in five children live below the poverty line. 
Furthermore, while child poverty rates have been declining consistently in most 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), in the UK and USA they had been 
increasing until relatively recently (Bradbury and Jantii 1999, Kamerman et al. 2003, 
UNICEF 2000).  
 
Figure 6.1 Percentage of children living in households with income below 50%  
of the national median  
Note: The New Zealand figure is for 2001 and the figure for Denmark is for 1992; all others are from 1995–1997. 
Source: MSD 2002, UNICEF 2000 
 
The need to distinguish between different types of child poverty according to the way 
the experience of poverty is distributed over time and to what extent it is continuous 
has also been highlighted, as this can have significant implications for children’s 111 
wellbeing. By analysing the number and duration of poverty and out-of-poverty spells, 
Ashworth et al. (1994) developed the following typology of child poverty. 
·  Transient: One spell of poverty lasting one year. 
·  Persistent: One poverty spell lasting over one year combined with at least one 
out-of-poverty spell. 
·  Permanent: One poverty spell lasting continuously for 15 years. 
·  Occasional: Repeated poverty spells all lasting one year. 
·  Recurrent: Multiple poverty spells (with some lasting over one year) interspersed 
with out-of-poverty spells (with some lasting over one year). 
·  Chronic: Multiple poverty spells (some lasting over one year) interspersed with 
short out-of-poverty spells (lasting one year). 
 
Children are more likely to experience persistent poverty than other age groups. 
Again this varies considerably across countries: the US has the highest rates of 
persistent child poverty – 14% of children live in poverty for two consecutive years, 
9% for five consecutive years and 6% for ten consecutive years (Bradbury et al. 
2001a). As has been pointed out elsewhere, given the variations in the nature and 
severity of the impact on children of different types of poverty, monitoring changes in 
different types of poverty is very important (Kamerman et al. 2003). 
 
There is increasing evidence on the negative impacts poverty has on many aspects 
of children’s lives and how these can persist into adulthood. This evidence has 
contributed to putting child poverty and wellbeing on the political agenda, even in 
countries where children have traditionally been regarded as a private responsibility 
and where, with the notable exception of education, governments had been reluctant 
to intervene except in more extreme circumstances. Research has consistently 
shown that children living in poverty are more likely to experience poor health, score 
lower on standardised IQ and achievement tests, and have higher drop-out rates 
from school (Gennetian and Miller 2002, Kamerman et al. 2003, UNICEF 2000, 
Waldfogel 2004). These effects are particularly strong for children who experience 
persistent poverty, who live in poverty when they are very young and live in very poor 
families. Longitudinal studies have also shown that the negative effects of child 
poverty can persist into adulthood, leading to poor academic achievement, 
unemployment, under-employment, poor mental and physical health, crime, 
antisocial behaviour and teenage pregnancy (Kamerman et al. 2003). 
 
In recent years there has been a growing focus on the social and economic 
correlates of child poverty to identify the risk factors and appropriate policy 
interventions. All the evidence points to complex dynamics that lead to child poverty. 
Explanations for child poverty have focused on three broad areas: parents’ labour 
market position, family structure and welfare policies. All are important factors – none 
has been shown to be pre-eminent (Bradbury and Jantii 1999). There are still many 
unresolved questions about the relative importance of different factors and how they 
interact with each other (Bradbury and Jantii 1999). The next section examines the 
links among parents’ socio-economic circumstances, child poverty, and other child 
outcomes; the impact of welfare policies is examined in section 6.4. 
 
6.3 Child outcomes among different groups 
 
Understanding why children grow up in poverty and experience a range of negative 
outcomes associated with poverty requires an analysis of the characteristics and 
circumstances of their parents, as these have been identified as the main correlates 
of child poverty and other key child outcomes. How parents’ labour market position 112 
(ie employment, unemployment and underemployment) might affect children is 
examined, as well as the impact of family structure, ethnicity and teenage 
parenthood. 
 
6.3.1. Parental employment  
 
The impact of parental employment on children, and particularly the role of maternal 
employment in protecting children from poverty and economic deprivation, has been 
central to the debate on negative child outcomes in general, and child poverty in 
particular. Additional to this has been the effects of non-parental care on children’s 
development when (both) parents are in paid employment and (young) children are 
left in the care of others.  
 
Many studies have highlighted the importance of maternal income in lifting families 
out of poverty, both among sole parents (mainly mothers), but also among two-parent 
families, as in many cases an income adequate to support a family with children 
requires two earners (Bradbury and Jantii 1999, Bradbury et al. 2001a). Nordic 
countries have the highest levels of maternal employment and the lowest levels of 
child poverty. However, research in the USA among low-income families (Morris et al. 
2001) has found that an increase in maternal employment not reflected in a rise in 
family income might not necessarily lead to positive outcomes for children. In 
particular, the impact on cognitive and language skills can be largely dependent on 
the quality of childcare a family is able “to purchase”. In countries like the USA, 
where the price of childcare is largely influenced by market forces, low-income 
families might not be able to afford good quality childcare (Morris et al. 2001).  
 
Concerns about the possible negative impact on children of maternal employment 
are still common in English-speaking countries and focus mainly on the impact on 
infants. This is not really a concern in Nordic countries: generously funded parental 
leave for (at least) 12 months after a child’s birth means that most parents (mainly 
mothers) are able to stay at home when their children are very young.  
 
A wide range of factors affect child outcomes in addition to parental employment, but 
we focus here on two key influences particularly relevant to the WFF; namely the 
quality of non-parental care and the age of the children. The impact of the former is 
discussed in section 6.5. In relation to a child’s age evidence suggests that maternal 
employment in the first year of a child’s life can be associated with poorer cognitive 
development and behavioural problems, especially if mothers work long hours. The 
evidence on the extent to which different children in this age group might be 
negatively affected is not conclusive, but some studies have shown that negative 
effects are more likely to emerge for two-parent and middle-income families. Maternal 
employment in the first year of a child’s life has also been found to be more likely to 
be associated with negative outcomes if it starts when the child is very young, and if 
the work is full-time, is not voluntary and is in low quality jobs (Gennetian and Miller 
2002, Gregg and Washbrook 2003, Joshi and Verropoulou 2000 and Waldfogel 
2004). Conversely, generous parental leave policies, which provide paid and job-
protected leave and allow parents to stay at home when their children are very 
young, have been associated with positive outcomes. These include a reduction in 
infant deaths, longer periods of breast-feeding, reduced maternal stress and 
improved cognitive development (Kamerman et al. 2003). One study that assessed 
the impact of paternal and maternal employment, found that they had similar effects, 
indicating the importance for both parents to be able to spend time with their young 
children (Shonkoff and Phillips 2000). 
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In relation to older children, most of the evidence indicates that if children are in good 
quality childcare maternal employment has no negative effects, and participation in 
early childhood education can make a positive contribution to a range of child 
outcomes (see section 6.5). Interestingly, recent results from evaluations of welfare-
to-work programmes in the US indicate that maternal employment (among low-
income families) may have negative effects on adolescents (Gennetian et al. 2002).  
 
The move to the “24-7” society and the growth in atypical working hours have also 
raised concerns about the impact parents’ atypical hours can have on children. This 
is an issue particularly likely to affect low-income parents as they work in sectors of 
the economy (eg the service sector) more likely to require these work patterns. 
These parents also tend to be in a weak labour market position and less able to 
negotiate family-friendly working arrangements (La Valle et al. 2002, Kamerman et al. 
2003). In the USA, Presser (2000) found that night work and shift work was likely to 
lead to marital instability. This finding is supported by research in England (La Valle et 
al. 2002), which found that parents who worked long and atypical hours tended to 
prioritise time spent with children and the whole family, at the expense of time spent 
as a couple. Further evidence from the USA shows a direct association between 
atypical working hours and child outcomes:  
·  for every hour a parent works between 6 pm and 9 pm, his or her child is 16% 
more likely to score in the bottom quartile of maths tests  
·  children whose parents work at night have been found to have a 2.7-fold increase 
in the likelihood of being suspended from school 
·  children whose mothers ever worked atypical hours (ie evenings, nights or had 
variable working hours) had lower cognitive scores than children whose mothers 
worked standard hours (Han 2005, Kamerman et al. 2003). 
 
6.3.2 Parental unemployment and underemployment  
 
Parental unemployment and underemployment are associated with negative child 
outcomes, in particular child poverty and poor educational achievement. In the late 
1990s in the UK, one in five children lived in “workless households” and were 
considered to be at high risk of poverty and social exclusion (Hills and Waldfogel 
2002). USA research (Kamerman et al. 2003) has also identified a range of negative 
child outcomes associated with parental unemployment and under-employment: 
children in these families are more likely to be poor and therefore less likely to have 
access to health services and other family benefits. Children of parents in temporary 
and part-time jobs that provide low incomes also lack benefits such as health 
insurance, paid annual leave and sick leave. Additionally, their odd and variable 
hours might require complicated childcare arrangements, which may need to be 
changed frequently. Parental stress associated with unemployment and under-
employment has also been found to have negative psychological effects on children 
(Kamerman et al. 2003).  
 
Research has also shown that child neglect and abuse can be closely linked to 
parental unemployment and unstable employment, even when controlling for parental 
education and other aspects of deprivation. Research in Denmark found that 
unemployed mothers of three to five year olds were more likely to behave punitively 
than working mothers. This difference was particularly marked when comparing 
unemployed mothers with working mothers who felt appreciated at work and were 
the least likely to behave punitively towards their children. The study also found that 
mothers dissatisfied with their role at work or as full-time parents were likely to 
reduce their involvement in parenting and become less sensitive to the needs of their 
children (Christoffersen 2000a, 2000b). Similar results were found when looking at 114 
the impact on older children (ie 6–18 year olds). Physical abuse and neglect were 
associated with long-term (more than 21 weeks) maternal unemployment as well as 
a range of other factors including parental lack of vocational training, father’s mental 
illness, decreasing access to social networks, violence and crime in the family, and 
mother’s alcohol and drug abuse (Christoffersen 2000b).  
 
6.3.3 Sole parenthood 
 
Children in sole-parent families face a higher risk of living in poverty, with the full 
range of negative outcomes associated with child poverty. However, the relationship 
between sole parenthood and child poverty is complex. Although lone parenthood is 
associated with child poverty and a number of other negative child outcomes, it does 
not necessarily follow that it is the cause of these outcomes. 
Table 6.1 Child poverty* in different families  
Country  Children in 
sole-parent 
families  














Denmark  15.2  13.8  3.6  3.8 
Finland  11.8  7.1  3.9  1.8 
Norway  15.0  13.1  2.2  6.0 
Sweden  21.3  6.7  1.5  4.5 
         
Australia  14.1  35.6  8.8  4.0 
UK  20.0  45.6  13.3  3.4 
USA  16.6  55.4  15.8  3.5 
         
*A poverty line of 50% of the median national income is used; the figures are from 1995–1997 for all countries except 
Denmark, which are for 1992. 
Note: the above source did not provide data for New Zealand as comparable data could not be found. Data from the 
Ministry of Social Development (2002) shows that in 2001, 27% of children lived in lone-parent families; using the 
60% of median income poverty measure, this source shows that 66% of children in sole-parent families live below the 
poverty line, compared with 20% of children in two-parent families. Using these figures, the risk of poverty ratio for 
children of sole parents compared with children from two-parent families in New Zealand is 3:1. 
Source: UNICEF 2000 
 
Table 6.1 shows that rates of sole parenthood vary between different countries, 
although the differences are not very large and show no clear split between Nordic 
and English-speaking countries. However, child poverty rates among sole parents 
vary considerably. For example, in Finland and Sweden 7% of children in sole-parent 
families live below the poverty line, compared with around half of their counterparts in 
the UK and USA, and over a third in Australia. These results reflect the considerably 
lower levels of child poverty in Nordic countries; they do not show that living in a sole-
parent family does not increase the chances of living in poverty. This is because with 
the exception of Finland, the risk of poverty among children in sole-parent families in 
Nordic countries is as high, or higher, than in English-speaking countries. 115 
 
Table 6.2 Estimated impact on child poverty* if the proportion of children of 
sole parents was reduced to 10% 
Country  Actual child 
poverty rate 
Child poverty rate with 1 in 
10 children in sole-parent 
families  
Difference  
  %  %   
Denmark  5.1  4.5  -0.6 
Finland  4.3  4.2  -0.1 
Norway  3.9  3.3  -0.6 
Sweden  2.6  2.0  -0.6 
       
Australia  12.6  11.4  -1.2 
UK  19.8  16.4  -3.4 
US  22.4  19.5  -2.9 
       
*A poverty line of 50% of the median national income is used; the figures are from 1995–1997 for all countries except 
Denmark, which are for 1992. 
Source: UNICEF 2000  
 
The estimates in table 6.2 show that reducing the proportion of sole-parent families 
would not lead to a significant reduction in child poverty, as sole parenthood explains 
only a very small component of child poverty. Predictably, this would have a very 
small impact in Nordic countries, where child poverty levels among sole-parent 
families are low. The impact would be greater in the UK and USA, but even here 
reductions would be modest (around 3%). These figures suggest that reducing the 
level of lone parenthood would have a very limited impact on child poverty. Instead, a 
more substantial effect would be to reduce child poverty rates for sole-parent families 
(particularly where both the level of sole parenthood and sole-parent poverty rates 
are high). For example, it is estimated that reducing the sole-parent poverty rate to 
the same level as for two-parent families would result in an overall reduction of child 
poverty of around 30% in Australia, the UK and the USA (Bradbury and Jantti 1999, 
UNICEF 2000). 
 
As well as child poverty, sole parenthood is associated with a range of other negative 
outcomes: 
A good deal of evidence suggests that family structure and stability are 
associated with direct indicators of child and later adult wellbeing, such as social 
and emotional adjustment, educational outcomes, family formation and labour 
force participation. (Kamerman et al. 2003:18) 
 
However, an important question to be considered is whether these negative effects 
are due to lone parenthood or poverty; the evidence is not conclusive. In the USA 
longitudinal research has shown that negative outcomes remain for children among 
divorced mothers and those who never married, even when controlling for income 
(Sanson 2002). For example, when mothers remarry and income goes up, lower 
achievement and higher behavioural problems remain. In fact stepchildren living in 
reconstituted families have similar levels of negative outcomes as children in sole-
parent families. Australian research also confirms these results: 
While remarriage may provide a route out of poverty, living in stepfamilies 
provides other challenges, with stepfamilies consistently being found to be 
associated with a range of poorer outcomes for both children and adults. 
(Sanson 2002:16) 
 
Longitudinal research in the UK has also found that children from sole-parent families 
perform less well on cognitive tests and have lower educational attainment than other 
children, but once income is controlled for, the association between sole parenthood 116 
and these negative outcomes is no longer significant (Joshi 1999). However, other 
research in the UK has found a direct association between children in sole-parent 





Child poverty and other negative outcomes have been found to be more prevalent 
among certain ethnic groups, particularly in English-speaking countries. For example, 
in New Zealand a range of health problems (low birth rate, hearing failure at school 
entry) are higher among Māori and Pacifica children than other children; obesity, 
disability, child abuse and neglect are also higher than average among Māori 
children, as are smoking levels among young Māori women. Māori and Pacifica 
children are also considerably more likely than children of European descent to be 
living in a sole-parent family and in households with low living standards (MSD 2002). 
 
For many years there has been a concern in the USA about more negative outcomes 
for ethnic minority children (black and Hispanic children in particular). These include 
poverty, poor academic achievement, lack of health insurance, living in a sole-parent 
family and teenage pregnancy (Kamerman et al. 2003).  
 
However, up to now there has been little robust data available to explore the complex 
relationship between ethnicity and child outcomes. A number of longitudinal studies 
have been launched in recent years in several countries (eg Australia, New Zealand 
and the UK), which collect information on families’ ethnic composition. This research 
should soon start filling the gap in our understanding of how and why ethnicity can 
affect children’s wellbeing. 
 
6.3.5 Teenage parenting 
 
Although teenage pregnancies have been declining in recent years they continue to 
be a problem, particularly in some English-speaking countries (the UK and USA), as 
teenage pregnancy is strongly associated with negative outcomes for children and for 
mothers. Babies born to teen mothers are at higher risk of low birth weight and infant 
mortality. They are also more likely to live in poverty, be part of a sole-parent family, 
suffer neglect and abuse, become involved in crime and antisocial behaviour, and 
become teen parents themselves (UNICEF 2001). 
 
Despite a recent decline, the USA has the highest rates of teenage pregnancy in the 
industrialised world, and these are twice as high among black and Hispanic young 
people as for white teenagers. Teenage births have also been highlighted as an issue 
for concern in New Zealand, as they are higher than average among Māori and 
Pacifica young women (MSD 2002). The UK has the highest teenage pregnancy 
levels in Europe and here, as elsewhere, teenage pregnancy is strongly associated 
with a range of negative outcomes for children. However, some negative outcomes 
(eg low cognitive test scores) can be explained mainly by the low parental education 
level of these mothers, which seems to explain a great share of the associations 
between low income, teen parenthood and low attainment for children (Kamerman et 
al. 2003). 
 
In recent years, policy concern with this group has led to the commissioning of 
research in English-speaking countries, as evidence is still relatively scarce. Given 
the strong associations consistently found between teenage parenthood and 
children’s and mothers’ wellbeing, this area certainly merits further attention and 
research. 117 
 
6.4 Promoting parental employment  
 
In this section we focus on welfare-to-work initiatives that aim to promote parental 
employment among low-income families (and sole parents in particular). Such 
initiatives can have a considerable impact on children and are particularly relevant to 
the WFF programme and its evaluation.  
 
Some of the more robust and useful data about the effects of welfare-to-work 
programmes on children’s wellbeing come from the USA. Many of the evaluations of 
these programmes are based on random assignment design, with people being 
randomly allocated to a welfare-to-work programme or to a control group. This design 
ensures that any differences between the intervention and control groups are due to 
the programme rather than other differences (such as the families’ initial 
characteristics or the general social and economic conditions they experienced). This 
section reviews recent research based on meta-analysis of a number of large scale 
evaluations. These meta-analyses examined the effects on children of different 
programmes in USA and Canada, where the key aim was to increase parental 
employment.  
 
6.4.1 Key features of the programmes and evaluations reviewed 
 
The two meta-analysis studies explore separately the impact of a range of welfare-to-
work programmes on children (Morris et al. 2001) and adolescents (Gennetian et al. 
2002). Information about the programmes and evaluations reviewed by these studies 
are included in tables 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. The programmes had a number of 
different features (or combination of features) classified as follows.  
 
Mandatory employment services: In order to receive welfare benefits, parents in 
programmes that included this element were required to take part in activities such 
as education, training or immediate job search. Those who failed to comply had their 
benefits reduced. As indicated in tables 6.3 and 6.4, in some programmes mandatory 
employment services could be combined with earning supplements and time limits 
(see below), while some programmes only included this mandatory element. 
Programmes including mandatory employment services were generally successful in 
increasing employment. However, if they were not combined with earnings 
supplements, they did not usually raise family income or resources. 
 
Earnings supplements: Some programmes provided families with cash 
supplements or an increase in the proportion of benefits parents could keep if they 
went out to work. Childcare subsidies were also provided by some programmes. 
Programmes including earning supplements were found to increase both parental 
employment and family income. 
 
Time limits: Some programmes restricted families’ eligibility to welfare benefits to a 
certain number of months in a specified period. Once a family reached the time limit, 
federally funded cash benefits were stopped. However, the family normally remained 
eligible for food stamps, Medicaid, low-income childcare assistance and (where 
available) state-supported cash assistance. The programmes with time limits, 
combined with mandatory employment services and a small earnings supplement, 
resulted in an increase in parental employment but only modest increases in family 
income (Morris et al. 2001). 
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6.4.2 Effects of welfare-to-work programmes on young children 
 
One of the main aims of the study conducted by Morris and colleagues was to take 
previous research a step further and consider the effects of different aspects of a 
welfare-to-work programme.  
 
The critical question for policy is not “What are the effects of welfare reform on 
children?” Instead, it is “What program features are most likely to promote 
children’s wellbeing?” or, conversely, “What program features harm children or 
leave them unaffected?” (Morris et al. 2001:ES-1) 
 
The study focused on children aged between three and nine when their parents 
joined the programme and between five and 12 when the follow-up studies took 
place. The report includes a full explanation of the child outcome measures used; 
most comprised standard and widely used assessment scales. A brief overview of 
these measures is provided below. 
 
Children’s cognitive outcomes: These included parents’ and teachers’ 
assessments of children’s school performance and children’s test scores (not all 
evaluations included information from all these sources and some relied only on 
parents’ reports). The measures used varied somewhat between different 
programmes, and parents’ reports tended to be based on a single question about 
children’s school performance on a five-point scale (from one: “not well at all” to five: 
“very well”). In some cases parents were asked to rate their children’s performance 
(again using a five-point scale) on three academic subjects. Teachers’ reports were 
measured using a 10-item academic sub-scale from the social skills rating system, 
which requires teachers to rate a child’s skills relative to those of their peers in key 
subjects on a five-point scale – from one: “bottom 10%” to five: “top 10%”. 
 
Children’s social behaviour: The emphasis was on externalising behaviour (eg 
children’s “acting out” and negative interactions such as fighting with adults and other 
children), rather than internalising behaviour (eg anxiety or depression). Externalising 
behaviour was considered to be more easily and accurately assessed by parents and 
teachers, and has also been found to be more likely to be affected by child-focused 
interventions. The measures used again varied and included a 12-item externalising 
sub-scale of the Behavioural Problems Index, which assesses negative behaviour 
such as cheating and bullying, and uses a three-point scale (from zero: “not true” to 
two: “very true”). A six-item externalising sub-scale of the Problem Behaviour Scale 
from the Social Skills Rating System was used in some cases to collect data from 
both teachers and parents about aggressive behaviour and how often children 
needed to be disciplined. This used a five-point scale ranging from one: “never” to 
five: “all the time”. Positive social behaviour (eg the extent to which children were 
helpful and co-operative) was also measured. In some cases the 25-item Positive 
Behaviour Scale was used – this included three sub-scales: compliance; social 
competence; and autonomy. Each item was scored by parents on an 11-point scale 
ranging from one: “not at all like my child” to ten: “completely like my child”. The 
Positive Social Behaviour was also used to assess (again using parental reports) 
children’s pro-social interaction with peers on a scale ranging from one: “never” to 
three: “often”.  
 
Children’s health: This was based on parental reports, and in most evaluations was 
based on ratings given to a single question, which asked parents to assess their 
child’s overall health on a five-point scale (from one: “poor” to five: “very good”). This 
is a very common health measure; in Britain, for example, it is used in the main 
survey series that collect health data (ie, the English, Welsh and Scottish health 119 
surveys). It correlates well with more detailed information on children’s health (also 
provided by parents). However, because most children’s health is good, the “positive” 
categories (ie “very good”, “good” and “fair”) might not provide sufficient 
discrimination Extending the scale could partly deal with this problem. 
 
As has been shown, the studies used for the meta-analyses relied, to a considerable 
extent, on information provided by parents. While this can be very useful, one should 
also consider the possibility that parents’ perceptions of their children’s academic 
performance, behaviour and health could be affected by participation in the 
programme. For example, high levels of work stress could result in perceiving a 
child’s behaviour more negatively, compared with the control group; similarly working 
parents might be more likely than non-working parents to be aware of their children’s 
health, because they might have to miss work. This suggests that data from a variety 
of sources (eg teachers and perhaps children themselves, as well as parents) would 
provide a more robust basis for an evaluation. Furthermore, as the authors of the 
study advise, teachers’ reports should be weighed more heavily than parents’ reports 
(Morris et al. 2001). 
 
The main findings from the Morris et al. (2001) study show that: 
 
·  Programmes that included earnings supplements (which increased both parental 
employment and income) led to higher school achievement, and some of these 
programmes also reduced behavioural problems, increased positive social 
behaviour and/or improved children’s overall health. These positive effects were 
most pronounced for the children of long-term welfare recipients. 
 
·  Adding mandatory employment did not affect children’s outcomes beyond the 
positive effects already associated with earnings supplements. 
 
·  The programmes with mandatory employment (which increased parental 
employment but not income) had very few effects on children, and the effects that 
emerged were mixed. None of these programmes were found to have any effects 
(positive or negative) on school achievement. The effects on behaviour were not 
consistent across the different programmes; for example, both Atlanta 
programmes were associated with a reduction in children’s negative behaviour, 
while in Grand Rapids the programmes seemed to have had the opposite effect. 
In the two Riverside programmes a negative impact on health was found, but in 
all the other sites the effect on children’s health was neutral. The authors 
conclude that these mixed results are likely to be due to the characteristics of the 
different sites. 
 
·  Not much information is available on the effects of time limits (which increased 
parental employment and resulted in a modest impact on income). Only one 
study reviewed included this element (which was combined with mandatory 
employment and a small earning supplement), and results are mixed as time 
limits were associated with an improvement in children’s health but a decrease in 
positive social behaviour. 
 
The results above indicate that an increase in parental employment leads to 
considerable positive effects on children only if it is combined with an increase in 
family income. Moreover, as Morris et al. have pointed out: 
Although the effects of earnings supplements on children are encouraging, the 
improvements are modest when considered in the context of these children’s 
high levels of disadvantage. Even the programs with the most benefits to 
children left many families in poverty and many children at risk of school failure 120 
and behaviour problems. These programmes do not eliminate the need for child-
focused interventions and reforms that promote school achievement and reduce 
behaviour problems. (2001:ES-5) 
Table 6.3 Studies and programmes included in the assessment of outcomes for 
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Aged 5–12 at 
follow-up 
1 MES = Mandatory Employment Services; ES = Earnings Supplement; TL = Time Limits. 
Source: Morris et al. 2001 121 





Study  Programme/s 
tested 
MES  ES  TL 











































































































































































































































Aged 13–18 at 
follow-up 
1 MES= Mandatory Employment Services; ES= Earnings Supplement; TL= Time Limits 
2 This feature of Full WRP is more accurately described as a time-triggered work requirement. 
Source: Gennetian et al. 2002 
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6.4.3. Effects of welfare-to-work programmes on adolescents 
 
The main aim of the study by Gennetian et al. (2002) was to fill a gap in our 
understanding of how welfare-to-work programmes might affect adolescents. 
Generally, research that has explored child outcomes has focused on young children 
and not considered if and how children’s age and life cycle stage might mediate the 
effects of these programmes. The data available on adolescents was more limited 
than the information collected for younger children, as the follow-ups tended to focus 
on the latter. Detailed information about the measures used to assess young people’s 
outcomes is included in the report; an overview of these measures is included below. 
 
School outcomes: These were measured by asking mothers about grade repetition 
and whether young people dropped out of school. Some evaluations also asked a 
question about overall school performance, which was rated using a five-point scale 
(from five: “very well” to one: “not at all well”). Only the SSP study included teachers’ 
reports, as well as the information provided by parents. 
 
School-related behaviour: This covered whether young people received any special 
educational services, had been suspended or expelled from school, and whether the 
parent had been contacted by the school about their child’s behavioural problems. 
 
Other outcomes: The only non-school related measure available from all 
programmes was teenage parenthood, while some (but not all) evaluations collected 
data on crime and antisocial behaviour, alcohol and drug use.  
 
Given the age group explored, there may be concerns about the accuracy of the 
information provided by parents about school performance, as some young people 
might not share much information about school activities with their parents. However, 
the authors of the study argue that maternal misreporting is unlikely to compromise 
the validity of the results for a number of reasons. First, even if there was some 
misreporting, there is no reason to believe this should be different between 
intervention and control groups. Second, mothers were mainly asked about very 
significant events (eg suspension, grade repetition and special needs), of which 
parents are very likely to be aware. Third, where data from teachers was also 
available (ie in the SSP evaluation), the teachers’ assessments were found to 
moderately correlate with mothers’ assessments. Despite these arguments, it would 
also seem that, as discussed earlier, an assessment of young people’s outcomes 
based on information from a number of sources would be more robust. It would seem 
particularly important to collect information from the young people themselves, 
especially on topics such as smoking, drinking and drug use, involvement in 
antisocial behaviour and crime, friendships, relationship with parents and other 
significant adults, and views and experiences of school, including bullying.  
 
Qualitative data was also used to complement the findings from the meta-analysis 
and to explore the processes that might result in different outcomes for children. The 
qualitative study was not part of the evaluations listed in table 6.4; it was a separate 
ethnographic study with mothers to explore how adolescents might be affected by 
their mother’s transition from welfare into work. 
 
The main findings from the Gennetian et al. (2002) study show that: 
 
Some school outcomes (school performance, grade repetition and use of special 
educational services) were negatively affected by the programmes examined. While 
the impacts were small, given that these young people were already highly 
disadvantaged and at risk, even a small effect could considerably influence their 123 
lives. (Not all school outcomes were negatively affected – school drop out and 
suspensions did not increase.) 
 
Negative effects were also found in relation to minor delinquency, involvement with 
the police and substance abuse, but these outcomes were not measured across 
most programmes. The only non-school outcome available from all evaluations 
(teenage parenthood) did not appear to be affected. 
 
The findings do not indicate that some features of the programme were less likely to 
result in negative outcomes for young people. In contrast to results for younger 
children, all three programmes approaches, even those that increased family income, 
resulted in some negative effects on young people 
 
For most of the outcomes examined, negative effects were more likely to be 
experienced by adolescents with younger siblings; even when the overall results did 
not indicate negative outcomes. For example, young people with younger siblings 
were more likely to drop out of school and be suspended than their counterparts in 
the control groups. 
 
Data from some of the evaluations that examined after-school activities found that 
young people with younger siblings (unlike those without younger siblings) did not 
receive more structured supervision or participate in more after-school activities than 
their counterparts in the control groups. They were also more likely than the control 
groups to look after their younger siblings and to be working for more than 20 hours a 
week (the last result is based on one programme only). 
 
The qualitative data shows that the jobs typically held by (sole) parents in the 
programmes were rather inflexible and made it very difficult for these parents to give 
their children the time and attention they needed. 
 
The authors conclude that: 
 
Policy makers should place priority on understanding how adolescents are 
affected by maternal employment and on testing new approaches in programs 
for low income youth and their families. (Gennetian et al. 2002:48) 
 
6.5 Early childhood education, out-of-school care and child outcomes 
 
Most research on the impact of early childhood education and out-of-school care on 
child outcomes comes from the USA. Two landmark studies involving children at risk 
were started in the US in the 1960s and 1970s (the Perry Pre-school Project and the 
Abecedarian Project). Both were based upon randomised trials and showed the 
lasting positive effects of good quality early childhood education (Burchinal et al. 
1989, Schweinhart 2005). These early studies have since been followed by a wave of 
research among both advantaged and disadvantaged children, mostly focused on the 
impact of early childhood education while a much smaller number of studies have 
explored the effects of out-of-school care.  
 
The main studies exploring the effects of early childhood education and out-of-school 
care are summarised in tables 6.5 and 6.6 respectively and are discussed in the rest 
of the section. 
 
Table 6.5 Main studies on the effects of early childhood education 124 
Name of 
study 







USA  1962–1990s  123  Targeted children from disadvantaged families to see whether 
high quality active learning pre-school projects could provide 
both short- and long-term benefits to children living in poverty. 
Children were randomly assigned to an experimental pre-
school group or a control group with no pre-school experience 
and were tested on entry to school and in subsequent years. 
The programme has been subjected to careful evaluation for 




USA  1978–1999  111  Targeted children from disadvantaged, mainly African-
American families, of whom 57 were enrolled for five years in 
an early education programme, with good adult:child ratios, 
ongoing professional development and salaries for staff based 
on the public school pay scale. The other 54 children were the 
control group who received no pre-school service (Burchinal 
et al. 1989). 
Stockholm 
Study 
Sweden  1980–1992  128  Children were three years old when study began to look at 
effects of different childcare histories on children’s 
development. At ages 8 and 13, teachers assessed children 




Sweden  1989–1997  145  Children were followed from 16 months, before they entered 
day care, until the age of eight. The study was designed to 
take into account pre-enrolment differences between families. 
It was set up to assess the effects of childcare on children’s 
development and data on the quality of the day-care setting 









USA  1989–  1300  Examines how variations in early childhood experiences 
among infants and toddlers from different family backgrounds 
influenced their development. Longitudinal prospective study: 
infants followed from birth to seven years in 10 research sites 
across the USA. It considers the effect of childcare, as well as 
inter-dependent variables of childcare environments, home 
environments and child characteristics (NICHD Early 






1992–1999  307  A retrospective longitudinal study designed to consider the 
effects of early childhood provision on children’s 
competencies, including literacy, mathematics and problem 
solving to age 12. Academic and social data were first 
collected when the children involved were five years old 





USA  1993–2000  826  Based on 398 centres (evenly distributed between profit and 
non-profit) in four states varying in licensing requirements. 
Data on quality collected on two classrooms randomly chosen 
from each centre. Children were followed for four years 
starting near the end of their next-to-last pre-school year 






England  1997–2003  3000  A prospective longitudinal cohort study of children drawn from 
randomly selected pre-school settings in England. The study 
analyses the impact on developmental progress (of children 
from different social and cultural backgrounds who have 
differing pre-school experiences) of duration and quality of 
early childhood education and care, family background, 
ethnicity and social and economic background. It uses a 
value-added, school-effectiveness design to establish the 
effects on the developmental progress of children (Sylva et al. 
2004). 
Source: McQuail et al. 2003:19 
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Table 6.6 Main studies on the effects of out-of-school care 






USA  1990s  585  The sample for this study included birth cohorts (1987 
and 1988) from three cities. The study had two strands. 
The first focused on exploring patterns of out-of-school 
care, in terms of complexity (ie number and type of care 
providers) and number of hours of care and children’s 
subsequent social, behavioural and academic 
adjustments at grade 6. The second strand looked at 
the impact of out-of-school care on children’s 
externalising (eg aggression and delinquency) and 
internalising (eg depression and anxiety) behavioural 
problems at grades 6 and 7. 
Children of the 
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 
(NLSY): choices 
in after-school 
care and child 
development  
USA  1986  390  This study took a sub-sample of parents of children from 
the NLSY to assess the impact of different types of out-
of-school care, including maternal care, self-care and 
other types of formal and informal care. While the 
sample was taken from a longitudinal survey, the 
assessments for this study were only taken on one 
occasion and effects over time were not measured. The 
study assessed the home environment, a range of 
behavioural problems and cognitive development.  
After-school 
activities and the 
development of 
low income 
urban children  
USA  1990s  150  This study focused on low-income urban families. The 
sample of children was followed over two and half years 
and assessed at grades 3, 4 and 5. The study explored 
children’s reports of their own out-of-school activities, 
children’s school performance and adjustment. 
Source: Munton et al. 2001:119–122 
 
6.5.1 Impact of early childhood education and out-of-school care 
 
The Perry Pre-School project was perhaps the first study to produce robust data on 
the effects of early childhood education. The project, which involved a two-year, high 
quality pre-school programme for three to four year olds, was targeted at a very 
disadvantaged group of children. Its aim was to assess the short- and long-term 
effects of early intervention. Data on a range of outcomes was collected at regular 
intervals from children who participated, with the most recent data collected when the 
participants were aged 40. The study has shown that: 
·  the “Perry children” significantly outperformed the control group on various 
intellectual, language and school achievement tests at every stage they were 
assessed; they also outperformed the non-programme children in terms of the 
highest level of schooling completed  
·  these positive educational outcomes were reflected in the economic performance 
of the “Perry children” as they became adults; at every stage of the study they 
were more likely to be found in paid employment and to be earning more than the 
control group 
·  the programme seems to have also played a role in reducing involvement with 
crime; the Perry children were less likely to have been arrested and to have been 
in jail than the control group 
·  according to one of the authors of the study, a cost-benefit analysis indicates not 
only that the return to the public of the initial investment in the programme is 
substantial, but larger than previously estimated, particularly as the latest results 
have shown that the long-term effects are life-time effects (Schweinhart 2005). 
 
While the above study is probably the only one that has provided evidence on the 
lifetime effects of early childhood education on children at risk, the long-term benefits 
of early childhood education for all children, not only those at risk, have been 
reported in other studies conducted in a range of national contexts. For example: 126 
·  evidence from a New Zealand longitudinal study, which assessed children from a 
range of socio-economic backgrounds who had been in early childhood 
education for three years or more, has shown that at age 10 these children had 
higher average scores on key competencies, including literacy, maths, problem 
solving, communication, social skills and motor skills (Wylie and Thompson 2003) 
·  longitudinal research in Sweden, which followed up children until the age of 8–13, 
has shown that children starting early childhood education between 6–12 months 
scored significantly higher on aptitude tests and cognitive outcomes, and got 
more positive ratings from their teachers on socio-emotional attributes than 
children who entered early childhood education later, or who were cared for at 
home (Andersson 1992, Broberg et al. 1997) 
·  in England, a cohort study (the Effective Provision of Pre-School Education or 
EPPE) of children selected from a range of pre-school settings, found that early 
childhood education enhances all-round development of children and school 
readiness, with these positive effects still being evident in the early years of 
primary school (Sylva et al. 2004). 
 
While there is some evidence that school-age children might benefit from formal 
after-school activities that provide a stimulating academic environment, far less 
research has been conducted in this area and the results are less conclusive. A 
review of the evidence from a number of longitudinal studies suggests that, for 
disadvantaged children, the availability of supervised after-school activities can 
reduce the risk of poor adjustment and incidence of problem behaviours, although 
the review did not find any evidence of direct links between out-of-school care and 
academic performance (Munton et al. 2001). 
 
The evidence on the effects of early childhood education also shows that the benefits 
can be greatest for children from disadvantaged groups. 
·  In England, the EPPE study found that disadvantaged children,
55 and boys in 
particular, could benefit significantly from good-quality early childhood education. 
They were more likely to benefit if they attended a setting with a mixed social 
composition, rather than one comprising mainly disadvantaged children (Sylva et 
al. 2004). 
·  Research in the USA has also shown that for some outcomes (maths skills and 
problem behaviours) children whose mothers had lower educational levels (who 
are usually considered to be at risk of underachieving at school) benefited more 
than others from high quality early childhood education, with the positive 
outcomes sustained through second grade (Peisner-Feinberg et al. 2000). 
 
Waldfogel argued that the evidence showed that Nordic countries have been most 
successful in breaking the link between parental disadvantage and children’s 
negative outcomes. Good quality early childhood education has played a key role in 
breaking this link. She concludes that: 
…the hypothesis that universal enrolment into high-quality child care leads to 
more equal outcomes than enrolment into care where the quality is correlated 
with parents’ ability to pay makes good sense. (Waldfogel 2004:4) 
 
6.5.2 Impact of quality and quantity of early childhood education 
 
Research on the effects of early childhood education has consistently highlighted the 
importance of its quality. Positive child outcomes are particularly associated with 
                                                  
55 The factors considered in defining children as disadvantaged included: English not their first 
language; three or more siblings; premature baby/low birth weight, mothers with no qualifications; young 
mother; parental unemployment; sole parenthood; father in semi-skilled/unskilled occupation. 127 
good quality provision, so that children in high quality services are likely to do better 
than children in poor quality provision (Kamerman et al. 2003, Peisner-Feinberg et al. 
2000, Sylva et al. 2004, Wylie and Thompson 2003). A recent review of the effects of 
the quality of provision concluded that: 
The positive relationship between childcare quality and virtually every facet of 
children’s development that has been studied is one of the most consistent 
findings in developmental science… The conclusions derive from experimental 
research of high quality interventions for children at risk as well as from the 
weaker correlation designs that assess a broader range of quality and a broader 
range distribution of children. (Shonkoff and Phillips 2000:313) 
 
The evidence also suggests that even among registered settings that need to comply 
with national regulatory frameworks the quality of provision can vary considerably. 
For example, in New Zealand findings from the Competent Children project have 
shown that high quality early childhood education “was unevenly distributed, a 
distribution which tended to favour children from well-resourced homes” (Wylie and 
Thompson 2003:76).  
 
The EPPE study in England also found considerable variety in terms of quality of 
provision, as well as finding that overall higher quality was positively associated with 
children’s cognitive progress in some key areas (eg pre-reading, early numbers 
concept and non-verbal reasoning). The research also found a clear association 
between different aspects of quality and child outcomes, for example: 
·  settings with high scores on the “social interaction”, “adults working together” and 
“language reasoning” sub-scales of the Early Childhood Environmental Rating 
Scale
56 were particularly likely to be associated with positive cognitive outcomes 
·  high scores on positive adult–child interaction were related to better pre-reading 
progress; conversely poor scores on this dimension of quality (eg detachment, 
punitive behaviour) were associated with poorer progress in pre-reading and 
early number concepts (Sylva et al. 2004). 
 
Research also shows that the age at which children start attending early childhood 
education can affect outcomes. 
·  Research in Sweden has shown that children who started early childhood 
education before the age of one did better in all school subjects, had more 
developed social skills and adjusted more rapidly at school than children who 
started early childhood education later (Andersson 1992). 
·  Evidence from New Zealand shows that the longer children are in early childhood 
education, the better their motor and early maths skills (Wylie and Thompson 
2003). 
·  Evidence from the EPPE study in England shows that an early start (before the 
age of three) is associated with better intellectual development. However, full-
time participation did not appear to lead to greater benefits than part-time 
attendance (Sylva et al. 2004). 
 
6.5.3 Assessing quality  
 
As argued by Mooney et al. (2003), measures used to assess the quality of provision 
can be classified into a number of broad categories, including structural features, 
processes and outcomes. Structural features relate to measures such as staff 
                                                  
56 The Early Childhood Environmental Rating Scale is one of the most commonly used observational 
measures for describing the characteristics of childcare settings. It includes 43 items divided into seven 
sub-scales: space and furnishing, personal care routines, language and reasoning, activities, social 
interactions, organisation and routines, and adults working together (Sylva et al. 2004). More information 
about this is provided in the next section. 128 
qualifications and training, staff working conditions and pay, group size and staff:child 
ratios. Process measures attempt to explore what happens in the settings, the range 
and nature of activities children engage in, and the interactions between children and 
between children and adults. Various measures of child outcomes were explored in 
the previous section; assessments of parents’ satisfaction with the service can also 
be included. 
 
While it is possible to identify these broad dimensions of quality, which are likely to 
feature in most quality assessments, the approaches used to assess the quality of 
provision can vary considerably, largely reflecting how quality is conceptualised and 
defined in different national contexts. For example, in Nordic countries, children, 
parents and staff develop both the quality objectives for the service and the ways 
progress towards these objectives should be assessed (Mooney et al. 2003). In 
English-speaking countries, standardised observation scales are a common means 
of assessing the quality of provision, of which perhaps the best known and more 
widely used observation scales are the Environmental Rating Scales. The latter 
include a series of four scales that share the same format and scoring system but 
vary considerably in requirements, with each scale assessing a different age group 
and/or type of setting. We now provide a brief explanation of the Infant/Toddler 
Environmental Rating Scale-Revised Edition (ITERS-R), which is used to assess 
provision for children from birth to 30 months. Further details about this series of 
scales and instructions for their administration can be found on the website of the 
FPG Child Development Institute, the University of Carolina at Chapel Hill 
(www.fpg.unc.edu).  
 
Through the scoring of a setting on a number of quality dimensions, the ITERS-R 
aims to assess provision in relation to the protection of children’s health and safety, 
appropriate stimulation through language and activities, and warm and supportive 
interaction. The ITERS-R includes 39 items that are organised into seven sub-scales: 
space and furnishings, personal care routines, listening and talking, activities, 
interaction, programme structure, and parents and staff (see table 6.7). 
 
An observation of a setting for at least two hours is needed to complete the ITERS-R, 
but a longer observation is strongly recommended – in practice this typically requires 
around half a day. There are certain parts of the day that need to be observed to 
complete specific items (eg arrivals and departures, outdoor play, snack and 
lunchtime, nap time) and this may have a bearing on the number of hours assessors 
need to spend in each setting. 
 
In terms of the skills required to administer the ITERS-R, some familiarity with and 
knowledge of early years’ provision is an advantage but not essential; with the 
appropriate training researchers from a variety of backgrounds can carry out 
observations. A fairly comprehensive training programme would require 3–4 days and 
include practice visits and extensive feedback.  129 
 
Table 6.7 ITERS-R sub-scales and items 
Space and furnishings  
1. indoor space 
2. furniture for routine care and play  
3. provision for relaxation and comfort 
4. room arrangement for play 
5. display for children 
Personal care routines  
6. greeting/departing  
7. meals/snacks  
8. nap  
9. diapering/toileting 
10. health practices 
11. safety practices 
Listening and talking  
12. helping children understand language 
13. helping children use language 
14. using books 
Activities  
15. fine motor 
16. active physical play 
17. art  
18. music and movement  
19. blocks  
 
20. dramatic play 
21. sand and water play 
22. nature/science 
23. use of TV, video, and/or computer 
24. promoting diversity  
Interaction 
25. supervision of play and learning 
26. peer interaction 
27. staff–child interaction 
28. discipline  
Programme structure  
29. schedule 
30. free play 
31. group play activities 
32. provisions for children with disabilities 
Parents and staff 
33. provisions for parents 
34. provisions for personal needs of staff 
35. provisions for professional needs of staff 
36. staff interaction and cooperation 
37. staff continuity 
38. supervision and evaluation of staff 
39. opportunities for professional growth 
 




This final section considers the possible implications of the review on child outcomes 
in terms of guiding the research to evaluate the WFF programme in New Zealand.  
 
The findings on the correlates of child poverty and other negative child outcomes 
show the complex interplay of factors that need to be taken into account when 
exploring if and how policy intervention can make a positive contribution to children’s 
wellbeing and life chances. In relation to parental employment, the findings presented 
earlier show that in assessing the impact this has on children, it is important to 
differentiate between various aspects of parental employment. For example, how 
many hours parents work and when, what type of jobs they do and how much they 
earn, as all these variables affect a range of child outcomes. As well as maternal 
employment (which has been the focus of most research so far), it would be useful to 
explore how paternal employment and (resident and non-resident) fathers’ 
involvement in caring for their children might impact on child outcomes.  
 
The results discussed earlier suggest that more research is needed to understand if 
and how sole parenthood might affect child outcomes, independently of poverty. They 
also indicate that an analysis that focuses on whether children at a particular point in 
time live with one or two (natural or step) parents might not be sufficient to provide 
the full picture. The effects of living in reconstructed families must also be 
considered, as previous (as well as current) experiences of living in a sole-parent 
family must also be taken into account. 
 
While not much research has been conducted on the effects of ethnicity and teenage 
parenthood on child outcomes, evidence available indicates that these factors need 130 
to be taken into account when considering if and how policies might affect children 
from these groups. An exploration of these groups could indicate, for example, that in 
order to be effective policy intervention might need to be better tailored to their 
specific needs and circumstances. 
 
The evidence also suggests that when looking at the impact on children of welfare-to-
work policies, it is important to explore variations between children from different age 
groups. Some would argue that variations between girls and boys should also be 
considered, although the evidence on this is less conclusive (Morris et al. 2001). The 
studies reviewed in this section have relied on parents and, in some cases, teachers 
to provide data on children. However, consensus is growing that it is important to 
explore the perspectives of children and young people when assessing how policies 
affect their lives. Information collected directly from children and young people could, 
for example, help explain differential effects on children and young people at different 
ages and life cycle stages. 
 
Finally, both the quality and quantity of the non-parental care that pre-school children 
receive is likely to have a considerable impact on key child outcomes. All the 
evidence suggests that in assessing the range of factors that influence children’s 
lives, it is important to consider: 
·  if children have been in non-parental care  
·  at what age this started  
·  whether they were in non-parental care full-time or part-time 
·  in what settings children were cared for (eg at home by informal carers, in 
regulated family care, in an early childhood education centre)  
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